MATES

MULTI AGENCY TRAINING EXIT STRATEGIES
FOR RADICALIZED YOUTH

NATIONAL REPORT SPAIN

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NATIONAL REPORT

In Spain, by the end of 2017, there were 150 persons in prison because of jihadist violence, with a usual age between 21 and 26 for suffering radicalization linked to this violence, and 9 adolescents (<18) having been detained for these motives in the 2013-2017 period (Vicente 2018). What makes the problem very complicated, however, is not those 150 detainees (a small number, when compared to other crimes, in a context with among the lowest homicide rates in Europe),[1] but the lack of knowledge about the blurred processes and trajectories that, first, make normal young people to sympathize with violent jihadism; second, make those sympathizers to consider themselves ready to participate in violent jihadism; and, third and still more puzzling, feed the external and internal dynamics that trigger and lead them step by step to commit a terrorist attack. To put the problem in perspective and avoid alarmism, it is always worth keeping in mind McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) advice: "individuals with radical ideas are 100 times more common than individuals involved in radical action; targeting ideas rather than actions multiplies the enemy by a factor of a hundred". The Muslim community living in Spain is around 2 million, those estimated as sympathizers to violent jihadism are around 5000 persons,[2] and, as said, the jihadist detainees are 150.

The topic is full of uncharted territories and grey zones, with leading research on both radicalization and deradicalization at a very early stage, with no reliable evidence about the outcomes of different programs across European countries, even skepticism among some experts about the possibility and degrees of deradicalization, and with no wide consensus about the relative importance of cultural, identity, psychological and socioeconomic factors in the processes of radicalization, and, consequently, in deradicalization.

In what follows, we explore how the Spanish probation institutional context and its professionals are dealing with these issues, to orient about how they assess the main knowledge and tools available to them in their day-to-day practice, and which are their main urgent capacitation needs in their efforts to contribute to the deradicalization and reintegration of young people with links to violent jihadism.

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[1] In Spain the annual homicide rate per hundred thousand inhabitants was 0.6, a very low rate when compared to 1.3 in France, 1.4 in Finland, 5 in in the USA or 30 in Brasil (Spanish Ministry of Interior 2018, Elpais.es 161218)

[2] Reinares LV 29112017

1. Background on National contexts:

- Anti-Radicalisation National Programs and level of implementation.

Stop Radicalismos campaign. A 2015 action plan based on public-private partnerships; favouring collaboration between police, several civil society actors and religious authorities; with a counter-narrative campaign, a counter-radicalization website and a nationwide hotline (Dolz 2015). The strategy was focused mainly on security and detection, and led by the government with all information sent directly to the CITCO (the Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and Organized Crime) (Koehler 2017), with less attention given to reintegration or rehabilitation of former violent extremists.

- National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalization (PEN-LCRV) *(Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LRV)*), 2015:

Created by the Intelligence Centre against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) in 2015, involving 12 ministries, Police, Guardia Civil y CNI, CITCO, FEMP y Fundación Pluralismo y convivencia. Its objective is the prevention of jihadist radicalism and its early detection, with special attention given to non-police actors & non-legal procedures in rehabilitation and reinsertion. It is based on the coordination of local groups, dependent on the local government, and integrated by social workers, schools, local police, courts and social entities. The aim is to create a space where the educational, health, welfare and social community meet periodically with officials, security and justice experts of the municipality to exchange information and to assess and manage these "early warnings". At the head of these groups there will always be a representative of the National Police.

 In August of 2017, it was only applied in 13 Spanish municipalities, and it has received criticisms on: being mainly involved in early detection and channelling to competent actor/institution; having inter-territorial coordination problems across local/regional/national administrations; and having to improve the co-ordination between local actors: social workers, teachers, police, NGOs, Muslim communities. According to some interviewees, much needs to be done as well in information, transparency, and public assessment, with technical inputs such as software to introduce and share information, still not well developed.

- Procedure for the Detection of Islamist Radicalization *Protocolo de prevención, detección e intervención de procesos de radicalización islamista* PRODERAI

At the regional level, in Catalonia, there is the Procedure for the Detection of Islamist Radicalization - Criminal Execution, which facilitates the indicators that allow the identification of radicalization processes in penitentiary centres, and which has been implemented since 2016 in all Catalan prisons. It is based on the training of prison service professionals and the

exchange of information, and it establishes the creation of a specific unit responsible for monitoring and evaluating cases. It has been criticised for applying the same treatment to those convicted of terrorism crimes as to those inmates over whom there are merely suspicions of radicalization. There is no specific protocol for the area of alternative measures to deprivation of liberty or in relation to minors.

- Catalan protocol for Prevention, Detection and Intervention in Radicalization Processes in Education Facilities PRODERAI in education. "*Protocol de prevenció, detecció i intervenció de processos de radicalització islamista*" (PRODERAI)

Led by the Education and Interior Catalan Departments, since 2016, it includes: training of schools directors; periodic meetings including teachers, educational and police civil servants; recommendations to prevent risk factors; presenting Muslim role models. A territorial coordinative body monitors and assesses the protocol, and it meets every 3 months to share experiences and observations. Then, the Catalan police (Mossos) decide, according to the degree of risk, to assign the cases to education personnel, social services, DGAIA (Catalan authority for youth and children), or even police.

After one year, a transparent public assessment is pending yet, with no information about actual cases. Several authors have stressed the protocol is strong on: "Interculturality", diversity, tolerance and fighting islamophobia; involving the local contexts, administrations and associations; and focusing on prevention and early detection.

However, critics claim there is little involvement of Muslim communities. Actually, several Muslim actors have severely opposed to this initiative, its only focus on jihadism, and potential stigmatization effects. Civil society actors, Muslim representatives and experts have also criticized the potential criminalization of Muslim young people in the educational environment, or the unintended role given to what might be cultural prejudices. The 2017 report of the Catalan ombudsman, the *Sindic de Greuges*, also called for attention to be paid to these issues. Some interviewees claimed the protocol followed a rhetorical use of interculturality and diversity, without any tangible commitment to give symbolic value and institutional recognition to Muslim culture, nor to a higher presence of Arabic language and culture in formal education curricula, or finding some "prestigious" context for religious education.

Besides, there are doubts about possible theoretical and conceptual deficits. Experts on radicalization have argued that radicalization processes often take place after YP leave education. So far, we could not get any empirical evidence on radicalization/deradicalization in Catalan schools.

- Intervention and Treatment Program on Religious Radicalization Processes (*'Programa de Intervención y Tratamiento de Procesos de Radicalización Religiosa'*). Saladino Project

The Saladino Project was created at the national level in 2016, it is led by the General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions, and is based on Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services regarding radicalization and violent extremism from the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b), and on the own Spanish experience in dealing with Basque terrorists. The project complements the existing security measures in the penitentiary area for the prevention of radicalization, and its main objectives are to prevent radicalization in prisons, and the re-education and social reinsertion of Muslim inmates already radicalized or in risk of radicalization. By 2017, the program focussed on 241 Muslim inmates (there are around 7000 Muslim inmates in Spain, more than 10% of the total prison population in Spain (<60000), more than twice the % of Muslim population living in Spain (<5%), which, demographic factors aside, is one of the main indicators about the vulnerable situation of many Muslim persons living in Spain UCIE 2016).

