Voluntary, involuntary and programmed circular migration in Spain: the case of Moroccan workers in the berry-producing region of Huelva (Spain).

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SUMMARY

TABLES

VOLUNTARY, INVOLUNTARY AND PROGRAMMED CIRCULAR MIGRATION IN SPAIN: THE CASE OF MOROCCAN WORKERS IN THE BERRY-PRODUCING REGION OF HUELVA (SPAIN).

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This report is dedicated to the circular migrants interviewed, who, after an arduous day of work, not only accepted being interviewed without ever watching the clock, but also made a conscious effort to answer delicate and personal questions, with the hope that, and despite the limitations of the research team, their experiences could contribute to improving the situation of others in their circumstances.

Different realities, different views

"I miss my children. Ideally, I would like them and my husband with me, but I value very much how important this work is for us, it is helping us a lot. Before coming to Spain, life was much harder for us (…). For me it is ok coming to Spain just 5 months, but, after coming for 7 years, it would be nice not to have to renew every year, without knowing if they will call you again next year, you cannot count on it for long-term plans."

Programmed Circular Migration Migrant on her annual 5-month stay in Spain

"The opportunity of coming to Spain has been among the best things that have happened in my life (…). When I saw my first month's salary I could not believe it, it was almost what I used to get in Morocco in one year (…). I have made many good friends as well, and I feel respected and enjoy the months in Cartaya (…). I would like it to be more months and more years."

Programmed Circular Migration Migrant on her annual 5-month stay in Spain

"Many employers have made great efforts to improve the situation of migrants and have put a lot of pressure on the Spanish Government to renew the permits of most of them, even though during the last 5 years (2010-2015) they have really been through amazing market competition and have had a hard job just to stay afloat (…). Sometimes, there might be unpaid overtime and social security contributions might not be fully paid, but the Huelva berry sector is offering Moroccan women, most of them with little or no formal education, the possibility of earning in 5 months (around 800€ per month) 3-4 times the income they would get in Morocco for a whole year of work. And this is with a working-day from 8.00 to 15.00, legal working conditions and transparency, and only a marginal % of abuses (…). I think this is much better than what you get in most places in Spain, and I would say in Europe (…). So many Spaniards would go wherever they could to earn twice the Spanish annual salary in five months (…) how many young Spaniards are working in the North of Europe in whatever job they can get just to make ends meet?"

Expert on Programmed Circular Migration

"These women are in a very weak situation, many of them with no knowledge of Spanish or of their basic rights; they are living in isolation on farms, far from any village (…). We have heard of abusive situations, not only from employers but also from foremen, often Moroccan, and foremen who have a tremendous power over them as they are aware how dependent these women are on the farms' discretion for the renewal of their permits (…). There is the issue of having to renew every year, with no security about your situation for the coming year. "

NGO representative

"Health and safety inspections are limited (…). And there are rumours that there have been local cases of connivance with the authorities, in the sense that there were farms that knew they were going to be inspected days before inspection"

Trade union representative

"In the last ten years, salaries have not improved in the berry sector, I do not know to what extent this has to do with migration, but no one has asked the local people about the scale and magnitude of the whole thing (…). In ten years we have received a number of migrants close to 20% of the total population in this village during the berry-picking season, this is challenging and we have not received that much extra public funding."

Local politician

"What can I do in Morocco now? It would be very difficult for me to find a living, it is tough there for employees, though I have friends who have stayed there and lead better lives than mine. If the situation in Morocco improves, I am not sure the whole thing is worth it (...), all this (...) for what? I was also young, what did I know? (…) Yes, for retirement I hope to go back, maybe before that."

Moroccan permanent resident (farm supervisor),
17 years living in Spain, on his migratory project and possible return.

"Until two years ago (2012), I worked, if I was lucky, 7-9 months per year as an agricultural worker; now I am unemployed, but it would be almost impossible for me to find something good in Morocco (…). I am 51, I know someone with some savings and with Spanish citizenship who is in his late fifties and has just gone back to Morocco. I have no savings, I could not do that, I do not think going back to Morocco is a good option."

Moroccan permanent resident, 22 years living in Spain,
on his migratory project and possible return.

"I have found a good job, almost paid for the house, a good school, in no way could I have had that in Morocco (...), at least where I come from, and I go back 3 or 4 times a year. (…) I have thought of trying something there and seeing how it goes, maybe in 5 years or so, but it will be difficult to find a situation similar to what I have got here (…). Yes I have heard of him, he was lucky and a very hard worker, he owns the XXXX shop, his brother is taking care of the day-to-day management and he spends a lot of time in Morocco involved in other businesses (…). But for me, yes, longer holidays, maybe … pre-retirement, who knows? "

Moroccan permanent resident (manager on a farm), 12 years living in Spain,
on his migratory project and possible return.

List of main acronyms used:

CM Circular migration

CMg Circular migration migrant

HOTRECAT Hotels, restaurants, bar, catering and tourism sector

MI: Migrant interviews.

NWS: National workshop

OE: Own elaboration from our analysis based on secondary literature, press reports, stakeholders' documents, and interviews with stakeholders and migrants:

PCM: Programmed circular migration

PCMg: Programmed circular migration migrant

SHI: Stakeholder interviews.

SH: Stakeholder

TCN Third country nationals

TM: Temporary migration

VCM: Voluntary circular migration

VCMg: Voluntary circular migration migrant

1. Introduction

This report analyses circular and temporary migration among Moroccans living in Spain: how their socio-economic conditions and well-being, their own assessment of their situation, and the Spanish migratory regime and policies, shape their alternatives in relation to cross-border mobility and temporary returns of different duration, from extended holidays to definitive return.

To do that, two main sources of documentation have been used. First, the detailed picture of the political and institutional factors affecting migrants' mobility choices is based on: a thorough study of the recent literature, main regulations, SHs' documents, statistical data and press reports; 8 in-depth interviews with national SHs; the knowledge, debates and experience shared in a national workshop, with 29 representatives of the key social actors involved, authorities (national, regional and local), NGOs, experts, employers, trade-unions and migrants; and the exchange of ideas at an international workshop with the other research partners and invited leading experts. Second, a case study in the berry-producing region of Huelva (South-West Spain) based on 33 in-depth interviews (> 1 hour) with migrants, a further 10 short meetings with migrants, 14 in-depth interviews with local and regional SHs, and analysis of relevant literature and documents (most migrants interviewed are working in seasonal agriculture, but to get a richer view, we also interviewed other profiles, including 6 Moroccans who had achieved successful employment trajectories – see details in annexes 1 & 2).

The Huelva region was selected for three main reasons. Firstly, it is the Spanish region with the highest numbers of migrants participating in Programmed Circular Migration (PCM), in addition to there being many other Moroccans living and working there with a wide range of temporary statuses and Voluntary Circular Migration (VCM) patterns, most of whom work in seasonal agriculture also in berry collection. Secondly, seasonal intensive agriculture is among the main economic sectors, providing relatively regular jobs for almost 100,000 persons for just a 5-month period, while other seasonal activities such as tourism are also important. And finally, Huelva is within a 3-hour driving distance from the Moroccan border, which makes it very telling of how cross-border mobility between a EU and a non-EU country is politically managed.

With regard to Moroccan-Spanish relations, it is difficult to imagine any better future scenarios if they do not involve personal mobility across the Moroccan-Spanish border and greater exchanges in all the social domains. However, the materialisation of these flows goes far beyond simplistic win-win assumptions. There are important distributive issues to discuss within both countries, with different social groups benefiting more or less from all of these exchanges.

The main conclusions show that the lack of better economic prospects in Morocco make the large majority of migrants very reluctant to plan any substantial temporary or definitive return, while circular migration, when voluntary, very rarely goes beyond

extended holidays. Still, there is an increasing and richer cross-border mobility between Morocco and Spain. This is evidenced in the more or less extended holidays/non-work periods of temporary and permanent residents, their daily economic and social exchanges, qualitative evidence on unregistered spontaneous temporary returns and circulation of one kind or another –(Moroccans with Spanish citizenship (15%) being the most de facto circular residents), and the small but growing minority of successful Moroccans who often move back-and-forth. The main political challenge is how to make the most of this phenomenon for the development of the persons and communities involved in it (see Policy Recommendations document).

2. Circular Migration within the Spanish Migratory Regime

2.1 Recent migration in Spain. Political answers to unexpected developments

In just a decade, 1998-2008, Spain became the leading European country in receiving migration, well ahead of traditional destination countries such as France or Germany, and also well ahead other close Southern European neighbours with more similar socio-economic conditions, such as Portugal or Italy (see Table 1). Most migrants arrived without the required documentation. Then, they subsequently found their way towards a regularised situation but ended up mainly in low-paid occupations in the construction, personal services and agricultural sectors (Arango et al. 2013; González Enriquez 2013).

Spain's rapid economic growth over the 1998-2008 decade was not a miracle of productivity increases and giant leaps towards a knowledge-based economy, but there were major labour demands in several economic activities led by a construction sector thriving on euro induced low-interest rates. At the same time, the entrance of 5 million people in one decade was not the result of an active open-door political agenda, since the two main Spanish political parties mainly struggled to face up to and deal with an unprecedented, almost exponential, migratory process, and improvised their migratory policies in response to new developments, often adopting a "fait accompli" logic. Nevertheless, the Spanish economic growth of those years cannot be decoupled from the hard work of the massive influx of migrants, and the relative civic coexistence of different communities is not detached from serious political efforts to facilitate it.

This, in many senses exceptional, reality, because of its magnitude and timing, results from a complex mix of factors, intended and unintended, with both explicit and hidden synergies between the policies and institutional frameworks in the main political areas involved: migratory policy, labour market, welfare state and the distribution of powers across the territorial levels of government.

In terms of the regulatory framework for entering the country, what has characterised the system is a combination of, on the one hand, unclear and confusing regular channels for Third country nationals (TCNs) to come into Spain; with, on the other hand, a relatively generous mix of processes and alternative routes leading from irregular to regularised situations: flexible visa-granting policies; the possibility to attain residency permits through both successive collective regularisations or individual procedures of regularisation (*arraigo*) even if entry or, more often, overstay, were or had been irregular; and reticence to apply repatriation policies out of political agenda and logistic difficulties (de Haas 2014; Gonzalez Enriquez 2013; Arango 2010; Ministerio Defensa 2006; Lopez Bernabe 2004; Lopez Sala 2011). This mix of channels shows how the system improvised legal ways to accommodate 5 million

people in ten years, which resulted in a higher degree of border openness than other traditional EU destination countries. For instance, by 2009, Spain was the only European country which allowed registration of irregular foreign nationals in the Municipal Register (*Padrón*), which guaranteed them free access to the public health system and to education (Gonzalez Enríquez 2009).[1] How in different EU countries the migratory regimes assemble a more or less viable mix of itineraries – combining "illegal" entry, "irregular" stay, and chances for final regularisation through different procedures – plays a central role in explaining different national situations concerning migration. In Spain, the majority of migrants have followed variations of an *illegal entry–irregular stay–long road to regularization* track that includes different spells of regularity and irregularity at the different stages.

