



**Raising Awareness and Staff Mobility on Radicalisation
in Prison and Probation Services
(RASMORAD P&P)
Grant Agreement n.723115**

FINAL EVALUATION
10 December 2018

Evaluator: Simona Cavaglieri

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION	
1.1 Context of intervention	7
1.2 Objectives, expected results and activities	9
1.3 The partnership	10
1.4 Financial data	11
2. THE EVALUATION	
2.1 Objectives and methodology	12
2.2 Execution of the project	13
2.3 Findings from evaluation questionnaires	18
2.4 Relevance	
2.4.1 <i>Relevance of the problems</i>	19
2.4.2 <i>Quality of the partnership</i>	20
2.4.3 <i>European relevance of RASMORAD P&P</i>	20
2.4.4 <i>Quality of the project design</i>	21
2.5 Efficacy	
2.5.1 <i>Results gained</i>	22
2.5.2 <i>Objectives achieved</i>	23
2.6 Efficiency	
2.6.1 <i>Internal organisation and external consultants</i>	26
2.6.2 <i>Financial efficiency</i>	26
2.7 Sustainability	
2.7.1 <i>Economic and operational sustainability</i>	28
2.7.2 <i>Changes triggered by the Project</i>	28
CONCLUSIONS	30
ANNEXES	33

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prison Administrations across Europe started to deal with violent radicalisation in prison in the early '90s with an increase in the number of detainees coming from Islamic Countries. Language difficulties and the separation from family and friends sometimes contributed to exacerbate frustration of those detainees who were more likely to develop beliefs in contrast with the society where they lived, refusing its values and laws.

RASMORAD P&P arises from the need to share a sound working basis in addressing violent extremism in prison and on probation across the European Union, giving due consideration to the different sense of urgency that exists among Partner Countries in managing that issue. The Project puts emphasis on a greater knowledge of violent radicalisation by promoting the exchange of the more promising practices actually in place while contributing to the enhancement of a multi-agency and multi-sectoral approach. RASMORAD P&P brings together a broad and varied Partnership including General Directorates and Prison Administrations from 7 different States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania) as well as representatives of the research and non profit making world.

Although project design is based on an extensive analysis of the problem of radicalisation in prison and on probation some inconsistencies in the logical framework do exist:

- (a) in identifying expected results, the improvement of detention condition in open prison regimes can not be considered as an achievable result since none of the project activities is addressed directly to inmates.
- (b) the development of a risk assessment tool to detect and assess violent radicalisation is listed as objective, output, activity and result
- (c) despite the risk assessment tool is pivotal to the success of the action, is not described with sufficient detail in the project document; it is refocused by moving on from an early warning system to a Common Strategy based on a set of shared standards to be applied to risk assessment practices currently implemented by Partner Countries

The Project proves to be highly relevant thanks to areas of intervention and activities that perfectly match the priorities of the Call of Proposal (JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-TERR) issued by the European Commission, while the involvement of Partner States with different experiences in managing radicalisation makes mutual learning genuinely fruitful.

The Project component devoted to the prevention of radicalisation is significant for the identification of trigger and protective factors of violent extremism while the enforcement of measures alternative to detention are consistent with the need of developing viable disengagement and de-radicalisation solutions.


The project shows to be fairly efficient in achieving results and objectives. Result assessment points-out that the improvement of detention conditions in open prison regime (Result 1) was not achieved because of the lack of a targeted involvement of detainees in the project and if present, such involvement would not fall into the scope of the Call for proposal ((JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-TERR).

The elaboration of a common risk assessment tool (Result 2) is partially achieved, despite its scope and purpose as originally conceived, were moderately reduced; Partner States preferred drafting a Common Strategy developed according to a shared set of minimum standards resulting from the review of the most relevant literature on violent radicalisation. This change was driven by the different perception of violent extremism among Partners: if Belgium and France, because of a consistent number of detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised, have already put in place a specific risk assessment tool (VERA 2), in other Partner countries the danger posed by potentially radicalised detainees is usually assessed according to criteria pertaining to strategies applied to other specific categories of inmates (drug addicts, affiliates to organised crime, mentally disabled).


The integrated approach to address violent extremism made it possible a closer inter agency and inter-sectoral cooperation (Result 3). The Common Methodologies on Prevention and de-radicalisation as well as the Common Strategy on Risk Assessment acknowledge the importance of a continuous and timely exchange of information between several actors working in prison and probation services (prison officers, social assistants, teachers, religious leaders and volunteers) in order to verify radicalisation among detainees, avoiding, however the risk of irreversible “labeling”. Although assessing to what extent the Project could influence policy makers in developing and funding specific policies to address violent extremism and disengagement (Result 4) falls into the scope of an impact evaluation rather than a result-based assessment, it shall be presumed that relevance of the partnership and the breadth of data collected might have good chance of influencing national policy making. The objective of improving the risk assessment methodologies on violent radicalisation currently in place in Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania (Objective 1) has been fully met, while the development of an early warning system to detect and prevent extremist deviations among inmates (Objective 2), which should be listed exclusively as output, has been only partly achieved, as shown before. In terms of efficiency RASMORAD P&P’s performance proves to be particularly high: such result is particularly commendable especially considering the large number of partners and outputs that had characterised the project. Project management has been entrusted to 2 different working groups only consisting by internal staff who benefited from a consolidated working synergy gained from past

experiences in managing EU funded projects. Financial management did not experience difficulties and no changes in the overall budget estimate were made, while few uncertainties experienced during the project had been promptly addressed by the EC project officer. RASMORAD P&P shows to be significantly sustainable thanks to a non burdensome outputs specifically intended to provide continuity for the project results; this is the case of the Memoranda of Cooperation and the National Guideline on the dissemination of the project results which may support strengthened cooperation ties between Partner States and enhance multi-sectoral and multi-agency approach among several actors relevant to the violent extremism management. Economic and operational sustainability are underpinned by the complementarity with TRAIIn Training project, a EC funded action promoted by the Italian Ministry of Justice which is currently on going. TRAIIn Training’s financial plan provides for specific budget items aimed to finance the upgrade of the transnational research on violent extremism by broadening its scope and updating sources. The synergy between projects is reflected by the fact that the Common Strategy on Risk Assessment will be implemented by the TRAIIn Training’s Partner Countries in order to develop a working method common to several actors dealing with detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised.

Results gained




Objectives achieved



Outputs produced

	DESCRIPTION OF OUTPUTS	LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION			
		Low	Medium	High	Very high
1	Collection of best practices & methodologies on violent radicalisation in P&P settings	High	High	High	High
2	Early warning system for radicalisation risk assessment	Low	Low		
3	Collection of results from implementation of common risk assessment tool	High	High		
4	Memoranda of Cooperation between participating Countries	On-going			
5	Project website	High	High	High	High
6	National guidelines for the implementation of a national network & helpline	On-going			
7	Monthly newsletters	High	High	High	High

Evaluation results



1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1.1 Context of intervention

Over the past decade European policies on terrorism have been affected and thoroughly revised in light of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that represented a turning point in managing the issue. With the exception of the Palestinian and Pan-Arabic nationalistic terrorism that from 1968 to 1989 had been guilty of long series of hijacking and attacks, the terrorist networks operating across Europe were limited to national territories usually addressing subversive (Italy) or independence objectives (Basque Country, Catalonia, Northern Ireland and Corsica).