The program divides the prisoners into 3 groups:

- Group A: from 47 in 2014 to 149 interns in July 2017. Those already sentenced, in pre-trial detention, and in temporary custody for links with jihadist terrorism.

- Group B: from 9 in 2014 to 35 interns in 2017. Not in prison for jihadist terrorism, but already involved in indoctrination and diffusion of violent jihadist ideologies.

- Group C: 87 interns in July 2017. Potential recruitees, many of them are 1.5 and second generation immigrant young Muslims in prison for minor common offences.

For groups B and C, the plan is mainly based on group interventions; for A, the plan intends intense and individual intervention. There are common measures for the three groups: work on the interpretation of religion and ideals, learnning Spanish, and improving the educational level and cultural integration. Some measures are compulsory (security), others are voluntary (reintegration), and depending on the group they are targeting (A, B or C) the treatment includes [3] :

- For Group A (13 steps in 2 phases). Intense and individual intervention in order to reject violence and dissociate from the organization, covering: self-analysis, religious beliefs

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[3] From interviews and: https://www.acaip.es/es/noticias/medios-de-comunicacion/6346-interior-activa-un-plan-secreto-para-desradicalizar-a-228-presos-yihadistas

https://www.vozpopuli.com/actualidad/programa-psicologico-Interior-desradicalizar-yihadistas_0_974003652.html

https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/09/01/actualidad/1504288960_939227.html; http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Fracasa-Plan-Desradicalizacion-presos-yihadistas_0_2973902589.html

assessment, resentful emotions awareness, self-esteem, values, empathy with non-Muslims, cognitive restructuring, personal and prosocial goals.

- For Groups B and C (19 steps in 3 phases). The treatment is made of joint and continuous intervention in order to modify the psychosocial variables of risk; improve empathy, self-esteem and personal autonomy. It places a strong stress on cultural pluralism and strategies to recognize and cope with indoctrination and pressure tactics from recruiters.

Agents involved:

- Officials. 300 civil servants were expected to participate in the program. They prepare a periodic report about the evolution of prisoners and send it to the State security bodies for a data analysis. Civil servants are trained to better detect radicalization signs (clothes, dress habits, physical appearance, religious practices, diet, attitudes to alcohol, modern music, personality changes…), even if these signs could also be absent because of *taqiya*.

- Moderate imams, to work on the interpretation of religion. However, by 2017, there were only around 15 imams and 17 Arabic translators for 7000 Muslim inmates in 83 prisons.

- Muslim support interns. They must meet certain requirements, such as having a good command of Spanish and not having penalties in their prison file. They receive training in basic strategies of persuasion and dialectics.

We were unable to get detailed information about budget, qualification of professionals, specific instructions for the personnel involved, detailed guidelines, intensity and temporalities of treatment (1 year, less, more? nº of hours and frequency of both individualized and group sessions). The authorities (General Direction of Penitentiary Centres) claim the plan offers some positive signs in early detection, avoiding violent incidents, and that 8 inmates have started to recognize their involvement in jihadism in judicial court. However, by the end of 2017, ACAIP (Penitentiary professionals Association) spoke of no advancement in terms of deradicalization or substantial implementation, with only 28 inmates showing any interest in this voluntary treatment program. Some professionals working in prisons show scepticism about the actual possibilities of any deradicalization initiative in the short medium term (< 3 years). Besides, there are no public evaluations or known results about this intervention, with several sources doubting its efficiency, and by April 2018, only 10 inmates had participated in the program.[4] This very low participation was already a problem with the Nanclares Plan for

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[4] Interviews and

https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/09/01/actualidad/1504288960_939227.html;
http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Fracasa-Plan-Desradicalizacion-presos-yihadistas_0_2973902589.html
https://elpais.com/politica/2016/11/29/actualidad/1480445877_689530.html

Basque ETA terrorists, which was a reference for the Saladino project, and where only 20 inmates participated.[5] Moreover, given the lack of documentation about its implementation, we could not check to what extent this initiative had followed the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, with its 25 core principles of organizational and political integrity designed to ensure effectiveness, among them the inclusion of several actors, and efforts on vocational training. Actually, according to some interviewees, Spanish home office is choosing summary expulsion of jihadists exiting prison, out of fears that deradicalization is not working that well.

- *Terrorism Law and Law Enforcement.*

Between 2013 and 2017, there were more than 40 police interventions against the EI (Reinares y García Calvo 2017), and 150 detainees. But not all detainees ended up in prison. In 2016, around 80% of detainees because of jihadism entered in prison. [6] There are 8-10 alarms a day about Islamic violence suspicions, 23% of them receive police attention. Barcelona is a main area of interventions.

- *Probation systems and intervention approaches with young persons in probation.*

Given the decentralized structure of the Spanish administration, we must distinguish between those matters whose exclusive competence is of the central State and those which are competence of the Autonomous Communities.

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http://www.interviu.es/reportajes/articulos/la-yihad-campa-en-las-prisiones/

https://elpais.com/politica/2017/12/13/actualidad/1513188136_530020.html

[5] Interviews and

https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/09/01/actualidad/1504288960_939227.html;
http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Fracasa-Plan-Desradicalizacion-presos-yihadistas_0_2973902589.html
https://elpais.com/politica/2016/11/29/actualidad/1480445877_689530.html

http://www.interviu.es/reportajes/articulos/la-yihad-campa-en-las-prisiones/

https://elpais.com/politica/2017/12/13/actualidad/1513188136_530020.html

[6] http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-justicia-espanola-condeno-2016-ocho-cada-diez-yihadistas-juzgados-201702200214_noticia.html

Criminal Justice System

Adults

Legislative competency	Executive competency
Central Government	Autonomous community Government (only Catalonia)

Minors

Legislative Competency	Executive Competency
Central Government	Autonomous community Government

In the Spanish judicial system, there are Victim Assistance Offices –run by the Administration-, which offer care, support and guidance to the victims of a crime. However, there is no equivalent in the case of offenders who instead depend on public organizations or on the NGO that offer such services. In the case of minors, they have the right to affective and psychological assistance at any time during the process, as well as the assistance of the services of the technical team assigned to the Court.

During the judicial process, a psychological examination of the defendant can be carried out by the forensic doctors, psychologists and social workers integrated in the Administration of Justice, when the judge requests it. In the case of minors, at the beginning of the process, the Prosecutor must request the technical team to prepare a report on the psychological, educational, family and social situation of the minor and to propose a socio-educational intervention on the minor. This report is not binding for the judge, but if the socio-educational measures are imposed, the technical team is responsible for its implementation.

Once the sentence has been pronounced by the judge, prisons, management services of alternative measures to the deprivation of liberty, juvenile centers (and public or private entities that collaborate in the execution of the measure) have multidisciplinary teams that must be in charge of the reinsertion and rehabilitation of the subject through the development and monitoring of an individualized treatment program.