However, the main explanatory cause for recent migration to Spain, according to recent literature (de Haas 2014; Gonzalez Enriquez 2009, 2013; Gonzalez Ferrer 2013, 2014; Arango 2010, 2013) and most of the SHs interviewed, is the fact that the Spanish labour market of the 1998-2008 decade was fuelled by this highly motivated low-paid work force. Some SHs were more unclear about how this ongoing labour demand found the regulatory possibilities to often abuse what are considered the already traditional embedded weaknesses of the Spanish labour market: segmentation, high % of temporary contracts, tolerance of the informal economy, and low wages. This de facto "de-regularised flexibility" of the Spanish labour market has shaped the incorporation of 5 million people into Spain.

During the boom years of 1998-2008, to have a job offer was the main step towards regularisation for migrants who had entered the country irregularly, or were staying irregularly since their permits had expired. And, in a buoyant period, the heavily segmented Spanish labour market, with the highest % of temporary contracts in Europe, a high tolerance of informality, and an under-developed workplace inspection system, produced thousands of job offers of dubious quality and legality.

A telling example is the fact that Spain leads Europe in the number of people working in "domestic service", with more than 3% of the total labour force (as opposed to less than 0.5% in Germany or The Netherlands), more than 75% of whom are foreign women (Villota, Ferrari, Vázquez 2011; ILO 2013),[2] whereas Spain has among the smallest percentages of migrants working in high-skilled positions (Koehler et al. 2010). Actually, during the boom years, "domestic service" figured prominently in the Shortage Occupation Lists ("*catálogo de ocupaciones de dificil cobertura*") and this meant an open door for many migrant women, which, in turn, represented a real opportunity for improvement for them. However, as happened in other highly demanded low-paid occupations in agriculture and services, workforce recruitment problems for these jobs

[1] http://irregular-migration.net/typo3_upload/groups/31/4.Background_Information/4.4.Country_Reports/Spain_CountryReport_Clandestino_Nov09_2.pdf

[2] http://www.inmujer.gob.es/observatorios/observIgualdad/estudiosInformes/docs/impCrisisEcoTrabDomic.pdf ; http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_173363.pdf

did not translate into salaries substantially above the legal minimum wage, which is among the lowest in Europe and well below 60% of the Spanish average salary.[3]

Since the mid 1980s, there had been evidence of varying degrees of manpower shortages in some low-paid Spanish sectors, such as agriculture and care services. At the same time, activities such as agriculture, care services, textiles, construction and HORECAT, had a long tradition of informal employment practices, often with the more or less tacit tolerance of authorities. Before migration started, in these sectors there was a large amount of informal jobs where no documents were demanded. There are plenty of reasons behind this: weak/undeveloped supervisory capacities of the relevant authorities; small size of the organizations; employment of family members, often female; unclear nature of the jobs, with difficulties in designing anything equivalent to standard full-time contracts.

In sum, the underground economy contributed to a fertile context for receiving irregular migration. Actually, a well-rooted underground economy has been identified as probably more important than weak controls on the borders to explain illegal immigration into Southern Europe (Reyneri 2003; Tapinos 2000 in OECD 2004), with the obvious implication that an important policy tool to deal with illegal migration is to reduce the underground economy. For Spain, the shadow economy was estimated at around 16.9% in 1985 (OECD in 2004) and at around 19% in 2013 (Schneider 2013), [4] well above the % in other EU countries.

Together with the above, free access to the Spanish public health and education systems exerted an important attraction, not so much in the initial decision to come as in the migrants' decisions to remain in Spain

These trends drastically diminished during the crisis, which brought unemployment in Spain close to 25%, and affected migrants much more severely, with some collectives, such as the Moroccan community, suffering levels of almost 45% unemployment in 2010-2013, and with much weaker access to formal welfare facilities, informal networks of support (family, friends, etc.) or personal savings (Koehler et al. 2010; González Enríquez 2013).

With the crisis, the proportion of temporary permits issued for employment reasons clearly decreased, but, at the same time, given that the majority of migrants had arrived during the boom years, the number of those eligible for permanent residence after the required five-year period of regular residence grew remarkably. Besides, in 2013, Spain, despite being one of the European countries suffering most heavily from the crisis, was still leading Europe in issuing first residence permits to non-EU citizens. Indeed, despite a much worse economic and employment situation than Germany and

[3] As recommended by European Social Charter, according to which the Spanish minimum wage should be around 900€ net per month.

[4] http://www.protisiviekonomiji.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/si/projekti/2013/siva_ekonomija/The_Shadow_Economy_in_Europe_2013.pdf . The 1985 and 2013 statistics are not strictly comparable.

the Netherlands, Spain was above those countries in issuing permits for employment reasons (see Table 3). However, after 2012, the number of those entering Spain was surpassed by those leaving, either going back to their home country or to look for better opportunities elsewhere.

Table 1: Main migration figures in selected EU countries. Columns 1-4: % total population; column 5: absolute numbers and (%total population); columns 6-8: absolute numbers.

	Foreign citizens (2000)	Foreign citizens (2011)	non-UE citizens (2013)	Foreign born (outside EU-27, 2013)	First residence permit (2013)	First residence permit (employment reason, 2013)	Temporary non-EU migrants (2006)	Temporary non-EU migrants (2009)
GERMANY	9.1	8.8	5.7	8	199,925 (2.5)	27,788	26,199	21,290
SPAIN	2.3	12.3	6.4	8.7	196,242 (4.2)	50,171	80,700	6,402
FRANCE	5	5.9	4.1	8.3	212,098 (3.2)	17,480	1,856 (2007)	7,802
NETHERLAND	3.2	4	2	8.6	64,739 (3.9)	12,673	6,833	9,094
ITALY	2,5	7.5	5.2	6.5	243,954 (4.1)	80,726		
PORTUGAL	1.8	4.2	3.0	6.3	26,593(2.5)	6,394	6,502	1,112
UK	6.5	7.2	3.9	8.1	¿¿	¿¿		

Sources: Eurostat; columns 7 and 8: EMN National Reports

This table illustrates that the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have a more open policy with respect to granting nationality, as is seen in the difference between 'foreign-born' and 'citizenship'.

Table 2. Recent evolution in the number of foreigners living in Spain: UE-28, non-UE; number of residents born in Romania and Morocco (INE Municipal Registry)(thousands). In brackets (Spanish citizens)

	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2006	2004	2002	1996
Foreign born	6,283 (1,730)				6,604 (1,220)				3,693 (796)		1,068 (567)
Foreigners	5,023	5,546	5,736	5,751	5,748	5,649	5,269	4,144	3,034	1,977	542
UE-28	2,057	2,361	2,445	2,397	2,352	2,275	2,104	1,429	676	520	260
non-UE	2,967	3,185	3,291	3,354	3,396	3,374	3,164	2,715			
Romanians	726 (4)	801 (4)	833 (4)	810 (3.6)	784 (3.5)	762 (3.3)	706 (3.2)	397 (3)	206 (3.2)	68 (2.3)	2.5 (0.7)
Morocco	774 (151)	777 (134)	779 (128)	769 (120)	760 (115)	737(109)	683 (103)	606 (92)	474(86)	370 (84)	158 (76)

Source: own elaboration with data from INE Continuous Register

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Table 3. First residence permits issued to non-EU 2013.

	TOTAL		Of which (%)			
	#	‰	Family	Employment	Education	Other
GERMANY	199,925	2.5	41.3	13.9	23.8	13.1
UK	¿? NOT FULLY COMPARABLE STATISTICS					
ITALY	243,954	4.1	44.4	33.1	11.1	11.4
SPAIN	196,242	4.2	54.8	25.6	13.5	6.1
NETHERLANDS	64,739	3.9	39.2	19.6	19.9	21.3

Source: Eurostat Residence Permit STAT

2.2 Moroccan migration to Spain.

Moroccans are the biggest non-EU community living in Spain, with 774.383 persons in 2014, 151.240 of them being Spanish citizens. The attraction factors of the previous two decades and the size of the Moroccan community in Spain also explain they are the main group receiving first residence permits in 2013, with 19.1% of the total (mainly family reunification and new employment contracts, including a percentage of Moroccan retailers contracting family members). During the last two years (2012-2014), it seems that there was a negative migratory balance with more Moroccans leaving Spain than entering it, though rather less accentuated than what has happened with migrants coming from Latin America, with different sources unclear about the whole Moroccan population having decreased or not so far.

When Spain imposed a visa requirement for Moroccan citizens in 1991 to reduce irregular migration as false tourists, the number of Moroccans, or any other group of migrants in Spain, was marginal compared to other European countries. After 1991, given the inadequacy of legal channels and weak border and labour controls, irregular entry became the main route into Spain for most Moroccans during the next two decades (1991-2010). But once living and working in Spain, until the regulatory restrictions of 2011, many of them managed to get their situation regularised, usually through an employment contract, or the collective regularisations of 2001 and 2005 (Gonzalez Enríquez 2013).

Since 2011, the most frequent path into initial temporary permits requires migrants to meet several requisites: 3 years of residential registration on the municipal register (“*empadronamiento*”), “settlement” reports (“*arraigo”*) and an employment contract. Afterwards, permits are open to successive renewals given some requisites, mainly a significant record of labour market participation, with no formal commitment to return. But the employment history requirement for renewal, in the context of a severe crisis where more than 40% of Moroccans are unemployed, has put all those Moroccans with

less than 5 years of formal residence in Spain (and thus not entitled to long-term permits) into a harsh position.

A regularised situation only solves part of the problem. The entrance and placement of migrants into the Spanish labour market during the last two decades (1995-2015), and this is especially true of Moroccans, has been very asymmetric (higher over-representation in unemployment, lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs than in other EU neighbours – Gonzalez Enriquez 2013; Arango et al. 2013, 2010). Migrants have consequently become part of a highly unequal Spanish labour market and, thus, society, with almost 40% of migrants living under the poverty threshold in Spain in 2014, the highest % in Europe after Greece (OECD 2015). Furthermore, when compared to other EU countries, Moroccan qualified migration to Spain is very low and Moroccan workers in high-skill positions are even rarer – around 40% of Moroccan migrants have not finished any formal education or are illiterate (20%), and just 10% hold a university education (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013).

This has put them in the most vulnerable situation among foreigners living in Spain, with their obstacles to integration ranging from their labour market plights and low qualification levels, through poor knowledge of Spanish, to prejudices among the native population which are more distorted against Moroccan than against other migrant groups (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013). These problems are reflected in much lower intermarriage rates than other migrant collectives (Cebolla and Requena 2010).

In the present context, issues like “re-qualification” or anything favouring major working life transitions or improvements for a majority of Moroccan employees working in the Spanish economy looks like a very daunting task – although this is also the case for the Spaniards working in the same low-paid sectors. Any real and plausible improvements are more likely to come from general developments in the Spanish labour market and the working conditions of low-qualified employees, such as the raising of the minimum wage.