The 11 September attacks and those 26 that targeted several European States raised the need to understand the features of the Islamic terrorism and its propaganda. European Union strategy on this issue stressed the urgent need for a closer cooperation between Member States on criminal intelligence while urging for cross-cutting measures to prevent violent radicalisation.

In 2011 the European Commission set-up the *Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)* gathering 4.600 professionals with different expertises in order to share information and experiences which are presumed to be useful to permit an early detection of signs of violent radicalisation. At the moment RAN's experts are divided into 9 working-groups¹ dealing with the many aspects of violent radicalisation. A further crucial element in addressing the issue is the internet control; in July 2015 the European Union set-up within the EUROPOL the *European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU)* with the mandate to identify and remove on-line content that spread extremist ideologies.

However, the internet also represents an important tool to challenge the same terrorist propaganda by forging a new narrative of Islam in accordance with the European values of tolerance and equality. In this context intensive efforts to support social inclusion of marginalised youth have been made by the European Union especially by funding projects through "Erasmus + Program" which involved schools, sporting clubs and prisons. All actions financed by the Program shared the goal of combating the marginalisation of a large section of young population, by teaching them a safe use of the web to avoid becoming an easy target for terrorist propaganda.

In the early '90s with an increase in the number of detainees coming from Islamic Countries, Prison Administrations across Europe started to deal with violent radicalisation in prison. Language difficulties and the separation from family and friends sometimes contributed to exacerbate the frustration of those detainees who became more likely to develop beliefs in contrast with the society where they lived.

1 (i) communication and narrative; (ii) education; (iii) exit strategies; (iv) youth, families and communities; (v) local authorities; (vi) prison & probation (vii) police & law enforcement; (viii) remembrance of victims of terrorism; (ix) health & social care (x) Steering committees.

When presenting a report in 2008, the European Commission Expert Group on violent radicalisation clearly pointed-out how detention could impact on violent radicalisation which can be defined «as an intersection between personal attitudes and an enabling environment²».

In order to distinguish between thought and action the UN *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist and the Prevention of Radicalisation in Prisons* urged a distinction between radicalisation and violent radicalisation. Despite radicalisation process has not a negative connotation in itself, extremist aspirations could represent an important sign which directly or indirectly could lead to terrorist acts. This illustrates the importance to provide for effective early warning tools to detect violent radicalisation; in this regard in the framework of the European Programmes to fight terrorism some interesting initiatives have been taken. This is the case of the Manual “*Community Policy Prevention Radicalisation and Terrorism (CoPPRa)*” developed by the Belgian police in cooperation with the police services of 11 Member States and aimed to support the investigative work of police agents and police officers. Besides providing for definitions, stages and trigger factors for violent radicalisation, it makes available a set of indicators both to detect radicalisation and foresee the preparation of possible terrorist attacks. The Manual contains also a brief profile of the most important terrorist groups with their logos and symbols.

Another Handbook to identify violent radicalisation is the *Terrorism and radicalisation toolkit* (TerRa) that is aimed at a broader audience of users. In addition to police and prison officers, the Handbook is intended for teachers, social workers, journalists, regional and national policy makers, providing them with tailored guidelines that point-out their tasks and responsibilities in identifying possible extremists. Although both Manuals introduces guidelines and indicators that can apply also, but not exclusively to prison, they do not provide for specific tools to detect radicalised detainees. In order to address this shortcoming, *Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA)* was developed; it is applicable both to terrorist organisations and individual actors. Completed in 2009 and then updated in 2010 and 2016, VERA is based on 34 risk indicators divided in 5 sectors focusing on detainee’s personal history covering his/her capabilities, religious and political motivations; it also includes “protective” indicators contributing to mitigate the risk of violent radicalisation. At the moment VERA represents the most common tool used by police and prison services.


2 *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*, A concise report prepared by the European Union Expert Group on violent radicalisation, 15 May 2008.

1.2 Objectives, expected results and activities

The intervention strategy of RASMORAD P&P is based on the exchange of experiences and knowledge among professionals who each in their own field of competence deal with violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. According to the project document this exchange should result in a comparative research on methodologies currently used by Partner Countries in addressing violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. This comparison, pointing-out strengths and weaknesses, is expected to give rise to a common warning tool to identify early signs of violent extremism. The Project is aimed to address violent radicalisation and foster a multi-agency approach and inter-sectoral cooperation. The expected results also include the improvement of detention conditions in open prison regime and provide support for policy-makers in order to establish anti-terrorist policies which take full account of violent extremism and de-radicalisation.

Project activities provides for the realisation of a comparative research involving 7 Partner States and the development of an early warning tool to detect and assess potentially radicalised inmates. This activities are accompanied by 6 transnational workshop arranged under a specific study-visit programme covering 6 different Partner States (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania). It is furthermore foreseen that the radicalisation warning tool developed under the Project frame should be properly tested to check its functioning and then presented to prison and probation professionals through 5 on-line seminars (webinars). According to the project document a dedicated web site with a monthly newsletter are also included as ancillary activities, while the preparation of a Memoranda of Cooperation coupled with national Guidelines on utilisation of RASMORAD P&P outputs are meant to support the dissemination of new schemes to cope with violent extremism.

Table 1: Target groups



1.3 The partnership


The Italian Department for Prison Administration established a partnership bringing together 3 different types of participants: (1) prison and probation administrations, (2) study & research centers, (3) non profit organisations. The partner search was carried out by referring to a list of institutions and organisations made available by the RAN *Centre of Excellence*, thus enabling the identification of potential partners who shared the common interest in violent radicalisation and equipped with the specific expertises to manage tasks and the responsibilities of the Project. The Ministries of Justice of Bulgaria, France, Italy (Department for Juvenile Justice and Probation), Portugal and Romania participated as co-beneficiaries while the Ministries of Justice of Belgium and Cyprus were involved as associates. The Partnership singled out the presence as Partners of the Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, Istituto Psicoanalitico per le Ricerche Sociali (IPRS) and the West University of Timisoara while the Laboratorio sulle Religioni (Labrel) participated in the Project as associate. Lastly, as representatives of civil society the Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d'Italia (UCOII) and “Exit” association joined the partnership. The Department for Prison Administration embarked in formalising the Partnership by means of bilateral agreements, where amount of EU funds, nature of tasks and dispute resolution were specified.