Spain. Distinction between probation and parole

Probation.	Parole.
Security measure (alternative measure to the deprivation of liberty or post-penitentiary).	Suspension of the penalty (post-penitentiary measure).
It consists of the acceptance of certain measures (obligation of location, obligation of periodic presentation, prohibition of approach, residence or communication, participation in training programs or medical treatment, etc.)	Early release of the inmate subject to the obligation not to commit new crimes + following certain controls.
PROBLEM: It is a supervised freedom without a guard (no regulation of the probation officer)	In addition, in terrorism cases: -They must show unequivocal signs of having abandoned terrorist ends and means -They must also have actively collaborated with the authorities.
Execution Penal Management Services and alternative measures (Spanish system) alternative measures execution delegate (Catalonia) "Open regime" technician (in the case of minors, both in Spain and Catalonia)	Execution Penitentiary Social Services technicians (Social Integration Centre) (Spanish penitentiary system) Penal enforcement Services technicians (Catalonia).

2. **Assessment activities**:

a) Description of activities

   Interviews:

   The following interviews took place between April 2017 and July 2018 with a duration between one and two hours, averaging at 95 minutes.

   Directors and senior managers

   1 Secretary General for Equality, Immigration and Citizenship, Government of Catalonia

   2. Deputy Director of Rehabilitation Programs at Prison Services of Catalonia

3. Deputy Director of the Catalan Community Supervision Service

4. Security and Prevention office manager Barcelona Local Government

5. Senior Manager in Correctional Services

Probation officers (social workers, psychologists, and equivalent…)

6. Probation officer 1 (Barcelona ciudad Justicia)

7. Probation officer 2 (Barcelona ciudad justicia)

8. Probation officer 3 (Barcelona ciudad justicia)

9. Probation officer 4 (Martorell)

10. Probation officer 5 (Martorell)

11. Probation officer 6 (Maretorell)

12. Probation officer 7 (rehabilitation program Barcelona minors)

13. Probation officer 8 (rehabilitation program Barcelona)

14. Probation officer 9 (LLobregat)

15. Probation officer 10 (Llobregat)

Muslim representatives

16. Secular Muslim organization representative (journalist, manager)

17. Secular Muslim organization representative (director)

18. Secular Muslim organization representative (social worker)

19. Muslim organization representative (spokesman)

20. One of main Barcelona Mosque directive representative 1

21. One of main Barcelona Mosque directive representative 2

Psychologists

22. Psychologist expert in deradicalization 1

23. Psychologist expert in deradicalization 2

24. Psychologist rehabilitation programs

25. Psychologist rehabilitation programs

Police officers

26. Police inspector working in deradicalization 1

27. Police inspector working in deradicalization 2

Focus groups

- 2 of them in 23 February 2018 and 20 April 2018, including probation officers, social workers, psychologists and professionals from Catalan Rehabilitation Programs and Community Supervision and Prison Services.

Pilot testing

- 31ST OF MAY 2018, 16 assistants

National event,

- 6th of JULY, 33 assistants

b) Assessment of Probation services

- *Profile of target group (young persons in probation).*

The number of underage youngsters (<18) with links to violent jihadist extremism in Spain is very few. Between 2014 and 2017, only 17 were investigated by the National High Court (Audiencia Nacional), the competent body in jihadist terrorism. 8 of them were convicted. They have received flexible sentences, including removal from negative environments, internment periods in rehabilitation centres, even deradicalization initiatives (but not systematized programs). We could not get the information about how many underage young people were investigated by the security forces and the Juvenile Prosecution Service, but, as said, only 17 were taken to court between 2013 and 2017.

Still, more than 50% of the 233 detainees until 2017 because of violent jihadism were under 30 years of age, and more than 50% of them entered radicalization processes linked to violent jihadism before they were 25, 36% of them before they were 19 (Reinares y García-Calvo 2016, 2017, 2018). These are small numbers, but the situation gets

complicated if we consider that there are estimations of around 5000 persons in Spain who sympathize with violent jihadism (there are estimations of between 10000 and 18000 for France), [7] and it is very difficult to say which tiny fraction of those may at some point consider themselves ready to participate in violent extremism, and, precisely, what may trigger the processes that lead them step by step to commit a terrorist attack. According to several experts and Spanish professionals who have been in contact with persons investigated because of jihadism, violent radicalization could be fast, and very difficult to predict, and, thus, prevent-. At the same time any prevention policy needs to be aware of McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) advice:

> *"Individuals with radical ideas are 100 times more common than individuals involved in radical action; targeting ideas rather than actions multiplies the enemy by a factor of a hundred"*

Among the detainees in Spain since 2013, around 52% are first generation migrants from Muslim countries (mainly from Morocco), 42% are second generation with Muslim origins (mainly from Morocco), and 6% with no migrant origin (Reinares & García Calvo 2017, 2017b). This is an important change when compared to the former decades, when, between 1996 and 2012, only 4.8% of jihadist detainees in Spain were born in Spain. 15.8% of all detainees were women.

The large majority of detainees were involved in groups and cells, with "lone wolfs" being rare in Spain –only 10% of detainees showed solitary involvement (Reinares y García-Calvo 2017). In the Spanish case, the main trajectories of radicalization involve face-to-face reiterated personal contacts –combined or not with online contact- with a radicalization agent; and preexisting social bonds within neighbourhood, friendship or family contexts with recurrent interactions between close peers, friends or family groups in specific locations (neighborhood, meeting place, prison,..) (Reinares, García-Calvo y Vicente 2017). These violent radical group formation processes are very frequent across Europe (Roy 2017). Roy also points out that the over-representation of siblings is something unique to jihadism, not present in extreme left or extreme right radicalization.

In most Spanish cases, the role of the recruiting agent has been determinant. In the words of J, a young detainee because of jihadism

"We befriended each other. He told us about the rewards if you die in jihad. We would train, run. He told me not to tell anyone. He also talked of money, women..."[8]

As to the education and employment trajectories of those involved in violent jihadism there is no detailed evidence, and what there is may lead to contradictory assessments. It is unclear up to which point detainees may come from vulnerable socioeconomic backgrounds, and it is even more confusing to guess the influence of the socioeconomic experience in the decisions to become violent. Cultural, identity and sense of belonging issues may play a more important role. Despite these general features, professionals claim that prevention, detection and deradicalization gets further complicated by the diversity of the individual profiles of the young people involved.

- *Intervention strategies with vulnerable young people (agencies and stakeholder involved in Probation intervention systems)*

In Spain there is already a long tradition of multi-agency work that involves main professionals and stakeholders dealing with reintegrating former convicts and probationers, and this is even more so in the case of young people. The key professionals working in probation keep contacts and communication with most of the main actors and stakeholders who can offer crucial support in favouring reintegration. However, many of those professionals interviewed and many of those who participated in the pilot testing, miss a higher formalization and standardization of multi-agency procedures. According to some of them, there is often the sensation that with each case everything has to start from scratch. This is more evident in the case of persons with links to violent jihadism, a relatively recent situation. Still, by combining previous experience in treating other forms of violent extremism, with the new challenges of deradicalizing violent and potentially violent jihadists, as happens elsewhere in Europe, there are great opportunities to design and implement efficient multi-agency efforts.