On another level, there is a noticeable scarcity of well-known Moroccan role-models in areas such as entrepreneurship, politics, arts or sports. This contrasts with what happens in France or The Netherlands – with famous examples in politics, such as French ministers Najat Vallaud-Belkacem and Rachida Dati, or Rotterdam major Ahmed Aboutaleb – or in the UK with other minorities, or with some Latin-Americans in Spain. Moroccan migration in Spain still is relatively recent and this might be a cause for their under-representation in better jobs, but given that in the early 1990s there were already over a hundred thousand Moroccans living in Spain, there are reasons to suspect that segmentation in the labour market, low social mobility, and employment favouritisms in core sectors, as well as covert discrimination, are also behind the problems Moroccans deal with when trying to improve their situation, as has happened with other vulnerable groups in Spain, like gipsies.

The migrants’ background and the segmented nature of the Spanish labour market make it more difficult than in most other EU countries to have access to skilled jobs. Moreover, given the Spanish productive structure, a very high proportion of high-paid

skilled jobs are civil servant positions in the public sector, restricted to Spanish/EU citizens and with rigid recruitment procedures. Finally, there are problems with recognising foreign qualifications and slow procedures to validate these.

While these integration and occupational upgrading challenges remain in place, Moroccan migration to Spain, as also to Italy, has been the main factor behind the spectacular surge in total remittances to Morocco experienced in the last decade, which went from around 2 billion $ in 2000 to almost 7 billion $ in 2012 (Wold Bank – cited in De Haas 2014). In 2012, this was around 7% of Moroccan GNP and three times the value of direct foreign investment to Morocco. There were certainly good reasons for the Moroccan government to support this flow by encouraging the opening of Moroccan bank branches in Europe, giving favourable fiscal treatment to migrants' money, and following a friendly policy in foreign exchange rates (De Haas 2014). What's more, the total amount of remittances might be higher, given the importance of informal channels and the direct bringing-in of goods – for instance, evidence on remittances in 2007, went from 528€ million, when only formal channels are considered (Spanish Central Bank – cited in Gonzalez Enriquez and Reyes Ramón 2011) to 800€ million if informal channels are also taken into account (Moré 2009) However, from a co-development perspective, the downside to this direct flow of resources is that very few Moroccan migrants living in Spain are starting economic activities in Morocco, even though almost half of them had bought a house or a flat in Morocco (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013).

In fact, the GDP per capita and average salary gaps between Morocco and Spain make it very attractive for cross-border neighbours to find almost whatever job in Spain, even more so while they keep assessing their income with a "Moroccan" perspective, which is more probable in circular mobility. In the words of a young Moroccan:

> "Here, in one day I earn more than what I get in Morocco in one week, and I am just a 4-hour drive away."

There are few other borders in the world with such GDP per capita differences as the Spanish-Moroccan one, Spanish GDP being almost ten times that of Morocco's. In social sciences the relations between two units, be it individuals, social groups or countries are particularly challenging when they are very close in some variables/attributes and very different in others. This is certainly the case for the Moroccan/Spanish case, with a big income and cultural gap, but just 14 km away from each other and with a predictable future of increasing exchanges, especially among persons, in a shared Mediterranean area.

The income gap, the mere 14 Km distance across of the Strait of Gibraltar, the importance of seasonal activities in the Spanish economy, and more locally, in Andalusia, shape a context where circular and temporary migration could play a stronger role than in other EU/non-EU border regions. However, so far, the most intensive process that fits into anything similar to CM are more or less extended holiday visits to the native country. This is much more frequent among Moroccans living in

Spain than in any other EU country, and proximity is the obvious reason, but other forms of returns that are longer than extended holidays do not seem to be usual practice at the current time.

2.3 Programmed Circular Migration in Spanish agriculture: the collective management of hiring in the country of origin "*Gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen*"

Over the 1990-2010 period, irregular migration was often a win-win scenario, even if a very asymmetric win-win solution for migrants and agricultural employers to satisfy agricultural workforce needs, which had become acute with the development of intensive agriculture since the 1980s. For migrants it meant a first stepping stone and the beginning of a "non-legal" stay that could end up in a regular situation, either through general regularisations or, since 2005, through individual procedures.

As in other situations with blurred realities, uncertainty and even tolerance to irregularities offer opportunities to adapt through improvisation, but they make it difficult to anticipate and implement long term policies. The challenge, obviously, is how to strike the right balance. Variations of the *illegal entry–irregular stay long road to regularization* track also meant that as soon as migrants had gained legal status, many fled agriculture, since the sector was not able to compete in offering attractive working conditions. Actually, before the recent crisis (2008-2014¿?), one of the main recruiting attractions agriculture had to offer was its tradition of turning a blind eye to *los papeles (*documents) and thus being the easiest entry door for irregular immigrants. As the migrants got their residency permits and found better jobs, again the agricultural employers started to face recruitment problems and looked for a new irregular foreign labour force.

This reaches the most critical situations during seasonal campaigns, especially of highly perishable fruit, when the usual recruiting policy, in a key stakeholder's words, is:

> "The campaign is like a big un-choosy bus that arrives to the bus-stop and collects everyone: Spaniards, regular migrants, irregulars, those just arrived in the settlements…whoever wants to work."

In this context, to better manage the migratory flows and to guarantee a reliable labour force to ensure the collection of highly perishable fruit during specific periods of time, some large employers and the authorities promoted the "collective management of hiring in the country of origin" (*Gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen*) of foreign employees, or contingent labourers (*contingente)*, in different countries. Other forms of formal CM, such as those for self-employed and would-be entrepreneurs, have not received much support. Here, CM suffers a similar situation to that of migration to Spain in general, namely the difficulties involved in integrating qualified migrants into high-skill positions, or even attracting students.

Over the last fifteen years, the "collective management of hiring in the country of origin" (*Gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen*) has been (Gonzalez Enríquez 2013; Requena and Stepanek 2010), and still is, the main institutional tool to regulate the entry of seasonal workers to work into Spain with a commitment to return within the following 9 months. It has been mostly applied to agricultural workers (>90% during the boom years), and despite some presence in other Spanish provinces (Lerida – with the agricultural trade union Unió de Pagesos pioneering CM in Spain; Almeria and Valencia), it has been mainly concentrated in Huelva, in South-West Spain, where it started as an employer-driven local initiative and where it achieved the active support of the main actors involved. For the last three years (2011-2014), though, the national employment situation led to its reduction to around 2000 persons in Huelva (more than 90% of them women – see section 2.7). [5]

The first steps of this recruiting strategy were not straightforward. Many of the Moroccans hired in Huelva between 2001-2004 never turned up at the farms, and of those who did, a majority did not return to Morocco (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013; Gualda 2012; Gordo 2010, 2014). In those days, according to the SHs and the authors who have researched this topic, there were several procedural and management problems in both the design and implementation of the programs: unclear selection mechanisms –including suspicions of corruption, recruitment not well adapted to the nature of the jobs ("urbanites for agricultural jobs with flimsy hands," as an employer put it), and flaws in the design that complicated the supervision and monitoring of the different steps (arrival, commitment to work with employer who initiated the permit, return). However, the top reason to explain why people fled these programs is that they managed to find better alternatives somewhere else.

After the unsuccessful initial efforts with Moroccans, from 2002 to 2009, almost 90% of these *contingent* employees came from new eastern EU countries (mostly Romanians, and also some Bulgarians and Poles). But as these new EU citizens gained full free-movement entitlements across the EU, the *contingent's* conditions lost their appeal for them, either because they found better alternatives in Spain or because they found opportunities somewhere else in Europe. Either way, they no longer needed the *contingent* permit to work, whether in temporary agriculture or otherwise.

Therefore, during the "boom" years, berry-producing agricultural employers, given the extremely demanding temporal requirements of their product, and the constraints on increasing salaries (international competition, price-formation mechanisms, productivity limits), found themselves in a permanent struggle to guarantee a predictable and stable seasonal labour force. The need for predictability and stability discouraged the "irregular" practices prevailing in the sector. So, for a few years, employers thought a better solution was to hire Eastern Europeans, and they did so. As of today, why some positions were attractive to workers coming from Romania and Poland but not to those

[5] Moroccan seasonal migrants using the circular program ("contingent labourers") were concentrated in the province of Huelva (16.271 in 2009, compared to 519 in Almeria and less than 200 in Lerida). Still, "contingent" moroccan workers are a marginal minority compared to Moroccan workers residing in Spain who combine seasonal work in agriculture with other jobs.

coming from Morocco remains to be better explained, and this might shed some light or shadows on the dynamics of Circular Migration. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, when new eastern EU citizens gained free movement across Europe in 2009, and more chances to find better jobs, Moroccans were again considered part of the solution, only with a difference – now it was the turn of Moroccan women, and this gets closer attention in section 2.7.

For the berry-producing employers in Huelva, the main gain of PCM is to guarantee predictability and certainty in the use of a reliable labour force for a seasonal activity. As has already been mentioned within this report, before the program, many agricultural employers had serious trouble in meeting their personnel needs. However, the Huelva case is very specific, and no other part of Spain has seen the implementation of CM programs with Morocco as convenient migratory or labour policy tools. Within the Spanish regulatory framework, local employers, with or without help from other local stakeholders, should take the first step in initiating the regulatory process that leads to specific CM programs, and nowhere else in Spain this has become a significant practice. The reasons behind the Huelva exception are various and they mainly belong to one of the three following groups: the peculiar characteristics of the berry campaign with its very strict temporal requirements; the initiative of certain local stakeholders (individual employers and politicians) with good access to the national and even European spheres of decision-making, who put considerable energy into designing and implementing these programs; a less tolerant context with respect to informality than in other parts of Spain, where the seasonal staff needs of agriculture are often satisfied with the help of informal employment practices.

Therefore, Moroccan CM, with a formal commitment to return to Morocco at the end of the temporal permit, has meant basically seasonal agricultural work in Huelva, planting and picking berries (with some extra marginal numbers in Almeria and Lerida, where even in the peak years before the crisis they never rose above a few hundred, see Tables 4 and 5). Whereas for Spain as a whole formal circular migrants have always represented a very low percentage, at most, 1-2 % of the total foreign-born population, in Huelva, just before the crisis, migrants with a *contingent* temporary work permit were 40% of the estimated 110,000 people working in the campaigns (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013; Gordo 2014; Gualda 2012). In fact, the CM program was probably the single most important labour market policy in Huelva.