Table 2: The partnership

	APPLICANT	
	Department of Prison Administration (Italy)	
	CO-BENEFICIARIES	ASSOCIATED PARTNERS
PRISON & PROBATION SERVICES	Directorate General for the Execution of the Sentences (Bulgaria) Ministry of Justice(France) Department for Juvenile Justice & probation (Italy) Department of Prison Administration (Romania) Directorate General for Rehabilitation & Prison Services (Portugal)	Ministry of Justice(Belgium) Ministry of Justice (Cyprus)
STUDY & RESEARCH CENTRES	Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC) - (Italy) Istituto Psicoanalitico per le Ricerche Sociali (IPRS) (Italy) West University di Timisoara (Romania)	Labororio sulle Religioni (Labrel) - Italy
ASSOCIATIONS	“Exit” (Italy) Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia (UCOII) - (Italy)	

Table 3: Financial data

Beneficiary	Country	Role	Amount	EU Funds
MINISTERO DELLA GIUSTIZIA	Italy	Coordinator	91,655.13	68,640.53
MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE	France	Beneficiary	37,689.68	28,225.80
ADMINISTRATIA NATIONALA A PENITENCIARELOR	Romania	Beneficiary	37,957.18	28,426.13
UCOII – UNIONE DELLE COMUNITA ISLAMICHE D’ITALIA	Italy	Beneficiary	14,637.60	10,962.10
UNIVERSITATEA DE VEST DIN TIMISOARA	Romania	Beneficiary	19,280.33	14,439.04
ISTITUTO PSICOANALITICO PER LE RICERCHE SOCIALI	Italy	Beneficiary	18,917.60	14,167.39
ISTITUTO SUPERIORE INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE CRIMINALI (ISISC)	Italy	Beneficiary	28,244.79	21,152.52
EXIT – SOCIETA COOPERATIVA SOCIALE ONLUS	Italy	Beneficiary	22,055.91	16,517.67
DIRECAO GERAL DE REINSERCAO E SERVICOS PRISIONAIS	Portugal	Beneficiary	38,909.48	29,139.31
GENERAL DIRECTORATE EXECUTION OF SENTENCES	Bulgaria	Beneficiary	33,448.20	25,049



2. THE EVALUATION

2.1 Objectives and methodology

The purpose of the evaluation is to document activities, expected results and outputs linked to the achievement of RASMORAD P&P objectives. The Methodology for the assessment was developed starting with the examination of the available project documentation consisting of:

1. project document
2. progress reports
3. exchange of correspondence with the European Commission
4. newsletters
5. reports on study-visits and workshops
6. reports on webinars
7. financial plan
8. deliverables from the comparative research on violent radicalisation in prison and on probation

The work then continued with the review of all 4 project workstreams while assessing results and objectives according to the traditional evaluation criteria. It was examined whether methods and quality of project implementation were appropriate and efficient, pointing-out problems and difficulties characterizing project workstreams and identifying changes occurred in the intervention strategy.

EVALUATION CRITERIA	EVALUATION QUESTIONS
Relevance The extent to which the Project coherently meets priorities and policies of target groups, beneficiaries and donors.	- Did project activities meet the real needs of beneficiaries? - Did project activities contribute to address the problem of risk assessment on violent radicalisation?
Efficacy Measures how far progress has been made towards the achievement of the desired objectives	- Were objectives clear enough and with measurable targets? - To what extent did specific objectives have been achieved? - What were the main factors affecting the achievement or the failure of specific objectives?
Efficiency Links resources utilisation (human, economic and physical) to the achieved results	- Were the resources utilised the most cost-efficient in addressing the expected results
Sustainability The ability to guarantee benefits through time	- To what extent do project benefits continue after the EU funding? - What were the main factors affecting the achievement or failure of project sustainability
Workstreams 1 Prevention of radicalisation in prison and probation settings 2 Development of common risk assessment methodology and tool 3 Boosting measures alternative to imprisonment 4 National networking and development of dissemination schemes	

In order to assess the actual progress in implementing activities towards expected results a triangulation then was made between activities and results. This triangulation proved useful for tracing the history of RASMORAD P&P in relation to the achievement of important milestones which are of fundamental importance to the project strategy, such as the completion of the good practice exchange, the finalisation of the risk assessment tool or the conclusion of the dissemination schemes.

The evaluation methodology provided for the preparation of 3 on-line questionnaires sent by e-mail to all partners. The first one was submitted to institutional partners (Prison Administrations and General Directorates), the second reached the Centres of Studies and Associations involved in the project and the third involved the Siracusa Institute of Criminal Studies – Istituto Superiore di Scienze Criminali-ISISC). Questions raised in the questionnaires were meant both to assess to what extent project activities were relevant to Partner States and identify difficulties that emerged while performing the tasks entrusted to them according to the intervention strategy.

2.2 Execution of the Project

2.2.1 Project workstreams

Work stream 1: Prevention of radicalisation in prison and probation settings

The transnational research on methodologies currently in place in preventing and contrasting violent radicalisation in prison and on probation in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania started in April 2017 under the coordination of ISISC. The research work involved the use of a tailored questionnaire developed with the assistance of the non profit organisation “Exit” and the West University of Timisoara; it contained questions structured in 8 sections and closely modeled on key topics of the workshops organised by the Project:

1. local and national strategies to prevent and contrast terrorism and radicalisation
2. prevention of violent radicalisation in prison and on probation
3. prevention of radicalization and cultural diversity management
4. prevention of radicalization and rehabilitation in prison and probation
5. prevention of radicalization and development of counter-narratives, alternative narratives in prison and probation settings
6. prevention of radicalization, capacity building and dynamic security
7. prevention of radicalization and inter-agency cooperation
8. prevention of radicalization and risk assessment

The analysis of the data collected were used as primary sources to draft a Common Methodology on preventing violent radicalisation in Partner States which was discussed and agreed during the *Steering Committee* hosted in Lisbon (April 2018). It contains recommendation on the need of managing cultural diversity in prison and developing a counter-narrative of Islam able to instills new values into the more vulnerable inmates, facilitating their rehabilitation and de-radicalisation path. Prison personnel who has the possibility to early identify signs of violent radicalisation play a pivotal role; the same applies to leaders of Muslim Communities who should channel a narrative of Islam other than that promoting violence and intolerance.

Work stream 2: Development of common risk assessment methodology and tool

The second phase devoted to the development of a common risk assessment tool began on the occasion of the Workshop hosted in Bruxelles (September 2017); a second questionnaire, with a question set developed around 9 standards derived from a review of the most relevant literature on violent extremism issued by RAN and the Council of Europe, was submitted to Partner States by ISISC. These standards, characterised by 5 different level³ of implementation, allowed a comparison between existing tools currently implemented by Partner States in preventing violent radicalisation in prison and on probation, making it possible the identification of the more promising practices.