When designing rehabilitating programs for persons linked to jihadist violent extremism, probation professionals miss more knowledge about several issues. The most mentioned of them were: the motivations behind radicalization, the different steps in the radicalization process, the levels of commitment to terrorist views, the very different profiles they need to deal with, and how these former issues should guide the reintegrating efforts.

Starting with the motivations behind extremists' decisions and views, we know little more than there seems to be complex interactions between affective (belonging), pragmatic (material) and ideological (political) motivations (Rabasa 2010). This calls for multi-dimensional deradicalization programs with several actors and stakeholders involved

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[8] From ElPais https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/04/16/eps/1492293912_149229.html

(Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, Marsden 2017, Koehler 2017,) to include a range of answers that cover and reorient the different ways in which former extremists deal with these essential needs.

Once immersed in the implementation of rehabilitation initiatives, probation professionals want more precise guidance about the signs that link narrative and behavioural evidence to a proper assessment of the level of radicalization; or more precisely, to the level of engagement with violent views, intentions and acts. The literature on the levels of radicalization and radicalization models, identify main steps in violent radicalization (Sageman 2004, 2008; Moghaddam 2005 "staircase" model; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008 "pyramid" model; Baran 2008 "conveyor belt" model), showing a variation in the typologies that has to be taken into account for whatever catalogue of possible deradicalization treatment plans and programs. The processes leading to violent radicalization are explained in these models as a succession of steps that take from discontent with subjective and objective unsatisfactory personal and social situations, through several intermediate steps, to violence and terrorism. The intermediate steps include dynamics such as: internalizing biased explanations about the main causes of these realties (subjective/objective injustices); growing scepticism towards non-violent alternatives of action, which lead to categorical thinking and, in most cases, socialization with other extremists in their inner circles; which, in turn, favours progressive suppression of psychological inhibitions, demonizing others, and, finally, though rarely, could end in violent or even terrorist attacks. The different levels of radicalization and commitment to terrorist views usually correspond to the different steps –see similarities between the models in fig. 1, 2 and 3. The explanatory and summarizing ambition of these models may suggest, however, a gradual and linear evolution that are very far from the truth. Given the psychological and sociological variables at play, the whole processes of radicalization and the correspondences between commitment to certain views and the readiness to act violently, are anything but linear. The steps might be successive, sometimes; but the duration and temporalities in each stage for any individual, or what events or circumstances might trigger the jump from one to the next, are so variable that they scape any schematic modelling, at least at the current level of knowledge. These processes can slow down, speed-up, reverse, re-initiate, ignite or fizzle out depending on factors that, so far, defy our control. Besides, many other times, the steps are not successive at all, and if almost everyone would agree that most radicals are not terrorists, not that many are aware that not all terrorists are radicals (Horgan and Taylor 2011),[9] since religious or ideological radicalization are steps left out by many terrorists.

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[9] Horgan and Taylor (2011) Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research

Fig. 1 The Staircase to terrorism

| Fifth Floor |
| The Terrorist Act and Sidestepping Inhibitory Mechanisms |

Fourth Floor
Solidification of Categorical Thinking and the Perceived Legitimacy of the Terrorist Organization

Third Floor
Moral Engagement

Second Floor
Displacement of Aggression

First Floor
Perceived Options to Fight Unfair Treatment

Ground Floor
Psychological Interpretation of Material Conditions

From Moghaddam American Psychologist 60, 2005

Fig. 2 Pyramid with levels of radicalization

Level of Radicalization

RADICALS
(Illegal/Violent Actors)

ACTIVISTS
(legal/Non-violent Actors, Support Network & Potential Recruits)

SUPPORTERS
(Justify Illegal/Violent Actions)

SYMPATHISERS
(Agree with Cause but not Violent Means)

From McCauley & Moskalenko 2008, figure from Muro 2016

Fig. 3 how does radicalization happen?

How does radicalization happen?

Radicalization is a process that can lead to violent extremism or terrorism.

From EFUS 2017

Consequently, the non-linear, multi-variable, and very diverse processes that lead to violent extremism, are mirrored by the complexities and non-linearity of the deradicalization or disengagement exit trajectories (Barrelle 2015, Koehler 2017).

Hard-core members and those who have carried out terrorist attacks are particularly refractory, or completely unreceptive -according to some experts, to any known deradicalization program. At some point, some of them may disengage, but their exiting routes and their more or less intensive turning points, have not yet been linked to specific responsiveness to programmed interventions. Sometimes an unexpected enthusiasm with an occupational or educational activity; or a new love partner; or a strong emotional disappointment with some members of the extremist group, may favour a drastic personal questioning. But these factors are not open to any treatment planning.

Even for medium and low levels of radicalization, the nature of the topic and the present stage of research, means that any attempts at straightforward guidelines or protocols are tentative efforts, what complicates any purpose of systematizing deradicalization programs. In Koehler words (2017: 33), "desistance-focused intervention have to be designed as long-term oriented and lasting". Taking into account recent understandings of deradicalization, such as Barrelle (2015), there are several areas where work needs to be done to advance in reintegration. Barrelle identifies 5 main domains: social relations, coping, identity, ideology and action orientation. She also defends, in line with other authors (Marsden 2016, Bouzar 2013, Gadd 2006), that full reintegration happens when someone develops meaningful relationships with other people not belonging to the

violent extremist milieu; thus, the importance of favouring pro-social ties and alternative spheres of social participation to develop positive social networks.

This perspective may inform the flexibility needed in multi-agency efforts, and the benefits from the widest availability of different resources and actors. But, at the same time, it requires the possibility to adapt to very different intervention demands in terms of the intensity (number of hours per week), duration (number of weeks, months, years?) and number of actors involved. In this sense, when, for example, thinking of setting up a group of mentors to help via more or less frequent individualized one-on-one conversations with concerned deradicalizing persons; instead of thinking of a few full-time professional mentors, a more versatile solution might be to set up a wide network of different professionals and actors whose work, experience or area of expertise are close to the rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives (in terms of the substance and procedures of their usual practices, among them: psychologists, social workers, teachers, imams, Muslim professionals, police, reintegrated formers, respected Muslim figures…), who, after some short specific training if necessary, could perform as mentors. Then, depending on the changing needs in the deradicalization programs, there should be the institutional and funding possibility to grant these potential mentors and their employer organizations enough leeway in their employment arrangements to redesign their total workload to include this mentorship dedication (e.g. 10-20 hours per month) as part of their total monthly or annual working hours. [10] Flexible provisions like this may offer a wide scope for adaptation and deviations from any modelled plans, such as the presented in fig. 4, that tries to put together evidence from different sources and inputs from interviewees, to speculate about a possible one-year multi-agency plan for a young person (18-30) following an alternative rehabilitation plan to a short prison sentence.

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[10] This idea was particularly stressed and detailed to me by the psychologist Eduardo Bada, who has carried out interesting work in this topic.