As has been stressed above, the “Collective Management of Hiring in the Country of Origin” (*Gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen*) has been, and still is, the main institutional tool to regulate the entry of seasonal workers to work in Spain. It is difficult to know why similar arrangements could not be extended to other sectors (care, construction, HORECAT), at least during the boom years before the crisis-induced restrictions on temporal permits. National authorities claim there was no clear demand among employers in other areas. Some experts argue that the administrative procedures were cumbersome and that the terms of the regulation in force remained clearly oriented towards collective seasonal (agriculture) recruitment; for instance, employers, together with drafting collective labour recruitment plans, are required to

provide housing and to organise and pay for travel (González Enriquez and Reynés Ramón 2011). This may have discouraged many employers in agriculture as well as in other sectors, especially tourism, with future potential for circular migration. Still, other experts claim that the limited success of formal circular migration, collective or individual, is less related to regulatory details, and more linked to the availability of alternative forms, including irregular ones, of finding a labour force.

At the regulatory level, the most decisive step in the Spanish formal CM process is the initial offer of employment for migrant workers channelled through big employers or groups of employers, who are required to draft collective labour recruitment plans;. This is followed by Government authorization of the final number of permits (this is done by the corresponding national Government representation office at the local level – Sub-delegation of the Government). The Government has the final word, after a meeting with a Monitoring Committee which includes all the levels and branches of the Administration involved (from territorial government delegations to local authorities) and social partners.

The Labour Accord between Morocco and Spain for the recruitment of workers, signed in 2001 and implemented since 2004, already detailed the different steps of the procedure: labour demand, communication, recruitment, travel arrangements, permits and working conditions. This accord, though, is different from the others Spain has signed: it does not consider aspects related to voluntary return or repatriation procedures, and it is heavily labour-market oriented (Gordo and Marquez 2014: 175). In Morocco, the main actor managing the process is *the Agence Nationale de Promotion de l'emploi et des Competences* (ANAPEC).

For 2013 and 2014, the Spanish Government extended the main regulatory framework issued in 2012 (Order ESS/2445/2013, 23 December), which included all circular migration linked to a formal commitment to return, and which constitutes the regulation that implements the Law on Foreigners, its subsequent reforms (Law 4/2000; Organic Law 2/2009 and the Royal Decree 557/2011), and the aforementioned bilateral agreement on migrant labour signed between Morocco and Spain. Before 2012, this procedure already applied to the vast majority of migrants with a formal commitment to return, and since 2012, it is the only entry available for almost every temporary migrant. In practice, for the 2012-2015 period, this affects just a few thousand persons.

Before the crisis, the Government was quite receptive to employers' demands, but since the dramatic rise in unemployment in 2009 (in 2013, above 25% for Spaniards, and 40% for non-EU migrants), many natives and long-term-permit migrants went back to look for jobs in agriculture, putting local authorities under heavy pressure. The national Government, both the social-democrat Government first, and the centre-right one after 2011, pushed towards almost complete cancellation of the program, just allowing for a very small number. Currently, as noted above, in addition to a hundred seasonal workers in other provinces, there are a few hundred in Lerida (still unclear for 2015), and 2,185 "repeaters" in Huelva, as a concession to a few local employers who pressured to keep some of their previous years' seasonal workers, as well as being the result of a well developed institutional framework.

The radical reduction of CM programs to give priority to unemployed Spaniards and resident migrants has meant that thousands of Moroccan employees – who had followed the rules, were highly productive and had obtained high levels of satisfaction among their employers – were not renewed for the successive campaigns, whereas some who decided to overstay finally found the possibility to remain in Spain. NGOs and several employers assessed this reality as very unfair, since, in the end, the transparency and formality of the programs made it politically easier to reduce these schemes than other restrictive alternatives, and, thus, this results in those who participate in CM paying a higher price of the crisis – by not having the possibility to come back another year – than those that remained in the country as regular or irregular migrants. Some employers were very assertive in criticizing this option, since it has prejudiced some employees they were very happy with:

> "We have been unfair with those who abide by the rules, and who could not come back these years; while we have ended up employing some of those who irregularly overstayed and in the good years left us to look for other jobs."

This situation points towards an important challenge for any promotion of circular migration, that is how to face the prevalence of irregular overstayers over regular circular migrants when migratory realities are full of "first come, first served basis" dynamics and "fait accompli", which serve to heighten irregularity.

Table 4. Temporary Work Permits for seasonal workers. Spain and provinces with the highest number: Huelva and Lerida. (total population in 2013 in brackets).

	2005	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
ESP (46,700,000)	33,297	47,180	9,224	14,615	6,650	2,500¿?	
Huelva (148,568)	22,391	40,491	7,273	11,843	4,206	2,185	2,185¿?
Lleida (139,834)		5,180	189	1,387	783	¿?	

Source: Ministry of Employment and Social Security; For Huelva (2013), Sub-delegation of the Government in Huelva.

Table 5. Migrants in Spain, Moroccan migrants in Spain, and Moroccan migrant seasonal workers from Morocco in Huelva.

	2000	2005	2009	2013
All migrants	1,472,458	3,430,204	5,386,659	5,072,680
Moroccan	236,517	557,219	737,818	756,946
MM SW	198 (2001)	1,094	16,271	2,185

Source: INE Cifras de Población; For Huelva (2013), Sub-delegation of the Government in Huelva.

2.4 Political and institutional factors linked to CM (SHs' views and agendas)

In relation to the political factors, the design and implementation of CM demands institutional capacities and coordination between a huge variety of administrations and actors from different regulatory areas and territorial levels: employers, trade-unions, NGOs, political authorities at different levels and with different powers. These efforts are more striking when one takes into account the following: the distinct, often contradictory, interests of the SHs involved; their usually diverging perspectives on socio-economic reality; and how the assessment of the situation might be very dependent on the territorial scale from which it is being analysed. That is, a policy that might be sensible for employers or trade unions associations at the local level, has other implications for those same actors when they consider it at the national level. The same applies to the administrations involved, which, besides territorial contradictions, need to balance policies pertaining to different fields (employment, welfare, education, and social protection).

Representatives of the various administrations stressed the need for harmonising the involvement of these actors in the various different areas and at different levels of government. Several SHs suggested that it would be helpful to coordinate these competences within a single department and to consolidate multi-stakeholder round tables that were less contingent on budget constraints. Some SHs also stated that the major influx of seasonal workers – here all seasonal workers were included – is not always taken into account when planning health, education and infrastructure needs. This holds true for both PCM and voluntary/non-programmed circular migration.

Given the restrictive financial situation since the start of the crisis, various SHs argued about the need to identify and guarantee certain critical funding levels in key support and intermediation services, a sort of "minimum ecological flow" as one stakeholder put it, for the sake of present migrants, but also as a guarantee to keep institutional capacities and not to start everything from scratch when the economy hopefully recovers.

Most SH also stressed the need for better cross-national coordination and a more active role for the Moroccan authorities in monitoring and supporting the evolution of those migrants who have participated in PCM. This is particularly relevant for issues such as impact on female migrants' children that are left with other family members (usually grandmother), the use of their savings, and other cultural or social gains/drawbacks from their experience. There is a transnational element here to be developed by both national authorities and other actors like NGOs or migrant associations. These activities could be included as part of the bilateral agreements between the two countries in migratory polices, a collaboration that has definitely improved over recent years, but with several demanding challenges remaining ahead. It is worth remembering here, that, for example, the Agreement signed 20 years before, in 1992 – on the movement of persons, transit and readmission of foreigners entering

the country illegally – only came into force in 2013. Meanwhile, the migration policy of Spain in relation to Morocco is often presented as balancing two main sets of demands: first, how to fit the migratory flows and the evolution of the labour market; and second, what is the role of the regulation of mobility across borders in the strategic neighbourhood relationship with Morocco.

Several local SHs close to the migrants' perspective are especially concerned with the impact of CM policies on the living conditions and rights of migrants, while they are sceptical about its potential as a strategy to manage migratory flows in terms of expectations about any significant impact it might have on total numbers of migrants. They are aware that voluntary preferences, opportunities and actual temporary or definitive returns among Moroccans are low, and they see enforcing involuntary returns as ethically questionable and/or actually difficult in terms of institutional capacities and logistical resources. Some experts argue, especially from within the literature which is more in favour of circular mobility (Triandafyllidou 2013; Zimmerman 2014), that the way forward is getting as close as possible to dual-citizenship scenarios and free-mobility across borders, even though they are aware that no major political party has actively supported PCM in Europe in any significant way.

Whereas a majority of employers hiring Moroccan migrants are in general highly satisfied, among the rest of the population there are also less favourable views, ranging from stereotypes and prejudices to surprise about the magnitude and management of these processes during the last decade. A delicate topic for SHs from different spheres is the general implications of any CM for the wider labour market and social model. There is a general reticence to give clear answers about the possibility of having a whole sector that may become structurally dependent on a foreign labour force with wages that may be attractive to circular migrants coming from much poorer countries, but which has serious problems to guarantee a more or less decent life in the country where the employment activity is carried out.

Certainly, for many local employers offering 700€ monthly wages is already almost an epic task, given heavy international competition and being at the mercy of the larger intermediation mechanisms shaping price-formation. But, in the long term, according to several SHs, the aim of getting closer to 60% (900€) of the average Spanish salary (around 1,500€ in 2014) would involve major changes in productivity, price-formation mechanisms, and even the possible need of state intervention to keep decent income levels.

After working conditions, other sensitive topics include access to the public health and education systems, which, as mentioned above, also have an important effect on migrants' decision to remain in Spain, since, like any other resident, they have free access to these services. But the integration potential of this reality is not trouble-free. In neighbourhoods with a high presence of migrants, there is evidence of significant percentages of better-off natives fleeing state education, while growth in migration in Spain has taken place at the same time as a two-tier education system has become consolidated. Within the education system we find, on the one hand, a privileged sector of private and pseudo-private schools where children from the upper third of income

earners are clearly over-represented and migrants are hard to find, if not actively discouraged (Fernández Enguita 2010, 2008), and, on the other hand, a state system for the other 2/3 of the population. Equivalent trends are also detected in the health system.

The promotion of PCM in Huelva is revelatory of the difficult match between general principles and actual policies. Spanish PCM has been a controversial topic, as it has almost everywhere else in Europe, and despite the fact that the Huelva experience has often been cited as a best practice in Brussels and has been used to inform a recent EU directive on the area,[6] no single political party has tried to claim it as their own, afraid of the electoral consequences, especially in the current context of economic crisis and high unemployment. Local employers and the local administration actually miss wider communication initiatives to present Huelva PCM as a serious institutional effort to balance the demand for labour with the welfare of migrants, and to counteract some "foreign media campaigns" that have linked berry production to the abuse of illegal immigrants. Employers are very sensitive to how the sector is portrayed in the European media since they are heavily export-oriented. (NW, SHI, OE).

Views closer to the trade-unions, NGOs, some experts, and from different areas of the administration are more critical of the situation, even if they stress that the PCM in Huelva is a radical improvement to what can be found elsewhere in Spain. An important issue relates to the high-levels of uncertainty for migrant women in the long term, with no predictable pathway to long-term permits and no security about future renewals. Actually, this insecurity and contingency on the Spanish economic situation, together with the desirability of longer permits, were among the most salient worries for migrants in PCM, who, as has been mentioned above, otherwise showed very high levels of satisfaction.