3 The levels of implementation are:(1) not implemented at all; (2) to a small extent; (3) to a medium extent; (4) to a high extent; (5) fully implemented

Table 5: List of standards

1. P&P Services should be using a tool/methodology to detect and assess radicalized inmates
2. Risk assessment tool/risk assessment methodology should identify specific goals
3. In case of potential radicalization, the risk assessment should go through a two-step procedure
4. Evaluation of radicalization should be reliable. The tool should take into consideration the different factors (root causes) and processes of radicalization. The risk assessment tool/methodology should have a holistic approach of the inmate/probationer
5. The information collected to implement radicalization risk assessment should come from a variety of sources
6. Continuous cycles of risk assessment avoid labeling and allow to make decisions according to accurate information
7. Human resources: (1) invest in, develop and offer general awareness training to all P and P Staff; (2) risk assessment team with a strong academic background and a relevant professional experience; (3) multidisciplinary risk assessment team
8. Practitioners carrying out risk assessment should be supported by peers and management
9. The risk assessment tool/methodology should be evaluated through objective criteria

The data collection was channeled into a Common Strategy on Risk Assessment aimed at fostering a common European culture of violent radicalisation through cooperation and the establishment of synergies with Partner States in prison and probation services. The document identified 5 guiding principles developed following the review of the more relevant literature on the topic.

- (1) using a risk assessment focusing on structured personal judgment
- (2) using a risk assessment targeting specifically violent extremists
- (3) broadening the scope of the data collection (gathering as much information as possible) and fostering inter-agency cooperation
- (4) ensuring high quality training and providing peer support are necessary
- (5) designing and implementing an evaluation policy of the risk assessment strategy

A distinction between risk detection and assessment was made; according to the Common Strategy, prison officers are expected to deal with detection whereas specialised commissions of experts have the responsibility to assess potentially radicalised inmates. Great importance was attached to high level training for prison and probation personnel who should have a better knowledge of Islam and improved command of tools to detect inmates at risk of radicalisation. Difficulties that have characterised this stage are linked to a different perception of violent radicalisation among Partner States: Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus and Portugal do not have specific methodologies in managing violent extremism; the same applies to Italy where, however, the severe poverty affecting a huge

amount of Muslim inmates could make them more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Partner Countries who made greatest contributions include Belgium and France who are more experienced in managing radicalisation and already have a specific risk assessment tools coupled with professional training programs for prison and probation officers. Following the drafting of the Common Strategy on Risk Assessment, ISISC conducted a trial of the existing methodologies implemented in Partner Countries. The collection of data took place in August 2018 by using a further questionnaire focusing on different topics:

- (a) prison and probation staff trainings
- (b) information collection, communication channels aiming at identifying potentially radicalized prisoners/probationers
- (c) use of detection tools and risk assessment tools
- (d) design and implementation of detection and risk assessment evaluation policy

The Common Strategy was properly disseminated through 5 webinars entitled “A Common Strategy for Violent Extremism Risk Assessment in Prison and on Probation” aimed at enabling participants to identify specific tools that better meet their national specific needs while utilising existing human and economic resources in the most efficient way. The first four webinars were performed with prison and probation managers as target group while the fifth one was meant to involve a more general audience. Webinars covered a wide range of topics ranging from screening and risk assessment protocols, staff training, internal and inter-agency cooperation to the utilization of a multi-disciplinary approach, linking screening and assessment with exit strategies, and evaluation policies. Contents and logistics of webinars were looked after by IPRS.

Work stream 3: Boosting measures alternative to imprisonment

The third stage of the Project focused on a comparative analysis about measures alternative to detention, with a particular attention to de-radicalisation paths and exit strategies currently implemented in Partner States. In this case as well, the research team developed a semi-structured questionnaire based on a set of 21 questions, many of them with open answers. Information collected were properly systematised into the “*Collection of info on radicalisation and exit strategies – Data, good practices and case studies*” that investigated several areas such as: (1) policies for alternatives measures to detention; (2) targeted interventions in P&P settings; (3) characteristics of programs (standardized, open, etc.) and contents; (4) methodologies of interventions for deradicalization/disengagement; (5) mentoring system in probation; (6) training of professionals/mentors; (7) inter-agency cooperation in probation.

The document showed that most of Partner States do not have specific programs on de-radicalisation and if any, they usually apply on prison and occasionally on probation.

On the contrary, Partners like Belgium and France which have been more affected by the problem, have already developed specific programs on de-radicalisation aimed at promoting the search of a new identity among inmates by promoting a critical vision of extremist ideologies shared by them in the past. This stage of the research showed the importance of the role played by mentors who assist detainees in their rehabilitation path. The professional profile of a mentor is quite vague: he/she can be a former radicalised inmate or a professional with an in depth knowledge of radicalisation process, root causes and modalities of recruitment.

Data analysis provided the basis for a Common Methodology on De-radicalisation and Exit Strategy whose main focus are on:

- (a) the impact of detention regimes on rehabilitation programs
- (b) the utility for detainees to access vocational training, work programs and leisure such as sport, arts and music
- (c) the need for access to psychological support
- (d) the urge to strengthen the cooperation with non profit sector who may support the resettlement of former detainees by providing them with job opportunities and accommodation.

It should be noted the focus on the inter-religious dialogue and development of a counter-narrative of Islam; in this regard Belgium is experimenting a training program for Imans who are provided with fundamentals on manipulative techniques and practical tips on how channel an alternative narrative of Islam among detainees. Given the sensitive type of information contained in the Common Methodology on Deradicalisation and Exit Strategy, Partner States agreed to shift the dissemination level from public to confidential.

Work stream 4: National networking and development of dissemination schemes

The final stage of RASMORAD P&P was devoted to the dissemination of results properly channeled among project stakeholders through thematic workshops organised in Partner States. Workshops represented a valuable forum where to track progresses and share further information to be inserted into the comparative research on violent radicalisation. RASMORAD P&P provided for specific outputs which were expected to disseminate the work done by Partners; this is the case of the Memoranda of Cooperation and a National Guidelines to foster the dissemination of the project outputs among different stakeholders. Despite this outputs have not yet been completed, have good potential for supporting the project dissemination schemes; the Memoranda of Cooperation might

affect policy makers in developing policies more sensitive to violent extremism in prison and probation settings while the national Guidelines could be an operative tool to foster multi-agency and multi-sectoral cooperation. Intervention strategy also provided for a web site that will continue to run for 2 years after the end of the action; furthermore regular updates were supplied to Partner States by a monthly e-newsletter.

2.3 Findings from evaluation questionnaires

Evaluation questionnaires were developed taking into consideration the different type of Partners involved and the differences in the nature of contributions expected from them. All three questionnaires shared some topics which were particularly relevant to the purposes of reviewing the whole project cycle such as: (i) participation of Partners in project planning; (ii) relevance of problems addressed; (iii) clarity of tasks entrusted to Partners; (iv) difficulties experienced; (v) visibility of the project.

Project proposal was developed almost entirely by the Applicant, with some contributions from Institutional Partners (Directorates General and Prison Administrations) and the West University of Timisoara, while associations and centres of research merely accepted the preliminary draft of the project. The distribution of tasks and responsibilities between Participants was not clearly specified when drawing-up the project document, but defined later when RASMORAD P&P had started.