Fig 4. ONE YEAR PROGRAM SIMULATION (own elaboration based on RAN 2017a,b; Agershou 2014; Bouzar 2015, 2017; Koehler 2017, Marsden 2017, organizations documentation, interviews)

ACTORS	ONE YEAR INTERVENTION		
	FIRST 3 MONTHS	**REST OF THE YEAR (9 months)**	**TOTAL HOURS INVOLVEMENT (one year)**
MA (Multi-Agency: police, psychologist, social services, mentor…)	Individual case assessment & intervention/exit program Monthly meeting face-to-face	Monthly meeting face-to-face of key actors and stakeholders involved (see RAN 2017 a:11)	12-20 hours per each actor
Social Worker/Case manager	One 1-hour individual interview per week Two-four 1-hour interviews with family members	One 1-hour interview every 2/3 weeks Two-four 1-hour interview with family members every 3-4 months	30-50 hour individual interviews 10-20 family interviews 6-12 MA meetings TOTAL: 50-100 hours
	Interview notes, report writing (every 2-3 months), MA meetings, formal & informal bilateral contacts with other actors, phone calls… A case manager could be responsible for 20-40 individuals		

Psychologist	Initial weeks: four-ten (1-2 hour) Individual Interviews Two-four (1-2 hour) family members interviews One-four (1-2 hour) other actors interviews Reports, tests	Five-twelve 1-hour interviews (2-4 per month¿?) Reports	TOTAL: 20-30 hours
Mentor	Ideally someone with ex-radicalized past, charisma, respected person from similar background and able to make convincing counter-narrative theological and ideological arguments Two-four 2-hour meeting per month Reports, Mentors could be coordinated by consultants, monthly reports		TOTAL: 20-40 hours
Family			
Muslim representatives			
Religious needs	Imams, qualified Islamic scholars… Theological education, discussion,		
Education employment counsellors	Two 2-hour interviews, tests, career services….		TOTAL: 4 hours
Housing, medical needs…			

Associations, group activities (education, sport, arts, political…)	One-two group courses 40-80 hours; same background/mixed backgrounds	
TOTAL		100-150 hours

The intervention presented in Fig. 4 is very specific, but the scope and scale of any real intervention, as said, would be highly dependent on individual needs. Some would need less duration, less intensity; but others may need two or more years. With the estimates included – all of them based on different experts and professionals assessments, plus the mentioned sources-, it is reasonable to expect a total of between 100 and 150 hours of expert time intervention for this supposed individual case in one year. This number of hours, together with non-personnel costs, the cost of participating in the group courses, and the multi-agency meetings, could add up to a total budget for this personal intervention during one year between 8000€ and 12000 € (in 2018 Spanish prices). Such a significant figure would still be under 50% of the estimated cost per inmate per year in the Spanish prison system, which for 2014 was estimated around 22000€ (CE 2015).[11] Besides, Spain has among the highest prison population rate (147.46 detainees on 100.000/ 101.5 in France), even if Spain has one of the lowest crime rates in Europe (EPO 2014, EU 2015), as a consequence of the length of sentences for minor crimes (main form of crime is thefts and robberies, then drugs..), with an overrepresentation of inmates of Moroccan origin –especially among youth (*"a non-resident risks being remanded in custody pending trial even where, in similar circumstances, a resident would not" (COM 2006)*

The need to formalize and systematize as much as possible different probation routs in terms of duration (short, medium and long term) and intensity (hours per week and experts involvement) will increase in Spain significantly in the coming years since a large number of detainees are coming out of prison in the next 5 years with different probation, monitoring and reintegration needs. At the same time, the changes introduced in the Criminal Code with The Organic Law 2/2015 to typify the crimes of passive and self-indoctrination, together with the acts of collaboration with a terrorist group, mean that depending on the interpretation of judges, several young persons may be placed as well in some kind of probation. The understanding of these crimes have been very controverted in Spain, as show the first case of self-indoctrination, with an initial sentence of 2 years by the Spanish National High Court in December 2016, which was later in May 2017 substituted with one of glorification of terrorism by the Supreme Court.

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[11] The cost of prisoner per day in Spain in 2014 was 59.72 €, far away from the European average cost of 102.61 €. Yet the overall budget devoted to the prison system was 1 477 672 749 € well over the European average, which stood at 601 475 996.29 €.

678 Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics SPACE I Prison populations, Survey 2015, p. 120. In Proceedings-Conferences of the Constitutive Project of the European Prison Litigatio Network, The Protection of Prisoners' rights in Europe
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjRg5_6kvreAhU OTRUIHfthDwQQFjAAegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fjournals.openedition.org%2Frevdh%2F4230%3Ff ile%3D1&usg=AOvVaw14t-1YviLCgOT9MmHVDL3v

Several verdicts of terrorist indoctrination and glorification of terrorism include prison sentences that vary from 3½ to 7½ years.[12] For some of these cases, many experts consider that there might be alternatives to prison, at least for some part of the sentence. These alternatives include open regime treatments, supervision, and community work. Last December 2017, for the first time in Spain in a sentence because of glorification of jihadist terrorism, a judge decided to substitute a one year prison sentence with participation in a deradicalization program. [13]

For more serious cases, as membership in terrorist organization, sentences were between 5 and 10 years. But all the sentences because of links with jihadist violence include a period of probation, often longer than 2 years, after exiting prison. There is a serious need, thus, for a typology of profiles with different scales of intervention.

- Sensitivity/awareness about the risk of radicalization

In Spain, by the end of 2017, there were 150 persons in prison because of jihadist violence, a major increase from 41 in 2012.[14] Between 2013 and 2017, there were only 9 adolescent (<18) detainees, but the usual age for suffering radicalization linked to jihadist violence is between 21 and 26, and more than 50% of detainees entered radicalization processes linked to violent jihadism before they were 25, 36% of them before they were 19 (Vicente 2018). Just in 2017, 78 persons were arrested linked to jihadist extremist violence, the second highest number in Europe after France (373 detainees in 2017, no specific data for the UK (Europol 2018). The majority of them have a Moroccan origin (first or second generation). What makes the problem very complicated, however, is not those 150 detainees (a very small number, when compared to other crimes), but the lack of knowledge about the blurred processes and trajectories that, first, make normal young people to sympathize with violent jihadism; second, make those sympathizers to consider themselves ready to participate in violent jihadism; and, third and still more puzzling, trigger and lead them step by step to commit a terrorist attack. To put the problem in perspective and avoid alarmism, in Spain, the Muslim community is around 2 million, those estimated as sympathizers to violent jihadism are around 5000 persons (Reinares LV 29112017); and, as said, the jihadist detainees are 150, with other 76 ordinary inmates suspicious of having become radicalized.[15]

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[12] https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017

[13] https://elpais.com/politica/2017/12/13/actualidad/1513188136_530020.html

[14] Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias.

[15] Spanish Ministry of Interior

Obviously, the prevention and deradicalization efforts oriented to all or some of those 5000 persons, have to be very different from those focused on detainees and/or those who are under police and judge supervision. Besides, given the variety of jihadist profiles, their diverse biographical background, and their degree of radicalization and commitment to violent extremist views; this calls for a huge range of deradicalization strategies in terms of intensity, actors involved and methodologies. So far, the known evidence about Spanish deradicalizaion programs, such as the mentioned *"Program of Intervention and Treatment of Processes of Religious Radicalization"* oriented towards jihadists inmates in penitentiary centres, show little success, with troubles as well in stopping new jihadist recruitments among those imprisoned for common crimes.