In relation to seasonal agriculture, there have been recurrent proposals and initiatives to increase stability among migrant and native workers: the joint planning of several campaigns, the design of national agricultural job pools and the promotion of internal mobility within Spain, which would require a reinvigoration of a national table for migratory flow management with representatives from the main Spanish regions where seasonal agriculture campaigns take place.

The debate on the joint planning of several campaigns offers a good example of how delicate the balance is between the labour market flexibility demanded by employers and the more stable contracts sought by trade unions and migrant associations. The joint planning of several agricultural campaigns for different products in order to cope with the brief duration of some of them (3-4 months) could be helpful for many circular migrants, but some SHs see it as a very complicated solution, since many campaigns overlap and have no clear starting or ending dates, given their contingency on weather

6 DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers Brussels, 7 February 2014 (OR. en) 2010/0210 (COD) PE-CONS 113/13

and market fluctuations. Besides, the implementation of this type of permit could become too bureaucratic.

Huelva employers participating in PCM, though quite satisfied in general terms, already claim that the bureaucratic procedures are a bit cumbersome. For example, they need to apply for their foreign labour force demand three months in advance of the anticipated starting date for the campaign. According to them, that is too early, given that their agricultural activity is heavily dependent on both the weather and international market fluctuations.

These topics point towards the dilemma-prone nature at the centre of CM. For employers, CM tends to be seen as a human resources policy that fits a wider “just in time” production logic and tries to adapt the hiring of employees to the fluctuations of their activities as best as possible (Gualda 2012). For the other SHs concerned and migrants, the “just in time” logic may not fit that well with other key issues related to access to citizenship rights. The need to go through the whole bureaucratic process of renewals on a yearly basis points to the fragile situation of these seasonal workers, whose rights may be too linked to the seasonality of their activities. Here CM policies import a key challenge from labour market policies: how to adapt to specific situations without unnecessarily increasing the total number and diversity of bureaucratic procedures; how to achieve a flexibility that softens the all-or-nothing logic inherent in many migratory policies without producing extended regulatory sets of requisites or wider segmentation of the labour market.

3. Migrants' experience: circularity, temporariness and uncertainty

3.1 PCM as second best

None of the migrants interviewed or contacted considered PCM as close to their best option, though they assessed it as a big financial improvement and as a very significant step towards a possible future of greater mobility and residence entitlements. At first sight, this was a salient fact, since at least a small minority was expected to find PCM as suited to their circumstances, and some of the stakeholders stated that PCM was often an ideal scenario for some of these immigrants. The qualitative nature of the study limits the generalisability of its findings; however this view was true for interviewees of different ages, and regardless of the number of years in the host country or family circumstances. Obviously, having Moroccan workmates entitled to move back-and-forth between Morocco and Spain as they please means it does make sense to consider better mobility scenarios than having a deadline for return.

Interviewees' assessment of the relevant drawbacks of their experience in Spain stressed the worries about extending/renewing their stay, present labour market uncertainties and family separation as their major problems. Furthermore, since the funding cuts linked to the crisis, they also miss the support and intermediation services and language and capacity-building courses that have been severely restrained.

All PCM migrants interviewed view it as just a second best option, with their situation often linked to uncertainty and vulnerability, with no predictable route to long-term permits. In these circumstances, some of those who have been coming since before 2008 are unhappy about their still temporary and seasonal status.

Consequently, most of them were concerned with alternative ways of extending their stay in Spain and family reunification issues. The majority we talked with claimed that if they were allowed to bring their children and their spouses, they would like to stay in Spain either the whole year or between 6 and 9 months. Those in PCM return to Morocco at the end of their campaign permit, as there is no legal way to over-stay, but when asked about the possibility of over-staying irregularly as former compatriots did, they said it is very difficult now, with much higher risks of not finding a job and losing any chance to come back to Spain, and above all, they were really worried about their children being left in Morocco. Several of them claimed that maybe in a non-crisis context they might have considered it (overstaying), when you could easily find a job doing whatever, but this is "not the case anymore." They knew of other Moroccans who had done this before and now had quite acceptable jobs –two veteran Programmed Circular Migrations migrants (PCMgs) personally knew former PCMg women who had "fled" the program and were now working "happily" in other parts of Spain (see annex 1 with the profile of PCMg14 who, during the interview decided to phone her friend (NPCMg-16), so that we could talk to her, and she is now managing a restaurant in

Alicante). They talked about them with an admiring tone, praising their courage, “she was very brave,” “she has been very lucky, though, you could see she was very courageous”; but this was before the crisis. Moreover, most cases did not involve children being left in Morocco, though “well, she did leave children in Morocco, and, after 2 years, they are with her in Alicante, but you never know if you will be lucky and no one finds a job now.”

These accounts, as further discussed in section 2.7 reinforce an interpretation of a strategic use of children by Spanish authorities to guarantee return, and it further complicates the assessment of the Huelva program; because to guarantee return compliance is a legitimate target, and the positive “social policy” effects of “quotas” for mothers are also there, but the instrumentalisation of children for guaranteeing return is highly questionable.

3.2 Income gains

PCM migrants earn what is stated in the provincial collective agreement in place. In 2013, the gross wage for non-qualified labourers (harvester) was 39.48 € per working day (6.5 hours), and 41.16 € for planters. Given that in Spain travel and residence for PCMgs is sometimes paid by employers, they can make savings of between 2500-3500€ per campaign, depending on how long the campaign lasts, which in turn depends on market and weather fluctuations. In a 4-month good season, a worker can earn, including long overtime, around 900€ per month and save something close to 3000€, at least twice what they could make (not save) with a full-year’s work in Morocco. In 2012, the legal minimum wage in Morocco for agricultural workers was 6 € per day (9€ per day for industry), below the World Bank absolute poverty-level threshold wage (6.4€ per day – US 2013). However, given that in Morocco more than 50% of the labour force is employed in informal businesses, that many employers do not observe the legal provisions and that the government has political troubles and few resources to supervise and implement labour law (interviewees and US 2013), the minimum wage requirements are often ignored (interviewees and US 2013, ILO 2013). Some women stated they earned lower wages than the minimum wage when they work in Morocco, and in rural areas the line between irregular farm work and domestic work is blurred, with domestic workers not being covered by labour law.

As to non PCMmgs interviewed working in seasonal activities, they worked for more than 9 months but got less than 7,000€ per year: around 900€ per month in the intensive seasons (February–June); between 300 and 500€ (if lucky) per month during the October–January period (since during this time of the year in this part of Spain agricultural work means less than 15 paid working days per month), and an unpaid two-month break in August–September where they usually return to Morocco. Some argued that, as working in the October-January period had become more and more difficult since the start of the crisis in 2009, if the residence permit requisites were

softer and larger absences from Spain were permitted for the sake of permit renewals, they would stay longer in Morocco where life is much cheaper.

For temporary migrants, a major implication of their low income is that most of those who have not brought their spouse and children before the beginning of the crisis cannot reach the annual income threshold for family reunification - between 10,000 and 14,000€ depending on the number of dependants. This generated serious emotional stress. Still, the significant variation across the interviewees in terms of the number of dependants and family circumstances was highly influential on their economic and general well-being.

3.3 Working conditions

Besides the income, many interviewees praised their standardised working conditions: working hours, the predictability of the arrangements, that extra-time is regularly paid. This sounds ironic given their uncertain situation by European standards, but they often compared their present conditions with the situation in Morocco, and stressed issues like:

> "You know when you start to work and when you end, and what you are going to get…you have your hours of rest and if you work overtime, you are paid, most of us want to work overtime, here we do not have much else to do"

> "Bosses do not bully you"

> "Before coming here, in Morocco I worked in the fields at my uncle's and as a labourer in the campaigns, I worked ten or more hours, then at home, it is from sunrise to sunset, and not even in one year would I earn the money I get here in a good month…they had told me about it, but I still would not believe it until I saw it"

Most interviewees and stakeholders say migrants get what is stated in the collective agreements and only very exceptionally suffer abuses. It seems that parity of wage and other employment conditions between locals and migrants are guaranteed – though some sources from NGOs and trade-unions showed some scepticism. Yet, it is more difficult to assess how the availability of migrants affects the evolution of the relative wages offered (Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2012).

In Andalusia, the collective agreements for harvesters and planters of fruits are distinctively signed for each major fruit and each province, and those sectors with a higher presence of migrants, like Almeria and Huelva, include lower pay per day. However, any account of the links between the presence of migrants and lower wages would need further and detailed quantitative evidence. Traditionally, agricultural collective agreements in Huelva have included lower wages than other parts of

Andalusia, well before migrants started to be a main component of the labour force. This may be related to the structural characteristics of the sector, level of formalization, size of the farms and the relative strength/weaknesses of the trade-unions. At the other extreme, the olive sector in Jaen has traditionally enjoyed the higher wages – 50€ per day for harvesters in 2014 – and it is also the sector where trade-unions are strongest and more organized, where there is a higher % of stable workforce, and it is the province with the highest proportion of locals working in agriculture in Andalusia.

Another issue that deserves further attention in the bargaining of working conditions is how collective agreements include significant wage differences for different positions linked to relatively more skilled tasks. It is not always clear that the wage variance is proportional to the alleged skill differences in the nature of the job, and migrants who tend to be over-represented in low-skill positions suffer this segmentation. This is an embedded problem in the fragmented Spanish industrial relations system, with numerous examples where the differences in employment conditions are not justified by difference in skill. For example, until very recently, in the olive sector there was gender segmentation and men used to work as “vareadores” (beating olive-trees with poles) with better conditions than the women who worked as harvesters.

According to trade unions and some NGOs in Huelva, serious abuses by employers against labour laws seem to be exceptional, though there might be some tolerance towards not fully paying social security contributions, for example by leaving out overtime. Some sources, though, claimed that abuses might be more widespread, and that the fight against mistreatment and the enforcement of labour laws is limited by several factors: extended tolerance towards minor and medium abuses (unpaid overtime, large proportions of unpaid social security contributions); limited resources for workplace inspection – there have been increasing efforts to provide the seasonal campaigns with extra personnel but the number of workplace inspectors is far from the ratio recommended by the ILO (1 per 10,000 workers); the trade-unions also suffer budget and staff constraints to effectively carry out their supervisory task; penalties for breaching labour regulation and/or the probability of getting caught are not high enough to discourage abuse (this is based on stakeholders views, and it would need a more detailed study to differentiate between the magnitude of the penalty and the probability of being reported and sentenced); high reluctance of migrant workers to report any abuse. Together with illegal behaviour, there are serious concerns with the negative impacts of some practices of unclear legality, such as those by some temporary employment agencies, which, according to several SHs, are close to social dumping.

3.4 Savings and long-term projects

Starting with PCM, given that PCMgs do not pay for accommodation and lead very frugal lifestyles, they save most of the income they get during the 4-month period, which is sometimes equivalent to almost a two-year Moroccan salary. But the number of dependants and the short period of the contracts for many of them, limit their saving

capacity, which is only very exceptionally linked to any clear upward social mobility and has little impact in terms of local development.