The comparative research on violent radicalisation in prison and probation was originally conceived as a product resulting from an international group of researchers from all Partner Countries. However, difficulties linked to a remote management of the research pleaded in favour of a more centralised supervision by establishing a focal-point which coordinated the research activity. This role was taken by ISISC who carried out the comparative research with the contributions of the University of Timisoara, “Exit”, UCOII and by IPRS for the dissemination activities.

Evaluation questionnaires pointed-out how the researchers involved in the project found it difficult to circumscribe their roles for the purpose of performing research tasks; this was due particularly to a lack of definition of responsibilities in the design stage, to which was added the difficulty for researchers to carry-out project-related-activities while performing their routine work at the same time. Despite problems addressed by RASMORAD P&P were generally considered to be fairly important for all Partners, their opinions were split on the most relevant topics covered by the Project; while institutional Partners showed greater interest for the development of a common risk assessment tool and the establishment of a network of stakeholders dealing with radicalisation, knowledge collection and deradicalisation strategies were the topic that met best the preference of

the Centres of studies and Associations. Potential difficulties that may be faced by the networks of actors relevant to violent extremism management usually focus on the lack of financial resources and the risk of additional workload resulting from the participation in that network.

However the Italian Prison Administration showed that the institution of a national network has been already put in place in Italy in compliance with a Ministerial Decree that provides for the appointment of 11 regional contact-persons who monitor prisons and regularly report back to the Nucleo Investigativo Centrale – Central Investigation Unit (NIC)

The Common Strategy on the Risk Assessment was considered useful by all Partners, especially in the pre-trial phase when measures alternative to detention are considered. In order to implement effectively such Common Strategy a great deal depends on the ability of prison and probation staff to apply the recommendations therein provided; hence the importance of training programs involving prison and probation staff engaged in regular contact with detainees and probationers. With a view to prevent the Common Strategy on Risk Assessment from being merely self-referential, Partners raised the need of integrating it into a structured and full financed programme, so contributing fruitfully to a shared culture against violent extremism.

Visibility of RASMORAD P&P was mainly ensured by internal channels such as a dedicated web site and a monthly newsletter; the evaluation questionnaires showed that Institutional and non institutional partners publicised the project on their web sites. In this respect, a notable attempt was made by “Exit” Association to raise project visibility through its participation in a seminar⁴ about radicalisation and through a forthcoming publication⁵. It is also remarkable the visibility given to RASMORAD P&P by the West University of Timisoara that spread information about the project through institutional web sites (Faculty of Political Sciences, the Romanian Center of Penitentiary Studies) and newsletters involving students and internal staff. Furthermore, project results are expected to be disseminated by West University TV and a local radio broadcasting.

2.4 Relevance

2.4.1 Relevance of the problems

The Project provides for areas of intervention that perfectly match the priorities of the Call of Proposal (JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-TERR) issued by the European Commission; project activities which gave priority to information and good practices exchange are absolutely consistent with the

4 Il contributo della società civile al contrasto della radicalizzazione violenta (The contribution of civil society to fighting violent radicalisation) Udine, Italy ,26 May 2017

5 Prevenzione ai radicalismi: tra prospettive e buone pratiche in Capire L'Islam mito o realtà? (Preventing radicalism: perspectives and good practices – Understanding Islam: myth or reality') Bombardieri M., Giorda M.C., Hejazi S., (eds.)

specific requirements of the Call. The involvement of Partner States with different experiences in managing radicalisation makes mutual learning and the exchange of the more promising practices dramatically fruitful. The Project component devoted to the prevention of radicalisation in prison and on probation showed particularly useful in identifying trigger and protecting factors of violent extremism which may be influenced by different detention regimes adopted by Partner States and by the possibility to access to spiritual assistance. Furthermore the project component on measures alternative to detention met the need to find viable disengagement and deradicalisation solutions. However the decision by Partner States not to develop a common risk assessment tool on violent radicalisation but opting for a more generic Common Strategy has partially weakened the relevance of the Project. Despite RASMORAD P&P remains consistent with specific objectives and the priorities of the Call, the ability to contribute to the improvement of risk assessment of detainees and probationers at risk of radicalisation is partially impaired.

2.4.2 Quality of the partnership

The Italian Department of Prison Administration promoted a partnership including institutions and organisations relevant to the fight against violent extremism. Participation of Prison and Probation Administration from 7 member States is consistent with the need to organize a useful exchange of experience on violent radicalisation at international level; while a comparison between actors with different levels of experience in dealing with violent extremism fosters the dissemination of the more promising practices implemented so far. The scientific approach of the projects in managing radicalisation is shown by the presence of Centres of studies and Research that have gained valuable experience in forensic (ISISC) and social sectors (IPRS and West University of Timisoara). Their contributions are relevant in order to detect and manage radicalisation taking into account the complexity of social and cultural background of detainees. The participation in the project of Exit that gained an outstanding experience in studying manipulative processes and hate crimes is particularly relevant to recognise the importance of psychological factors in spreading violent extremism. Finally the involvement of UCOII and Laboratorio delle Religioni as an associate are pivotal to make a distinction between religious practice and radicalisation as well as to develop a counter-narrative of Islam.

2.4.3 European relevance of RASMORAD P&P

Size and composition of the partnership provide the project with a valuable European relevance; with 10 co-beneficiaries and 3 associates partners covering 7 different member States, RASMORAD P&P shows to have an extensive sectoral and geographical scope. The best practices

exchange benefited from the different level of experiences of Partner States in managing violent extremism as well as relevance was assured by carefully avoiding duplication of similar outputs and deliverables implemented by RAN. The Common strategy on risk assessment and the Methodologies on prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation tried to identify a set of general recommendations that can be easily adapted to the different needs of Partner States so contributing to mainstreaming the culture of risk assessment also into the policies of those Partners which have not yet affected by violent extremism.

2.4.4 Quality of the project design

RASMORAD P&P is based on an extensive analysis of the problem of radicalisation in prison and on probation; it also shows a fair quality of project design characterised, however, by some inconsistencies in the logical framework:

- (d) the improvement of detention condition in open prison regimes can not be considered as an achievable result since none of the project activities is addressed directly to inmates. According to the intervention strategy this result should have been assured through the organisation of workshops and study visits which, however, involved exclusively prison and probation personnel and other professionals dealing with radicalisation. Despite workshops and study visits contributed to improve knowledge of violent extremism, did not effect detention conditions.
- (e) the development of a risk assessment tool to detect and assess violent radicalisation is listed as objective, output, activity and result
- (f) despite the risk assessment tool was pivotal to the success of the action, it was not described with sufficient detail in the project document; it was refocused by moving on from an early warning system to a set of common standards (Common Strategy) to be applied to risk assessment strategies currently implemented by Partner Countries

2.5 Efficacy

2.5.1 Results gained

Result 1: Improvement of detention conditions in open prison regimes from a preventative perspective on violent radicalization leading to extremism and terrorist attacks and in high security regimes for those who are convicted for terrorist crimes

The Call for Proposal⁶ to which the Applicant responded, covered activities of research and best practices exchange; the improvement of detention conditions is not consistent with the priorities of the Call and also represents an inconsistency in the logical framework as RASMORAD intervention strategy did not provide for activities involving detainees. Therefore no effect on their detention condition should be expected.