In Spain, there is a clear awareness among the relevant actors that radicalization is an issue that has to be dealt with. However, beyond that, there are no uncontroverted ways to reach objective assessments of the actual size of the violence threat; nor about which are the main sources behind these processes, for example, the Spanish debates reflect the opposed views of Roy and Kepel in their stress on, following Roy (2017), the self-destructive nihilism among violent youngsters with delusions of grandeur; or, following Kepel (2016), the influence of radicalized Salafism, as the main reasons behind jihadism; nor there is much consensus about the detailed procedures to try deradicalization of different intensities and durations.

As said before, of a total of 150 inmates because of jihadism by 2017, only 9 were minors, but we could not get the information about how many underage young people were investigated by the security forces and the Juvenile Prosecution Service. Regardless of under which criteria we might consider these numbers big or small, or how to deal with those 5000 persons in Spain who may sympathize with violent jihadism, according to several experts and Spanish professionals who have been in contact with persons investigated because of jihadism, violent radicalization could be fast, and very difficult to predict, and, thus, preventing it. For them is easier to agree, on the one hand, on the main structural policies that are usually linked to the long-term trends of decreasing criminality (education, employment conditions, social integration, intercultural practices); and, on the other hand, on refining the detection mechanisms of verifiable actions and behaviours linked to violent extremism (increase communication and trust between community actors and security forces).

- Information and training needs

Our target public, considered the project very relevant at making use of the current knowledge and research in radicalization, deradicalization and multi-agency. It helped them to identify the main concepts, methodologies, actors and challenges involved in the prevention and deradicalization community efforts. They (probation officers) specially appreciated the material on the involvement of mentors with sound religious knowledge and Muslim

community actors; the stress on alternative narratives and ideological rehabilitation where one-on-one focus is crucial; the role of victims; the stress on early intervention and alternatives to prison; the need to design community answers that involve several actors.

However, this topic is full of uncharted territories, grey and blurred zones, with leading research on both radicalization and deradicalization at a very early stage, with no reliable evidence about the outcomes of different programs, even scepticism among some experts about the possibility and degrees of deradicalization (Marsden 2015)[16], and no significant consensus about the relative importance of identity, cultural and socioeconomic factors in the processes of radicalization (Kepel 2016; Reinares & García Calvo 2017; Roy 2017; Wieviorka 2012, 2015). Therefore, we found ourselves unable to give the precise orientations many of them would like to have access to.

There is much work to do about the following issues

- Clearer indicators and signs about different radicalization levels. There is much to do yet about specifying early sings of radicalization, since at those stages is when deradicalization efforts have more hope to be effective. This line of action, however, as said before, faces the challenge of grounding its assessments in behavioural evidence instead of ideas or verbalizations; and, as any general prevention measures, it needs to be aware about the stigmatization and criminalization risks in dealing with Muslim persons suspicious of any level of radicalization.

- More detailed knowledge about "push" and "pull" factors in moving people away from violence. For example, what is the weight and actual scope for formal educational and employment opportunities in a Spanish context where most young people have serious troubles in finding satisfactory education-employment transitions?

- Clearer indicators and signs about progress in the deradicalization routes. There are no clear metrics yet about what successful reintegration "looks like" (Marsden 2015)

- More information about different profiles of radicalization, and how to deal with them.

- Systematization of several deradicalization strategies depending on radicalization levels and profiles. These different strategies need to include the best possible informed advice on issues such as: duration of internment periods in prison; internment in non-prison centers (halfway houses…); duration and intensity of counselling and reintegration programs while in probation (nº of hours per week, total nº of years); duration and intensity of further monitoring; actors involved; proper balances between individualized treatment/intervention, group activities, and conventional courses; socio-educative tasks; role for victims; Muslim actors involvement. So far, present practices draw a lot from ad-hoc designing and previous experiences with Basque terrorism and extreme-right violence, but there are key issues (misinterpretation of religion, identity issues, minority migrant background, stigmatization risks, socioeconomic obstacles to

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[16] https://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/marsden-deradicalisation/

reintegration…) that are different in violent jihadism, and practitioners miss more knowledge and systematization in these processes.

- Then, how to combine systematization and formalization with the flexibility needs of guaranteeing the highly individualized and personal nature successful treatments are based on, with little space for one-size-fits-all-approaches

- As to the involvement of Muslim communities: increase the current low reciprocal trust between the Muslim community and main institutions, what to do, for instance, with the social distance between mothers and any kind of institutionalized professionals, which is often insurmountable. Besides, given that the Muslim community is not a monolithic actor, with a great variation in perspectives around integration or issues such as which would be the role for religion in this debate, there is an urgent need to institutionally accommodate these different perspectives and taken them into account when designing communication and social dialogue spaces. In this area, a particularly controversial issue is what is the role for non-violent Salafism?, since how to deal with Salafism has become a major challenge in present preventive policies across most European countries (Kepel 2016, Reinares La Vanguardia 280518)

- The different agendas for adults, underage adolescents, and the transitional stage between 18 and 25. The usual age for getting radicalized is between 21 and 26, so most radicalized youngsters are adults in legal terms and the usual procedures in the Spanish legal probation system; however, when considering reintegration and rehabilitation measures for this young people, for example labour market participation or further education, one should not forget that in Spain that age group, 21-26, is mainly dependent on their families (income, housing…), and neither employment nor education are sources of income autonomy for most persons in this age group.

- In the realm of detection and early intervention, much needs to be known to design programs whose implementation have as little stigmatizing effects as possible. For example, how to design protocols and tools that help the work in schools, sociocultural spaces and Muslim organizations. Experiences in Spain in this field are controversial. A major challenge remains: there are no clear indicators to detect early radicalization, what makes very difficult prevention efforts without facing risks of stigmatizing the Muslim populations. Since jihadists show very different profiles, there is also much to learn about radicalization processes, and, thus, about the most efficient deradicalization strategies.

- In supporting reintegration, favouring the capacitation of autonomous personal projects is an area that still requires much development. Much remains to be done in supporting the development of probationers' strengths, skills, agency and values to pursue their goals in pro-social ways (Good Lives Model). Social services, education and community actors often defend an holistic perspective on reintegration (close to Marsden' framework 2017), but there are clear funding gaps –not only in terms of total budget but in the capacities to prioritize different categories of expenditure- and institutional infrastructure weaknesses, confronted by statutory agents and community-based groups who work with persons at risk of becoming

violent or having been already involved in violence, and try to model adaptive relationships, practical support, etc…

- Probation officers and experts also miss advances in the following areas: tools to specify intermediate objectives in the deradicalization process, possibilities of prioritizing funding into different reintegration initiatives depending on typologies, clarifying the responsibilities and involvement of different actors in multi-agency teams; evaluation tools, monitoring strategies; better coordination and harmonization between macro-social, meso-social and micro-social initiatives. For example a nation-wide legislation or a public policy particular funding of employment or education measures (macro-social) could be out of touch with initiatives to support reintegration in specific employment or education environments (meso-social), with detectible impacts on the individual trajectory (micro-social).