They consume very little, getting plenty of what they need from the farms and the rest in hard-discount grocers. Most go out rarely to bars or restaurants. No alcohol, no tobacco, a diet based on fruits, legumes and vegetables, and very rational strategies of consumption with high levels of coordination to take advantage of the saving opportunities offered by hard-discount stores through large collective purchases. Then, if the occasion demands it, they might buy a whole lamb and share it among themselves.

Of all the groups of migrants, PCMgs were in general the most satisfied with their income. Their temporal and back-and-forth situation certainly strengthens the assessment of what they get within a framework of expectation heavily determined by the country and background of origin and the very unequal situation between Morocco and Spain. This makes them highly satisfied with wages that would only provide for a very basic livelihood in Spain, as any other migrant or native would concede. Therefore, PCMgs evaluate any income and savings they get with the reference to how many times that particular quantity compares to the expected income they would get for equivalent efforts or time units in Morocco. Besides, since most of them live on the farms or in other free accommodation facilities, they benefit from considerable saving potential. Together with not having any rent costs and low levels of daily consumption, by living in a very similar and relatively isolated community, with much less exposure to more consumerist lifestyles than would be the case if they were living in the city, they are less susceptible to the “keeping up with the Joneses” effects that are behind a lot of conspicuous consumerism among both natives and permanent migrants (Mizrachi 2013).

Actually, in the present circumstances, many PCMgs apparently save more than the non-PCMgs, so there is a serious dilemma to keep in mind for the two different migratory projects with different balances of advantages/disadvantages in the short and long term. Most of them were concerned with alternative ways of extending their stay in Spain and family reunification issues, but they were highly aware of this dilemma:

> “I would be much happier with my children here, but, then, I could not live in the farm lodgings, I would need to pay rent in the village, and this is losing half your wage”

As for the saving capacity of most non-PCM temporary and permanent migrants, it is very low, given very low salaries in the agricultural sector, the severe impact of the crisis in the last four years, and the demanding personal circumstances many of them often bear (many come from poor rural areas and belong to large families with high number of dependants per salary). As mentioned above, most non-PCM interviewees worked for more than 9 months but got less than 7,000€ per year.

The large majority of both PCMgs and temporary migrants, according to interviewees and several SHs close to them (migrants associations, support NGOs), do not have any detailed economic project of any significant or medium-to-long term scale (starting a business or self-employment activity), and have trouble responding to questions about both their desirable and probable situation in 5 or 10 years. For most of them, the money helps to muddle through or to ease the usual hard struggle. Some pay or save for children's education and/or emergency cushion-funds for just-in-case health costs. A minority save for refurbishing, building or buying a house – in a striking contrast with the Moroccan collective living long-term in Spain, 45% of them own a house or flat in Morocco (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013). A few cases among CMgs showed some economic initiative: one was saving to open a grocery store sometime within the next 5 years; one was thinking of a small cattle cooperative business (sheep, goats and rabbits); another one had already contributed to significantly increase her family's head of livestock (sheep and goats); one was also in a partnership with a brother with a taxi; others considered opening small shops sometime in the future. An NGO representative told us of two cases of groups of women who had met in Spain through PCM and had managed to launch small cooperatives back in Morocco.

In relation to the Moroccans who had been living in Spain for longer than 5 years, although the collective is highly over-represented in low-paid jobs, we could find examples of successful trajectories, especially belonging to one of the following three groups:

- Small-business owners (shops, bazaars, groceries, discount phone, internet and money-transfer services). Given the size of the Moroccan community in Spain, just on their own they provide a number of customers which is a key support for a significant minority of small Moroccan businesses.

- A reduced but growing number of high-achieving Moroccans in medium and large agricultural companies who through on-the-job learning and internal promotions have reached high management positions in those farms.

- Qualified Moroccan workers in NGOs that are highly respected among local SHs.

They are definitely a minority, however, and we discuss their attitudes to return and circular mobility in section 2.9. The following quote illustrates their assessment of the situation:

> "I have found a good job, almost paid for the house, a good school, in no way could I have had that in Morocco (...), at least where I come from, and I go back 3 or 4 times a year"

For the majority of the Moroccan permanent residents interviewed, despite the drawbacks of low-paid jobs and uncertainty, their migratory experience was a better

situation than what they had in Morocco or what they thought they might find in the case that they decided to return. So, when asked if they would do it again (leave Morocco and come to Spain), most unambiguously said they would. Still, a few were not that clear, and their doubts are well expressed in this quote:

> "If the situation in Morocco improves, I am not sure the whole thing is worth it (...), all this...for what? I was also young, what did I know?"

This last quote has a sad tone and it was part of a sceptical assessment of a personal situation, from someone with formal education (up to secondary level) and friends in Morocco who, in his eyes, were leading better lives having remained in their home town than he was doing in Spain. However, it also points towards what might be a weakness of the mobility discourse, which often uncritically assumes mobility as a positive thing. But, what could be an ideal scenario in terms of mobility? One where asymmetric mobility from rural to urban, the periphery to the centre, the less developed to the more developed always pays off, reflecting the territorial imbalances of economic growth; or alternative ones where the chances and risks are not that clear, and there are well-grounded doubts about leaving or not, or for how long and under what circumstances.

At the weakest extreme, several of the interviewees had demanding personal circumstances with a high number of dependants per salary, and two reported that most of the money went into the serious health expenses of close relatives.

The importance and cumulative impact of savings could be downgraded out of cultural and personal discretion, difficult personal circumstances and uncertain expectations about the future, not least the renewal of the PCM program itself or the temporary permits. The migratory projects are economically decisive, even critical in some cases, but, for 37 of the 43 people interviewed and contacted, it was not a step into any major occupational transition or part of the start of a small autonomous business. One may consider here factors such as their starting low levels of education, their rural background, or that the income gained does not reach a specific critical threshold, though the lack of any major occupational change plan is also prevalent among most Spanish workers.

3.5 Integration and relations with the other communities and institutions

In terms of the interactions of PCM migrants with the local population, these are limited by two sets of factors. Firstly, the circumstances of seasonal work: short 4-month period, intensive work, accommodation in the agricultural holdings – usually not within walking distance from any town or village – and a massive majority of foreigners in the workforce, often grouped by nationality. Secondly, the background of both workers and the host community: on the one hand, the workers mostly come from rural Morocco, have low levels of formal education, with a high % of illiteracy, and no knowledge of the

Spanish language; on the other hand, the host communities are rural areas with traditionally low levels of income and education where the arrival of foreign workers on the present scale is something completely new. This situation certainly does not contribute towards fluent interactions between the two communities; rather, on the contrary, it often highlights more the real existing cultural barriers than the also real existing commonalities, and sometimes sharpens them with prejudices and clichés.

There are some initiatives by local authorities, NGOs, and even some employers, who have made a serious commitment to offer language courses and to promote multicultural activities. However, most of these efforts face the risk of ending up as sporadic one-off events that do not transcend their exceptional nature.

The language barrier is definitely a main obstacle for almost all migrants in their relations with locals, since they cannot maintain a conversation, and, thus, there are very few exchanges and socialisation opportunities with Spaniards or other migrant communities. In relation to travel procedures and bureaucratic transactions, they are helped by translators provided by their firms, or organizations like FUTEH, and often most of the paperwork is done for them. This has raised some concerns among NGOs, since, according to them, migrants are too dependent on individual employers' and other intermediaries' goodwill. As regards work instructions, this is usually the least problematic field, because in most companies there are Moroccan foremen or veteran employees who can explain the tasks.

Still, when assessing the integration record of CM, one has always to bear in mind the temporal limitations of the situation and to adjust the expectations with a realistic perspective. Here, it may be convenient to remember that, for example, in Spain, despite very different socio-economic circumstances there are other groups of foreigners who spend 4-to-6 month periods in the country on a cyclical basis, such as Germans and British residents, and they also show a low record in integration or Spanish language fluency.

At the same time, the limited communication and social exchanges between Moroccans and Spaniards and other nationalities has not translated into any serious conflict or into any sign of a latent tension or confrontational atmosphere that could feed violent incidents such as those that have taken place elsewhere in Spain (El Eiido in 2000). Still, several Moroccan women claimed that they were aware that the locals in general were closer and more friendly to Romanians than to them, be it because of cultural proximity or because Romanians had arrived before, or because "they are very good speaking Spanish." This point was also raised by several experts and SHs, who also noted that intermarriage was much more frequent between Romanians and Spaniards than between Spaniards/Romanians and Moroccans.

Before the crisis-induced funding cuts had reduced the language courses, many of the PCM women attended the courses, and some of them, highly motivated and with some academic background, achieved significant progress. Yet the results of these courses were considerably hampered by the short period of their stay, the few engagements with non-Moroccans, tiredness during the after-work hours, and the fact that more than

50% of them were illiterate. Still, when these courses and other training initiatives had been in place for some time, veteran PCM women lamented their cancellation, as much for the knowledge they might have learnt as for the social time it provided during the course and in the pre- and post-course hours, and for the chances to have individual access to the teachers or monitors for any queries about everyday life they might have had.

Given the duration and context of the interviews, due to lack of trust or out of precaution, most immigrants were very reluctant to formulate any serious criticism of anything related to the host country, whether workplace abuses, things to do with racism or some kind of harassment, or their social relations with the rest of the community in more general terms. Both migrants and most stakeholders claim that the living together of different communities is good, or at least untroubled; but it is unclear where to put this “good living together” on a scale that may go from mere coexistence to more or less rich and symmetrical interactions. For example, despite some known cases of employers’ exploitation, Moroccan employees almost never pursue legal procedures. In other areas of social life, the situation in spaces like the secondary schools is not that easy – especially for boys (there seem to be some frictions in their relation with female teachers – >75% in some secondary schools). Furthermore, very few young Moroccans make it to university, mixed couples are rare, and even other aspects like leisure activities or TV viewing habits (most of them only watch Moroccan channels and little Spanish TV) do suggest that there is significant room for improvement.

Regarding the relations with Spanish institutions, several Moroccan representatives stressed the difficulties for Moroccan citizens to participate in Spanish political life, with the long-standing demand of achieving a bilateral agreement between Morocco and Spain that allows Moroccans to vote in Spanish local elections remaining unmet. Then, there were complaints about overly bureaucratic administrative practices, and also the issue of having a proper solution for Islamic cemeteries and burials.

As for positive elements of their life in Spain, besides the income they get, most of them stressed the Spanish health service and the education system – for many, the health and education systems are very strong reasons to remain in Spain even if their employment situation has deteriorated.