Result 2: Implementation and delivery of a pilot common risk assessment tool to help front line workers in carrying out targeted interventions on vulnerable individuals at their arrival in prison, during detention time and before release or supervision in community

The result has been achieved, albeit partially, within the deadlines and according to the project intervention strategy. The different perception of Partner States on violent extremism coupled with legislative differences hindered the development of a common risk assessment tool really applicable to different types of prison and probation systems. The project limited itself to identifying common principles utilised for testing the implementation of different risk assessment methodologies currently in use in Partner States. As a result of little interest shown by Partner Countries such as Belgium and France that already have a specific tool to detect and assess radicalised detainees (VERA 2), the development and delivery of a pilot common risk assessment tool has been partially reduced, opting for a more modest Common Strategy which may inform the future national strategies on risk assessment of Partner Countries.

Result 3: Improvement of multi-agency approaches and cross sector collaborations in tackling the issue of violent radicalisation in prison/probation settings and to support in detecting and assessment activities

The result was achieved; both the Common Methodologies and Common Strategy on risk Assessment investigated the possibilities of developing a shared sensitivity on prevention, risk assessment and de-radicalisation. Inter-sectoral and multi-agency cooperation is closely linked to the need of diversifying the sources of information on potentially


6 JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-TERR

radicalised inmates. A triangulation between information from prison officers performing dynamic observation and data provided by teachers, social assistants, cultural mediators and religious leaders should be useful to detect and assess signs of radicalisation as well as providing important contributions to manage the challenging deradicalisation process. Multi-agency approach has been properly channeled by 5 webinars along with the development of national guidelines on utilisation of project outputs.

Result 4: Supporting actions for policy makers in the prevention of violent radicalisation leading to terrorism in prison/probation key environments (development of exit programmes and their funding), the revision of national strategies, the reviewing of a policy area or the development of key project plans (national radicalisation networks, helplines, for instance)

It could be considered as an ancillary Result in respect of Results 2 and 3, providing for lobbying activity aimed at influencing policy makers. Despite this result should be covered by an impact assessment rather than a result-based evaluation, it is likely that the richness of data collected coupled with the value of Partnership might influence national policies on terrorism supporting the development of specific intervention to address radicalisation in prison and on probation.

Table 6: Results gained



2.5.2 Objectives achieved

Objective 1: improve the risk assessment methodologies on violent radicalisation currently in place in Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania

The objective is largely attained; thanks to the transnational research on violent extremism carried-out under the scientific coordination of ISISC a greater awareness on strategies being implemented by Partner States has been achieved. The more promising practices have been identified encouraging Countries with no or little experience in radicalisation to develop specific strategy to address the issue. The Common Methodologies and the Common Strategy on risk assessment drawn up by the project research team adopted an integrated approach calling for the introduction of rarely used elements such as the development of a counter narrative of Islam, specific training for prison and probation personnel and the intensification of interreligious dialogue. The improvement of existing methodologies on risk assessment has been possible thanks to the contribution from different expertises in prison and probation sector and the urge to a greater involvement of external actors such as representatives of Islamic Communities and voluntary sector that can play a crucial role also in de-radicalisation process.

Objective 2: develop an early warning system to detect & prevent extremist deviations among inmates

Notwithstanding an overlap between Objective 2 and Result 2, the objective has been partially achieved. The risk assessment tool that originally was meant to be applied in all 7 partner countries after first being tested in France was modified, by developing Common Strategy based on a set of minimum standards which are meant to be applied in Partner Countries.

In August 2018 ISISC moved on to investigate the application of existing risk assessment strategies by submitting a questionnaire covering 4 different items:

- (1) prison and probation staff trainings
- (2) information collection, communication channels aiming at identifying potentially radicalized prisoners/probationers
- (3) use of detection tools and risk assessment tools
- (4) design and implementation of detection and risk assessment evaluation policy

It is interesting to note the no-participation of Bulgaria and Cyprus in the questionnaire which indicates that, as previously stressed, perils associated to violent extremism are differently perceived among Partners.

Table 7: Objectives achieved




Table 8: Outputs produced

	DESCRIPTION OF OUTPUTS	LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION			
		Low	Medium	High	Very high
1	Collection of best practices & methodologies on violent radicalisation in P&P settings	High	High	High	High
2	Early warning system for radicalisation risk assessment	Medium	Medium		
3	Collection of results from implementation of common risk assessment tool	High	High	High	
4	Memoranda of Cooperation between participating Countries	On-going			
5	Project website	High	High	High	High
6	National guidelines for the implementation of a national network & helpline	On-going			
7	Monthly newsletters	High	High	High	High

Table 9: Deliverables produced

	DESCRIPTION OF DELIVERABLES	LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION			
		Low	Medium	High	Very high
1	Project planning	High	High	High	High
2	Website	High	High	High	High
3	Newsletters	High	High	High	High
4	Project meeting minutes	High	High	High	High
5	Monitoring reports	High	High	High	High
6	Evaluation report	ON	GOING		
7	Interim report	High	High	High	High

8	Collection of knowledge				
9	Common methodology				
10	Risk assessment tool				
11	Tool test report				
12	Collection of info and deradicalisation strategies				
13	Deradicalisation and exit strategies Common methodologies				
14	National Guidelines	ON	GOING		
15	Memoranda of Cooperation	ON	GOING		

2.6 Efficiency

2.6.1 Internal organisation and external experts

The project management was entrusted to 2 different working groups involving staff from the Italian Department of Prison Administration and Department for Juvenile Justice and Probation, The first working group, composed by 12 persons e 1 coordinator, dealt with the project coordination, internal evaluation and the dissemination of results. The second group supervised the operation of RASMORAD P&P, by taking care of the different stages of the comparative research which covered violent radicalisation methodology, risk assessment tools and de-radicalisation strategies. The creation of 2 working groups looking at several aspects of management showed to be efficient in coordinating the rich set of expected deliverables and functional to the control of administrative and financial burden that are always associated with a large partnership. Administration and operational management did not face any difficulties and excluding the external evaluator, all human resources involved in the Project were internal staff from the Italian Ministry of Justice.