- Experts, several probation officers and community actors missed a wider involvement in the deradicalization programs of NGOs that are institutionally independent from the public authorities, especially Muslim NGOs which could get higher trust from potential participants. There are areas where the role of NGOs could definitely increase: exemplify practices of non-violent political participation, sports and recreational activities to expose participants to young people coming from other social groups.

c) Counternarrative approach targeting individuals:

- *What is the message we are countering?*

In Spain, there is a general awareness among the key actors involved in preventing violent radicalization and promoting deradicalization, that the narrative field is a crucial one, that there are several levels and audiences, and that each of them needs a different approach. There is a wide consensus among key actors and experts that alternative narratives are needed to fight the attractiveness of violent jihadist propaganda, especially among young people in transitional stages with identity uncertainties (education-employment transitions, life stage, belonging, overlapping identities…), who are in search for purpose and significance (Atran S 2011, Kruglanski et al. 2014, Volkan 2014), and who might be very tempted by the monolithically straightforwardness and glamourized simplicity of jihadist arguments and group identities. For example, a Spanish psychologist who treated a young person judged for jihadism, compared his indoctrination to how sects follow coercive persuasion or thought reform -"brainwashing". A strong group identity replaces a former weak individual one, often already disturbed in one way or another (compounded by a difficult socioeconomic migratory situation).

Main political and social actors across the different territorial levels from the state to the neighborhood scale, educational institutions, and media; play the most important role in general prevention, and their main challenges are presenting reality without sensationalism,

Manichaeism, oversizing actual threats, nor simplification. Since all these logics are easily reversed by violent jihadism to the opposite effect. Besides any campaign, policy or intervention oriented towards the wider population, large collectives or large target groups, including groups considered at risk of radicalization, need to take particular care to avoid any stigmatization or criminalization effects against the Muslim community, as for example some critics have identified in the British Channel program (Marsden 2016, Koehler 2017, Toboso 2016). Here, words are never enough to make clear that in Spain the detainees linked to violent jihadism are less than 200, a very tiny, tiny fraction of the 2 million Muslim residents; while, to put numbers in context, there are more than 1000 detainees because of gender violence, and a total of around 60000 inmates in Spanish prisons (2017).

As to the practitioners directly working in reintegration, the professionals we talked with, were particularly interested in having tools for individualized one-on-one conversations, and for how to talk to small groups where one could at least presuppose some degree of sympathy to violent jihadism. Here, again, the different levels of commitment to violent jihadism and its rhetoric, change completely the convenience of different strategies, to such an extent, that some actions that might be helpful with some young people just in the very early pre-stages of violent radicalization, or just apparently radicalized –what some professionals called "fallacious radicalization", could be actually counterproductive when used with those more deeply engaged in violent views. For example, having a detailed look at main media news to work a critical perspective against jihadism, may be self-defeating when speaking with heavily radicalized persons, who would dismiss these discussions as usual horse-trading and western manoeuvring.

When working with young persons where there are reasonable expectations to get positive advances in the deradicalization efforts, several professionals stressed the need for more work on things such as:

- A glossary/catalogue of key terms with clear definitions, striking factual evidence, and emotionally gripping accounts of personal experiences, on the main concepts and ideas that violent jihadist propaganda has proved particularly skilful at distorting (war/terrorism, "kamikaze", lone-wolf, terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization, deradicalization, western policies in the Middle East, laicism, religion, discrimination, liberal democracy, justice, freedom, "tawheed", manhood, "ummah", "true life after death", jihad…). We also need better and harmonized definitions across EU of terms such as: deradicalisation, disengagement, desistance, demobilization, deprogramming, rehabilitation, resettlement, reinsertion, reintegration, reconciliation…

- In the interviews, professionals reflected a plurality of views about the relative relevance of socioeconomic, identity, and integration factors, in the radicalization/deradicalization processes. To avoid theoretical and methodological contradictions in the treatment programs, these could benefit from explicitly adopting a cautious argument that assumes how little we know yet about the actual weight of socioeconomic versus personal identities versus cultural integration factors, in the violent radicalization processes. Most experts agree that there are several causes feeding the radicalization processes, but, then, there is no strong evidence

about the relative weight of the different groups of causes, be them socioeconomic, identity, integration or individual psychological issues (González Enríquez 2016, Oliver Roy 2017, Scott Atran 2011, Kepel 2016, Kruglanski et al. 2016, 2014; Rahimi Graumans 2015, Reinares & García Calvo 2015, 2017; Volkan 2014). For some authors, identity elements are gaining relevance, with several experts stressing the role of moral disorientation, nihilism, feelings of belonging to a stigmatized collective, and the search for greater transcendence and significance.

- A more detailed repertoire of arguments and narratives that favour doubts, critical thinking and cognitive dissonance between jihadist rhetoric and realities. This repertoire should include a wide range of arguments mixing different doses of: emotional elements, rational analysis, intelligible and compelling empirical evidence (i.e: thousands of Muslim deaths in jihadist terrorism, since 2000 87% of jihadist attacks were suffered by countries with a majority of Muslim population (Toboso 2016)), irony, humour, non-violent channels for expressing discontent, promoting reasonable expectations and hopes in the future grounded in references of agency, for example: a not very attractive part-time job could be a first step in a long-term better career …). As to the emotional elements, practitioners and professionals working in individualized one-on-one sessions with persons in probation, may benefit from detailed knowledge and tactics to mobilize emotional elements linked to childhood, early memories, sounds, tastes and smells reminiscences, or recovering pleasant activities and hobbies from pre-radicalization times (Bouzar 2014, 2015). When working with "brainwashed" persons, instead of appeals to reason, feelings and emotions could be more effective in trying to reawaken the unconscious, and trigger "rehumanization" moves, with tools close to what Bouzar calls "invoking the Madeleine of Marcel Proust".

- The involvement of the Muslim community. Muslim organizations and mentors can provide key support and reference in a wide range of issues: from showing examples and role models of Muslim life trajectories, and especially young Muslims, who lead exemplar lives in western societies with no conflicts between Muslim values and inter-cultural democracies; to organizations that are politically active in expressing non-violent discontent about issues (Middle East controverted western policies, Palestine, Iraq war, refugees, discrimination,…) usually instrumentalized by violent jihadist propaganda.

- In Spain, there is also much to be done in getting the support of qualified Islamic scholars and imams –there is a scarcity of qualified and trusted imams (less than 20 imams working in the penitentiary system, with very little funding, by 2015, 88% of penitentiary centres lacked any Islamic religion assistants (UCIDE 2016)). There is also the need for mentors with deep knowledge of Islamic religion to explore and talk about religious arguments and their distortions, and to persuasively use theological texts to show factual inaccuracies and contextualize religious messages. The beneficious impact of credible scholars have proved to be very significant (Marsden 2016), helping probationers to grasp new understandings of their religion that actually strengthened their resilience against violent narratives.