Maybe, one of the clearest long-term positive impacts could be related to the education possibilities for the second generation, either if they live in Morocco or in Spain. One PCM female interviewee, for instance, stated that her work in Spain was crucial to support the university engineering studies of her young boy in Morocco, whereas many of those living in Spain with their families have expectations about the benefits for their children from going through the Spanish education system. This, though, needs to be further examined in both cases. For those remaining in Morocco, it remains to be seen how in different circumstances the extra-cash compensates for the parents’ absences. And for those in Spain, it is also unclear how being a minority may affect their academic chances; so far, as said before, there is already evidence that young Moroccan students, especially male ones, are not fitting that well into formal Spanish

secondary education (with a largely female teaching labour force), and very few of them reach university (Fernández Enguita 2010, 2008).

In a different realm, for the PCMgs women in Huelva, apart from the monetary remittances, participation in these programs, according to several representatives, experts and some migrant women themselves, has had significant empowering effects on some of them: increased admiration within the family and close friendships, a bigger role in family decision-making and higher self-confidence. There is a lack, however, of any close monitoring or assessment of these developments, and it might be too soon to appreciate their actual magnitude. At the same time, this "empowering" of women, according to several SHs, has raised certain distrust among some Moroccan actors about their future reintegration into Moroccan society, though a male Moroccan representative argued that migration is another significant factor contributing to the new role of women in Moroccan society.

3.6 Accommodation

Accommodation is a serious topic for migrants and several stakeholders (NGOs and public bodies), with different implications ranging from the well-being of migrants to territorial and urban planning matters. Accommodation is free for seasonal workers in Huelva, but not in other parts of Andalusia or Spain. According to the provincial collective agreement for seasonal workers, employers have to provide for accommodation, and in general they comply with the rules. However, the habitability rules may not be too ambitious in regard to the migrants' well-being, since they allow for very austere conditions (relatively small rooms for 4 people sharing) – actually, some migrants raised the issue of lack of privacy. Besides, since inspections are not that exhaustive, and migrants are very afraid of reporting any infringement of the rules, the final conditions depend very much on individual employers' discretion. Most employers seem to comply with the rules, and many of them, highly satisfied with their labour force, even offer much better conditions. Still, according to some stakeholders, there are also situations of abuse and overcrowding. Several SHs argue for improving habitability criteria and, especially, the levels of inspection and control.

Given that accommodation is free for seasonal workers in Huelva, this allows employers to put this factor into consideration when bargaining salary increases in the collective agreement. It remains to be seen in which cases the salary increases foregone because of free accommodation are compensated by the quality of the accommodation enjoyed. Besides, this arrangement could benefit PCM but prejudice other workers with permanent residence in the area who would prefer higher salaries.

As a matter of fact, the topic of accommodation shows how the national, regional and local levels of the administrations involved need to coordinate their different powers and views of the situation. Local governments apparently favour lodging adjacent to the firms to minimize the impact of big numbers of temporary (foreign) workers in their

villages, and favour the option preferred by employers (in terms of "availability" and "building costs"). But the regional government is more concerned with the territorial and environmental implications of building new constructions in rural areas. NGOs and experts, for their part, stress the limits to integration of that type of accommodation and spatial segregation. There are issues of spatial segregation of national communities, and, though these accommodation arrangements were also a tradition with local temporal labourers and pre-dates the arrival of migrants, there could be risks of substituting or compounding previous lines of class discrimination with national ones.

Several stakeholders also referred to a significant number of accidents and the risk for migrants of being run over as they walk along minor roads where there are no pavements for pedestrians.

All things considered, the location of the lodgings within the agricultural exploitations and often not within walking distance from any village is a controversial aspect whereby the proximity to the workplace and building-costs savings are counterpoised against aspects linked to richer relations with the host community. The next quote from an interviewee expresses well the isolated situation some migrants find themselves in, especially at the beginning. After some weeks since leaving Morocco, a woman remembers having asked her friend

"Are you sure we are in Spain?"

Living with other PCM Moroccan migrants on the farms or in purpose-built labourer accommodation, not within easy walking distance from any village or town nor with easy access to public transport, limits their socialization, cultural scope, and language learning. Despite this, only three interviewees stressed they would prefer a shorter walking distance to the village, in comparison with most of the others who were quite satisfied with the accommodation and valued the feeling of protection and friendliness of living together with other Moroccan workmates. They definitely would have preferred any extra-investment to translate as higher wages rather than as better accommodation.

3.7 The temporary circular recruitment of Moroccan women in Huelva

As regards Moroccan seasonal migrants, since 2005 the bulk of contracts have been mainly offered to women between 18 and 45 years old, with small children and with experience in agricultural work.

A controversial outcome of the application of these CM programs is the constitution, in its vast majority, of a female labour force: *las* "*marroquinas*" (Gordo 2009, 2013; Gualda 2010, 2012). This fact is a double-edged sword, mixing negative perceptions associated with gender discrimination in search of a more docile and vulnerable labour force and, on the other hand, positive aspects that have echoes of "positive

discrimination" and which favour access to employment in Spain of Moroccan women coming from very vulnerable situations (rural, with dependants under their responsibility, sometimes single/separated/widowed mothers).

The reasons stated by employers to justify this result are manifold but mainly related to women being more efficient in collecting these "delicate" berries, as opposed to other collection campaigns such as oranges or olives. Political representatives also claim that by "bringing" women with children, left at origin under the supervision of other family members, return was more highly guaranteed. However, there are criticisms coming from NGOs and trade-unions that see in this choice a strategy to get a more vulnerable and submissive labour force. Still, the assessment of this feminised reality in the NGO and trade-union context is very mixed, with, as mentioned, voices of caution against de facto discrimination and a possible instrumentalisation of a more acquiescent workforce (Fargues 2008; Gualda 2010; Gordo 2014; interviewees from trade-unions). In contrast, many leading female members of trade-unions and NGOs argue that the significant income (much more than a one-year salary in Morocco) and experience these women get should not be underestimated even from a gender perspective. So far there has not been any litigation in this regard, but a formal discriminatory recruitment system would go against the principle of equal opportunity as understood by the European legislation and the case law of the European Court of Justice.

However, this recruitment policy seems to be more implicit than formal, it is only explicit in the outcome, and, as mentioned, it includes elements that even NGO actors assess as a sort of "positive discrimination." As one NGO activist put it:

> "… some women who have had access to these 800€ per month jobs in Spain, would have never had the chance to come to Spain otherwise"

A Spanish feminist expert on this issue concluded that even if the selection procedure was indeed very questionable, in her opinion, there were also clear positive side effects of the whole process in terms of the significant empowering and emancipative potential the situation has had for Moroccan women. For them, living together, free from any family masculine authority and earning their own money is highly reaffirming. Another issue, in a circular migration context, is how to reconcile this newly-gained autonomy with the traditional contexts and families they find on their return.

All things considered, the feminisation of an occupation could mean several things and it is not always directly linked to vulnerability (education and health sectors). The detailed origins of this change in the selection criteria are unclear, but in a way they are a very representative sign of how the different actors involved in the process and with different interests in their agendas were able to achieve consensual strategies with relevant win-win elements, some fortuitous aspects and a clear will to coordinate among themselves:

- According to the interviews, the first conscious movement towards the recruitment of women with family responsibilities in Morocco may have come from the initiative of some local authorities in the area. They were aware that employers were already contracting a high number of female harvesters for the berries, from different nationalities (by 2005, a majority of Eastern Europeans), because apparently women were more “careful” and “patient” with these delicate fruits. Also, in the mid 2000s, most local governments were very concerned with the massive immigration taking place and its often disorganized nature, with spontaneous irregular settlements appearing in several localities fed by the rumours of high and indiscriminate labour demand during the peaks of the campaigns. Thus, local politicians become very interested in guaranteeing return, avoiding irregular settlements, and formally managing a flow demanded by employers. And they saw the contracting of Moroccan women with young children left in Morocco, so that they returned at the end of the campaign, as a possible solution to this.

- Employers, for their part, claim that Moroccan rural women are very resilient, delicate and hard-working. Besides, “their culture makes them very “sober” (no alcoholism, no going out)” and not inclined to create problems either in the workplace (almost no absenteeism or disputes) our out of it (“they are very good at taking care of the shared accommodation” and do not create any disturbance). Trade-unions are sceptical about this, and speak also of hidden interests in the employers’ agenda to favour a less complaining and more docile labour-force. They also point to the fact that while women make up more than 90% of the collectors, men occupy most of the positions of responsibility, which creates a very asymmetric situation.

- As for ANAPEC, the Moroccan employment service which carries out the first step of the selection process in Morocco, they may also have found a coincidence of interests between their own concerns and those of the Spanish employers. Spanish actors interested in Moroccan women with dependent children usually thought of married women, and, actually, ANAPEC stipulated the requirement of the husband’s acceptance of his wife’s entering the program – which has been criticized by Moroccan women’s associations (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013). However, the fieldwork, though qualitative, revealed a high proportion of single mothers, widows and divorcees (the actual proportion would need a quantitative approach). When asked about this, some interviewees argued that ANAPEC may have a mixed agenda of their own. This is because, firstly, they might not be so sympathetic to married mothers going to work abroad; and, secondly, they were using their involvement in the selection procedures as a kind of “social policy” tool, favouring rural single mothers, widows and divorcees who were facing serious difficulties in Morocco and would have lots of difficulty finding work in Morocco – again, this could be understood as some kind of “positive discrimination” quota.

3.8 Family and gender values in a CM context

Family separation was for almost all migrants a major cause of stress, and this is most acute when it involves children under school age. Children are usually taken care of by other female members of the family, mainly grandmothers, then aunties, and more rarely fathers – still, almost half of the PCMgs interviewed were unmarried. Several interviewees gave the general impression of having rationalised the situation with arguments along the lines that the period was not that long, "they are left in good hands, otherwise I would not do it," "it is worthy, this allows us a much better life," but three stakeholders' representatives (2 NGOs, 1 manager) repeated that the saddest moments of this reality was seeing some of these women suffering when talking with their children on the phone.

Given the present circumstances, for many PCMgs there is a real dilemma here, bringing their children to Spain, at least those under school age, would mean, in many cases, that they could not enjoy the free (or very cheap) accommodation in the agricultural holdings, since farms do not allow children in their accommodation facilities. Then, if they have to pay a normal rent in the village, this heavily undermines their savings potential.

From the children's perspective, the final impact of the mothers' absence on the children's well-being is unclear, and even more unclear is how to assess the off-setting balance between the potential negative aspects of their mothers' absence and the positive effects of the income gain – that actually could translate into more and better time with their mothers during the months they spend in Morocco. The age of children, the involvement of fathers and the support of close female family members are all factors which could radically change the experience.

As for relations with husbands, this has been pointed out as a controversial family issue by stakeholders and experts, and numerous women said their husbands were not that happy with the situation and reticently accepted it as a temporary sacrifice which needed to be made. Though this research has not had access to the husbands' perspectives, a majority of the male Moroccans interviewed living in Cartaya expressed disapproval of the situation, with traditional observations like:

> "a mother needs to be with her husband and her children"
>
> "to live abroad, alone, on your own is not the right thing to do for a woman, I would never allow my wife or daughters to do that, whatever it takes to be done".