2.6.2 Financial efficiency

On 17 January 2017 the European Commission notified the Italian Ministry of Justice of the pre-financing payment of € 166.867,90 (65% of the total amounting to €256,719.85). During a meeting held in Bruxelles, RASMORAD's Italian coordinator was provided by the European Commission with a new budget template including new sub-categories under A (staff costs) B (subsistence costs) and E (direct costs) categories. New provisions of the budget form have been detailed during the

workshop of Sofia (April 2017). On this occasion all Partners were encouraged to draw on EC funds only after co-financing contribution they laid down when preparing the project proposal has been utilised. Project administration has been efficient in managing EC funds and careful to assure an accurate financial monitoring by calling on Partners to provide quarterly expenditure declarations to the Steering Committee. Financial management did not experience difficulties and no changes in the overall budget estimate were made. The only uncertainties identified during the project were promptly addressed by the EC project officer who provided information on:

- request from the Bulgarian and Romanian Partners to calculate subsistence costs using daily allowance rather actual costs
- clarifications on how calculate the co-financing contribution (25.11%)
- request from the West University of Timisoara to modify its project effort in person-months

Cost of the project

Beneficiaries	Personnel costs	Travel costs	Subsistence	Subcontracting	Support to third parties	Other direct costs	Indirect costs	Total costs	Requested grant
DAP Italy	9,160.00 €	17,585.00 €	31,554.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	27,360.00 €	5,996.13 €	91,655.13 €	68,640.53 €
DAP France	5,400.00 €	9,650.00 €	14,664.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	5,510.00 €	2,465.68 €	37,689.68 €	28,225.80 €
ANP Romania	5,190.00 €	10,160.00 €	14,614.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	5,510.00 €	2,483.18 €	37,957.18 €	28,426.13 €
UCOII Italy	5,200.00 €	2,645.00 €	4,635.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	1,200.00 €	957.60 €	14,637.60 €	10,962.10 €
UVT Romania	4,904.00 €	4,835.00 €	7,080.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	1,200.00 €	1,261.33 €	19,280.33 €	14,439.04 €
IPRS Italy	9,200.00 €	2,645.00 €	4,635.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	1,200.00 €	1,237.60 €	18,917.60 €	14,167.39 €
ISISC Italy	15,300.00 €	3,495.00 €	6,402.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	1,200.00 €	1,847.79 €	28,244.79 €	21,152.52 €
EXIT ONLUS Italy	8,150.00 €	4,360.00 €	6,903.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	1,200.00 €	1,442.91 €	22,055.91 €	16,517.67 €
DGRSP Portugal	6,540.00 €	9,650.00 €	14,664.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	5,510.00 €	2,545.48 €	38,909.48 €	29,139.31 €
GDES Bulgaria	4,200.00 €	9,060.00 €	12,490.00 €	0.00 €	0.00 €	5,510.00 €	2,188.20 €	33,448.20 €	25,049.36 €

2.7 Sustainability

2.7.1 Economic and operational sustainability

RASMORAD P&P was aimed at supporting research and information exchange on the more promising practices to address violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. The project showed to be highly sustainable due to a close link with the project TRAIIn Training (Transfer Radicalisation Approaches in Training) an on-going EU funded action which shares the same RASMORAD P&P's objective of creating a shared working method common to all various stakeholders dealing with detection and management of detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised. TRAIIn Training provides for financial resources for the updating and further development of the knowledge platform on violent extremism gained under RASMORAD, so directly contributing to its financial sustainability. A further elements which ensured a good economic sustainability are the Memoranda of Cooperation and the National Guidelines on the utilisation of project outputs: both represented a formal but not burdensome channels which ensures a strong sustainability of the project and at same time promoted a significant operational sustainability, preserving the bonds of international cooperation gained under the project.

The complementarity with TRAIIn Training project provides that the Common Strategy on Risk Assessment is fully implemented by TRAIIn Training Partners, while the Memoranda of Cooperation ensures the implementation of an integrated approach to violent extremism by fostering cooperation among partner States and enhancing the utilisation of different expertises available both in the prison and probation settings and non profit sector. All three Common Methodologies on prevention, assessment and deradicalisation will be pivotal teaching materials within 4 training courses to be delivered in the framework of the TRAIIn project.

2.7.2 Changes triggered by the project

RASMORAD boosts the valuable achievement of fostering a common awareness on violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. It stresses the co-existence of several strategies in addressing the danger of extremism ranging from the more generic which apply without distinction to all detainees to the more specific one such as VERA 2 which was specifically designed to detect and assess detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised. The Common Strategy on Risk Assessment developed in accordance with shared minimum standards contributes to balance the differences between Partners in existing practices on violent radicalisation and facilitate cooperation among different prison and probation system within the EU.

Emphasis has been placed on shortcomings affecting risk assessment strategies currently in place, such as the absence of inter-religious confrontation and the lack of a counter-narrative of Islam, for which a greater involvement of representatives from the Islamic Communities is needed.

CONCLUSIONS

RASMORAD P&P presents an intervention strategy coherent with the need to develop a shared approach in addressing violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. Both activities and outputs show to be relevant to establishing a common working method characterised by an inter sectoral cooperation and collaboration among the different actors involved in the detection and assessment of violent extremism. The division of the project into 4 workstreams is pertinent with the identification of the main problems influencing the development of shared paths against radicalisation (prevention, assessment and deradicalisation).

Despite the project boasts a clear and in depth identification of problems to be addressed, project design is affected by uncertainties due to the overlapping between objectives, results and activities. The most evident inconsistency concerns the development of a common risk assessment tool which is listed as objective, result, activity and output. Also the Result 1 referring to the improvement of detention conditions of open prison regime shows to be no coherent with the project logical framework: the lack of activities specifically targeted to inmates excludes any significant influence on their detention conditions.

RASMORAD P&P promoted a broad and varied Partnership including;

- Institutional Partners (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania) represented by Departments and Directorates General forming part of their respective Ministries of Justice that made available their technical expertise in implementing prison and probation policies on a daily basis
- Research and study centres (IPRS, ISISC and the West University of Timisoara) were strategic in characterising requirements and limits of the transnational research on violent radicalisation
- Exit Association thanks to a considerable experience in addressing manipulative phenomenon, provided a valuable contribution by stressing out psychological implications of radicalisation with a particular focus on deradicalisation strategies and the development of National Guidelines on the utilisation of project outputs
- UCOII and Laboratorio sulle religioni (Lab.Rel) proved to be fundamental in stressing the need for a new narrative of Islam in prison and on probation and confirm the importance of interreligious confrontation; they offered in depth information on religious radicalisation with a special focus on radicalised European terrorists. Particularly useful was the collection of first hand accounts from Iman working in the Italian prisons.

The project showed to be fairly efficient in achieving results and objectives. Result assessment points-out that the improvement of detention conditions in open prison regime (Result 1) was not


achieved because of the lack of a targeted involvement of detainees in the project and if present, this involvement would not fall into the scope of the Call for proposal ((JUST-2015-JCOO-AG-TERR). The elaboration of a common risk assessment tool (Result 2) was partially achieved: Partner States preferred drafting a Common Strategy developed according to a set of minimum standards that have been used to test the implementation of their national strategies to fight violent radicalisation. This change was driven by the different perception of violent extremism among Partners. If Belgium and France, because of a consistent number of detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised, have already put in place a specific risk assessment tool (VERA 2), in other Partner Countries the danger posed by potentially radicalised detainees is assessed according to criteria pertaining to strategies applied to other specific categories of detainees (drug addicts, affiliates to organised crime, mentally disabled). The scope and purpose of the risk assessment operational tool were reduced by developing a Common Strategy with a set of recommendations which should underlie a shared working method applicable to the national risk assessment strategies that, however, excluding Belgium and France, do not still exist.