- Involving former radicals and defectors from jihadism, even disengaged terrorists, in deradicalization programs (as in the British Channel program) is an area that several experts

and professionals in Spain considered crucial, and where there are experiences with former ETA and extreme-right terrorists. But where, so far, a serious development still needs to be designed and implemented. Formers and defectors, by telling about their own disappointments and unsatisfactory experiences, the banal power and material ambitions of terrorist groups, their grim day-to-day reality, and their corrupted dynamics; might be very helpful in demystifying the glamourized epic of terrorist groups and activities (Koehler 2017, Briggs & Feve 2013). Alcoholics Anonymous-style informal meetings might be helpful.

- The role of mothers of formers and radicalized persons, is other area that Spain is looking to develop, following the examples of Mothers for life (Koehler 2017, Toboso 2018), since the testimonies of mothers' experiences have a strong emotional power to grab an attention, that, otherwise, is often impenetrable to most rational discussions. Besides, mothers can ground their legitimacy straight in the Quran.

- Integration into families and communities have strong impacts on these processes.

- In Spain, the possible role of victims in the deradicalization programs is still to be substantiated in detailed initiatives. To see the real and personal consequences of terrorism is a powerful tool to unlock emotional and cognitive barriers, and Victim-Perpetrator Dialgoue (VPD) has been defended to make participants (persons with former or present links to violent radicalization) to gain empathy, recognizing the suffering of victims and humanizing "others" (koehler 2017) However, VPD programs need special attention to the wellbeing of victims, since there have been reported negative effects on them by some of these programs (Alonso & Bada 2016, Clubb 2016)

- In educational institutions, prevention, alternative narratives and countering islamophobia could be present in coordinated efforts such as the pioneering kif-kif program designed and delivered by The Al Fanar Foundation in several secondary schools around Madrid, which uses the fight against islamophobia as a main tool to prevent radicalization, and increase communication between Muslim and non-Muslim students. A successful activity includes the reading of a comic telling the story of young Muslim girl facing general society prejudices and the conservative ethics of her family. [17] After the reading, including the dramatized reading of some sections, the teenage students participate in 5 50-minutes workshops discussing issues such as identities, islamophobia, gender, fear, cultural stereotypes, non-violent activism. This program will be delivered as well in other Spanish cities (Valencia, Barcelona), and it will also be applied in Molenbeek (Brussels)

- *Who are the messengers? Which are the channels?*

The most recent research on Spanish radicalization processes and the experts interviewed stressed that the key sources and channels leading to radicalization are the physical contact

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[17] http://www.eldiario.es/madrid/islamista-musulman-yihadismo-Al_Fanar-integracion_0_607889628.html

with charismatic recruiting agents –who are active at identifying vulnerable young people prone to violent radicalization, starting a succession of face-to-face interactions, combining one-on-one and group sessions (along the lines of sectarian recruitment); and the existence of pre-existent emotional ties and affective relationships (based on friendship, family or neighborhood bonds) between the members of the terrorist group (Reinares y García-Calvo, 2016; Reinares, García-Calvo y Vicente 2018; Bouzar 2015). These inter-personal relations support "relational recruitment" mechanisms that dissolve the individual identity within the group and puts in place a groupthink set, with usual meeting places being: public spaces, sport facilities, religious sites, private households. This stresses the importance, in deradicalization programs, of facilitating entries into environments and contexts leading towards possible alternative meaningful relationships with non-extremist people. Sometimes it might be easier trying groups predominantly Muslim, but in the long term, this could be combined with intercultural and mixed spheres of social participation.

3. Pilot site selection and Testing phase

We carried out the Pilot testing the 31st of May 2018, with 16 social workers and probation officers working in the area of Barcelona. By 2017, there was no systematized approach to dealing with probationers related to violent jihadism in Spain. Probationers with jihadist links in Spain, still are very isolated cases, dispersed across the national territory; though in the next 5 to 10 years, there will be an important number of present jihadist detainees coming out of the penitentiary centres with the obligation to follow probation for several years, since all recent Spanish sentences for jihadist violence include long post-internment periods of probation, often more than 2 years. In our knowledge, the closest thing to a deradicalization program taking place in Spain is the Intervention and Treatment Program on Religious Radicalization Processes ('*Programa de Intervención y Tratamiento de Procesos de Radicalización Religiosa*', *Saladino Project)* described in page 5, but we could not have access to this program, and as said in the report, there is no public documentation about its implementation.

However, after some perseverance, we managed to contact the two probation officers, their team coordinator, and the psychologist involved in the treatment program of two youngsters sentenced for violent jihadism, one of the very few cases in Spain and Catalonia, at some point the only active probation intervention going one linked to jihadism (they were minors when detained, and of legal age at the end of the treatment program). We had long (close to two hours) in-depth individual interviews with each of these professionals, plus they participated as well in 2 group discussions with other professionals and practitioners. In these interviews and discussions we commented in detail most of the toolkit units contents, and they were a main source for this report.

Then, the 31st of May we tested the units with 16 social workers and probation officers working in the Area of Barcelona. Aside from the two probation officers just mentioned, who

worked with the two youngsters linked to violent jihadism, the rest of professionals had no relevant experience of working with persons related to violent jihadism.

In the units presented, they appreciated a good introduction to the main concepts, methodologies, actors and challenges involved in the prevention and deradicalization efforts within a community context. They (probation officers) were particularly interested in the involvement of mentors with sound religious knowledge and Muslim community actors; the stress on alternative narratives and ideological rehabilitation where one-on-one focus is crucial; the role of victims; the stress on early intervention and alternatives to prison; the need to design community answers that involve several actors. However, they missed precise orientations on the different steps, and more detailed descriptions of real case interventions, ideally grounded on best practice already proved successful somewhere else in Europe. Actually, this lack of precise orientations and detailed explanations of best practices (be it the Danish Aarhus experience, the British Channel or the French and German programs), either in the available organizations documentation or in the specialized literature, was a main obstacle for our work before and after the pilot session. In our view, this field of work still misses more specific information and evidence on: clearer indicators and signs about different radicalization levels; clearer indicators and signs about progress in the deradicalization route; several deradicalization strategies depending on radicalization levels and profiles; duration and intensity of counseling and reintegration programs while in probation (nº of hours per week, total nº of years); duration and intensity of further monitoring; actors involved; proper balances between individualized treatment/intervention, group activities, and conventional courses; funding details; guides on one-on-one proactive conversations. As said before, probationers were also concerned with how to deal, in terms of reintegration and rehabilitation, with young people, between 18 and 25, who are of legal age, but belong to an age group which in Spain is mainly dependent on their families (income, housing…).

4. Dissemination activities

- The final Report will be sent to main administrations, civil society actors, professional bodies and stakeholders.

- Website

- National event, 6th of JULY, with 33 assistants including representatives from police, penitentiary centres, rehabilitation administration, probation officers, psychologists, social workers, experts and Muslim organizations.

- Presentation of the project main results in 2-3 national conferences on deradicalization within the 2018-2019 period.

- Forthcoming book in collaboration with other experts working on deradicalization.

- Forthcoming article in an internationally recognised academic journal.

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