The integrated approach to address violent extremism made it possible a closer inter agency and inter-sectoral cooperation as well as a greater awareness of the risk detection and assessment (Result 3). Both the Common Methodologies on prevention and de-radicalisation and the Common Strategy on risk assessment acknowledged the importance of a continuous and timely exchange of risk assessment information between several actors working in prison and probation services (prison officers, social assistants, teachers, religious leaders and volunteers) in order to verify radicalisation among detainees

Evaluating to what extent the project could influence policy makers in developing policies on radicalisation and funding specific programme of desengagement (Result 4) seems premature; despite possible effects must be reviewed in the framework of an impact evaluation rather than a result-based assessment, it shall be presumed that relevance of the partnership and the breadth of information collected might influence national policy making. The objective of improving the risk assessment methodologies on violent radicalisation currently in place in Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania (Objective 1) has been fully met, while the development of an early warning system to detect & prevent extremist deviations among inmates (Objective 2), which should be listed exclusively as output, has been only partly achieved, as shown before. RASMORAD P&P presented an outstanding efficiency on financial, operative and administrative sector. Management of the project entrusted to 2 different working groups involving the division of responsibilities facilitated the flow of several commitments to the European Commission. All two working groups only consisting by internal staff benefited from a consolidated working synergy

gained from past experiences in managing EU funded project. This efficiency is particularly commendable especially in the light of number of partners and outputs which had characterised the project. The complementarity with TRAIIn Training project, a EC funded action promoted by the Italian Ministry of Justice and currently on going, assured a good operational sustainability to RASMORAD P&P. TRAIIn Training intervention strategy shows a clear synergy with RASMORAD P&P, providing for the implementation of the Common Strategy on Risk assessment by Partner Countries in order to develop a working method common to several actors dealing with detainees at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised. Complementarity between projects also assures economic sustainability: TRAIIn Training’s financial plan provides for specific budget items aimed to finance the upgrade of the transnational research on violent extremism by broadening scope and updating sources. Intervention strategy may be successfully replicated despite the specific feature of the projects is not the chance to be duplicated elsewhere but the ability to further develop outputs that had been already produced.

Table 9: Evaluation results



ANNEX 1 - EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

(INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS)

1. RASMORAD P&P focuses on preventing and contrasting violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings. In your experience, indicate the importance of this issue in managing the prison and probation settings of your country
2. Did your Administration contribute to the drafting of the RASMORAD P&P project proposal?
3. In the preparatory phase of RASMORAD P&P did your Administration contribute to the selection of the activities in which was involved?
4. Once the RASMORAD P&P project proposal has been successfully submitted, to what extent were the tasks/activities entrusted to your Administration clear and well formulated?
5. The first stage of RASMORAD P&P focused on the research on “Prevention of violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings”; please, describe briefly what difficulties, if any, your Administration faced when participating in the research
6. In order to ensure the visibility of RASMORAD P&P, please, indicate where the participation of your Administration in the Project has been publicised (e.g. institutional web sites, publications, newsletters, etc.)
7. The second stage of RASMORAD P&P focused on the development of a common risk assessment tool to prevent violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings. Indicate to what extent this tool could be useful in managing prison and probation settings in your own country
8. Indicate if a common risk assessment tool to prevent violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings could be really applicable to your Administration. If not, please, explain why
9. In order to present the common early warning system on preventing violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings RASMORAD P&P provided for the use of webinars. Indicate to what extent webinars were the most efficient tool to use
10. RASMORAD P&P is based on mutual learning and exchanging experiences on violent radicalisation in prison and probation settings. In your opinion, indicate to what extent participating in the Project has been useful for your Administration
11. Please, in your opinion, choose the most interesting work packages of RASMORAD P&P (multiple answers allowed)

ANNEX 2 – EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

(ASSOCIATIONS AND CENTRES OF STUDIES)

Did your Association/Centre of Studies contribute to the drafting of the RASMORAD P&P project proposal?

- yes
- no

In the preparatory phase of RASMORAD P&P did your Association/Centre of Studies contribute to the selection of the activities in which was involved?

- yes
- no

Once the RASMORAD P&P project proposal has been successfully submitted, to what extent were the tasks/activities entrusted to your Association/Centre of Studies clear and well formulated?

- Very clear and well formulated
- Very clear
- Fairly clear but poorly formulated
- Fairly clear
- Not clear enough

The first workstream of RASMORAD P&P focused on prevention of violent radicalisation in prison and on probation. Please, describe tasks and responsibilities entrusted to your Association/Centre of Studies

The second workstream concerned the development of a common risk assessment tool. Please, indicate how your Association/Centre of Studies contributed to such output

The third workstream was devoted to deradicalisation and exit strategies. Please, describe tasks and the activities performed by your Association/Centre of Studies in this stage

Please, describe problems and difficulties experienced during the project

Please, in your opinion, choose the most interesting work package of RASMORAD P&P (multiple answers allowed)

- Knowledge collection
- Risk assessment methodology and tool
- Deradicalisation and exit strategies
- National networking and dissemination schemes

In order to ensure the visibility of RASMORAD P&P, please, indicate where the participation of your Association/Centre of Studies in the Project was publicised (e.g. institutional web sites, publications, newsletters, etc.)

ANNEX 3 – EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

(ISISC)

During the preparatory phase, did your Organisation contribute to the drafting of RASMORAD P&P project proposal?

- Yes
- No
- Other

In the preparatory phase of RASMORAD P&P did your Organisation contribute to the selection of the activities in which was involved?

- Yes
- No
-

Once the RASMORAD P&P project proposal has been successfully submitted, to what extent were the tasks/activities entrusted to your Organisation clear and well formulated?

- Very clear and well formulated
- Very clear
- Fairly clear but poorly formulated
- Fairly clear
- Not clear enough

The first stage of RASMORAD P&P focused on knowledge collection; please, describe briefly what difficulties, if any, your Organisation faced when developing the research questionnaires to be submitted to Partner Countries

Please describe how “Exit” Association and the “Union of Islamic Communities of Italy” (UCOII) contributed to the research

In your opinion, describe briefly problems and difficulties faced by Partner Countries during the research collection

Explain why Partner Countries decided changing the original goal of the common risk assessment tool to identify radicalisation in prison and probation settings

In order to ensure the visibility of RASMORAD P&P, please, indicate where the participation of your Organisation in the Project has been publicised (e.g. institutional web sites, publications, newsletters, etc).