Views such as these, together with seeing women as competitors for jobs they could do, are the main reasons behind the extended scepticism about the CM program as a whole expressed by the permanent Moroccan community living in Huelva. This is in line with former research findings about the reluctance of husbands to see their wives going abroad to work, even for short periods of time (González Enriquez 2013). However, several male Moroccan co-workers showed respect and even admiration for

their female compatriots, even if this was often argued within a traditional framework of values, “Moroccan women are very hard-workers and they would do anything for their families.”

The women interviewed, for their part, included several possible situations that defy a reductionist understanding of their relations with their husbands. The most common assessment by those who are married is that their situation is not an ideal one, that it helps them decisively to make a better living, but it should be transitional, with a desired provisional ending being all the family having a life in Spain. Then, there were some who showed clearer signs of longing for their husbands, “I call him every evening and ask him everything he and the children have done that day, then I ask the children again…what have you eaten, did you finish your dinner?... is everything fine?” Others referred repeatedly to common decision-making processes, “both my husband and I think this could improve greatly our situation,” “we both would like to come to Spain, as long as one of us could find a full-year job.” From a different viewpoint, there were also those more inclined to express comfort and relief at being away from the cultural, family and social constraints in their original backgrounds.

We have presented here three main attitudes towards the circular migratory experience of married Moroccan women, that we could label as “muddling through while waiting for something better,” “longing for/homesickness,” and “relief”; and there were women who really were more or less clearly associated with one of them, but there were also many interviewees who presented a tangle of the three attitudes where it is difficult to assess in which proportion each attitude was present.

The most unexpected evidence in this field, though, was the high proportion of unmarried women: single, divorcees and widows –as discussed before (section 2.7). The majority of them wanted to extend their stay in Spain and bring their children, if they have any, with them.

In the area of family life, a key topic in migratory debates on movement between countries with different family and gender values is the reflection on how the exposure to different ways of organising family life, mainly gender issues, changes the worldview and behaviour of women. In PCM this may get further complicated by moving back and forth across the border between two very different family/gender “regimes”. The interviews with PCM women did not offer examples of deep changes in this regard, as all of the married PCM women did not report substantial changes in their role in the family once they were back in Morocco, nor any change in the family status. Again, the qualitative nature of the research limits its generalisability, and sources from NGOs claimed they knew of cases of PCM women who get divorced after their husbands had married other women while they were in Spain. Maybe our interviewees were reticent or embarrassed to confess to serious changes of gender perspective, or it was too soon to assess them, or their circumstances (4 months living mainly among fellow Moroccan citizens with similar rural backgrounds) did not favour much openness to new things – a key exception to this is the close cohabitation between Moroccan married and unmarried women (back to this below). When for example they were asked about desired futures for their daughters, they were much more concerned about

material improvements in their life conditions than with gender issues, and three of them explicitly showed the conservative view that they would not like their daughters to become like the “Romanian” or “Spanish” girls who do not care that much for family life.

Still, even if they did not articulate explicit changes in the family organization, those who had become the main earners in the family may have strengthened, in a significant way, their power position in the family, and a few were making serious efforts to convince their husbands to try to come to Spain, which shows initiative and some bargaining power. At the same time, at least for those PCMgs interviewed in 2014, the fact that any probable future in Spain, even the renewal of their PCM position, was so uncertain did not support any firm expectation of wider economic, and the correlated social and family, autonomy. In the straightforward words of one of them:

> “As of now we have no idea about what would happen the next year, it is only 4 months, we really have nothing to count on”

The unmarried Moroccan women offered quite a different picture. Their perspective obviously originated from their unmarried status previous to coming to Spain, but the PCM experience may have certainly contributed to empower to some extent their situation, in spite of the fact that they were very much aware of how uncertain their current migratory arrangement was. With the exception of one unmarried woman – who had an extensive support network (family and friends) in her village and was happy with PCM, though she would prefer a longer period (something close to 6 months) – all the other ones wanted to come to Spain for a continuous longer period, considered Spain a better place for unmarried women, in general, did not see any urgency to re-marry (some were actually determined to remain single), and three of them considered, half in earnest half joking, the possibility of marrying a Spanish man.

Regardless of the actual influence of PCM in changing some elements of migrants’ worldviews such as those linked to gender issues, changes are more probable when the exposure to new behaviours goes hand in hand with more stable material conditions to try them. Among Moroccan women working in seasonal agriculture and living permanently in Spain we found clearer cases of two young women (under 35, also with low levels of formal education but clever and very fluent in Spanish, one had come to Spain via CM and then “fled”, the other had entered irregularly) who had consciously adopted a clearly secularised pattern of behaviour in their relations with work, family and men. Related to this, as well, in Cartaya’s secondary schools young Moroccan girls are doing much better than boys and of the few Moroccan youngsters we got news of who had reached university, all but two of them were girls. Also, when talking with different interviewees about the attitudes of the second generation, girls were considered in general less willing to think of going back to Morocco than boys, though one of the girls who had finished university was actually going back to Morocco to take up an attractive position in a multinational.

3.9 Temporary/definitive return, circularity and cross-border mobility

The serious problems with the definition of any kind of CM and the availability of standardised data severely hinder efforts to monitor and assess these movements. Thus, any estimation of the number of Moroccan citizens involved in VCM and temporary/definitive return to Morocco is very difficult to attain. Given this lack of reliable assessments, it is not clear how to make any predictions about the statistical magnitude of possible returns so that it can be taken into account in the long-term management of migration.

Regarding PCM, a major challenge involves the difficulties implementing return, since Spain has had serious problems, logistically and ethically, in implementing involuntary return and this complicates any policy which may include the need to enforce involuntary return. Actually, and according to qualitative evidence, within a European perspective, the Spanish competent police forces seem to be harsher at avoiding entry than at enforcing return. An official from EDATI (the Spanish police force with powers for migration issues), familiarised with irregular migrants in settlements, said:

> "We recommend irregular migrants in the settlements that if they do not get into trouble (petty crimes), we will leave them alone, and if they are patient and wait, over time, they might get chances to get permits"

According to the sources and the data available based on the population registers (González Ferrer 2014, 2015; Domingo and Sabater 2013), VCM, temporary and definitive returns well ahead of retirement, appear to be low among Moroccans. SHs support this and also claim that it is very low. The majority of Moroccans prefer to stay in Spain and do not foresee any return at all, much less than other collectives such as Latin-Americans or Romanians. In 2010, 83% of the Moroccan respondents to a survey for the Spanish Labour Ministry declared to have adapted to Spanish culture and did not contemplate any return (Gallego 2012). This also helps to explain the failure of any programs to incentivise return. The 2008 Voluntary Return Plan, included in the Law on Foreigners in 2010, offered the payment of all due unemployment benefits in two instalments, but this was not an incentive at all for the Moroccan community, since it required a commitment to not to return to Spain in the next three years, and most Moroccans did not want to lose their residence permit that had taken long waiting periods to achieve, often including irregular situations. For many, the expectations of finding any job are still important, and the health and education system also motivates migrants to stay.

Among the Moroccan migrants living in Spain we talked with, the first preferred scenario is permanent residence and, failing this, the renewal of temporary permits of full-year periods. Otherwise, the most similar situation to Circular Migration (CM) that seems to best suit the circumstances of those working in agriculture would be something close to 6 months in Spain/6 months in Morocco.

In the interviews, for a majority of interviewees, the clearest intention about return was after retirement: 35 of the 43 Moroccan migrants we spoke with (interviewees and other conversations), when asked about their definitive return to Morocco, were only assertive about spending their post-retirement years in Morocco. This is in line with available survey-evidence on first generation return plans, which, however, are in contrast with the second generation's preferences, who very rarely (<10%) consider a move back to Morocco on a permanent basis (Domingo and Sabater 2013). SHs and experts interviewed confirmed that, in their experience, definitive return before retirement (or early retirement) appears to be low and mostly when the situation in Spain has become unbearable, and return is very low for the second generation.

Given the difficulties of finding any attractive job or substantial economic activity in Morocco (here, the asymmetry between the countries is determining, since the GDP per capita and average salary gaps between Morocco and Spain are so high (10 and 5-to-7 times respectively), any CM at the short or medium term is, at most, a second best option.

Just 2 of the 12 non PCMgs interviewed considered a probable voluntary return somewhere within the next 5 to 10 years. The other 10, when asked about their life plans, their preferred and probable future situations, for the next 5 to 10 years (including voluntary more or less permanent returns to Morocco), found it difficult to see the possibility of finding attractive working conditions in Morocco. In addition, for the majority of them, starting a small autonomous activity (shop, bazaar, small farms, hostelry, taxi, transport, etc.) was not a feasible possibility. When asked about their knowledge of other Moroccans that have returned, they mainly named cases of non-voluntary return, either because of problems in attaining first residence permits or with the renewal of the temporary permits; or because, after being unemployed for a long period and with the end of unemployment benefits, they had problems meeting monthly living costs (mostly rent).

From a regulatory perspective, those with temporary residence permits have added difficulties to participate in circular mobility since the requirements of the Law on Foreigners for renewal and access to long-term permits are strict in delimiting the absence periods from Spanish territory (less than six months out of Spain within one year, 10 months in 5 years) (Gallego 2012). This severe regulation of residence permits inhibits unemployed Moroccans from temporarily returning to their country or going somewhere else to try their luck. Furthermore, the Law on Foreigners 2009 also incorporated a restrictive Council Directive on TCN that affected the mobility of long-term residents, as they will lose their status if they are out of the EU for more than twelve months (González Enriquez 2013). Finally, as González Enríquez (2013) stresses, the more difficult access of Moroccan migrants to Spanish citizenship application procedures (a legal requisite of a ten-year stay) than for Latin Americans (2-year stay requisite) also affects their chances to move back and forth.

Still, regardless of what the actual influence of regulatory aspects might be, the majority of Moroccan migrants try to make their working life in Spain, and very rarely follow any economic or social activity in Morocco, other than owning a house or returning for

holidays. These holidays, though, for those working in agriculture or other seasonal activities and with long term permits or nationality (and, thus, not affected by the renewal requirements), could mean 2-3 month periods (often shaped by the school year) and often involves, depending on the economic circumstances, the buying, building or major refurbishing of a house.

The few plausible return narratives that could involve significant life-course improvements are mostly to be found among those that had started small businesses long before the beginning of the crisis – around 2008 or before (grocery shops, bazaars, "*locutorios*"[7], etc.). But this represented a small number, and maybe less than 5% of the Moroccan community. They come from a different background (more urban, sometimes with some little but key family capital to start with, family links here and in Morocco, and often with previous experience in small businesses). They invest some money in housing or other small business in Morocco associated with family members or close friends (shops, small import/export businesses, rental homes, transport, etc).

Other situations of more successful VCM involving Moroccans were also identified among collectives that may be statistically marginal but with significant impact in terms of human and social capital exchange: Moroccan workers who, through work experience, on the job training and informal learning, have been successfully promoted in their companies into managerial and directive positions at the firm and may also help their employers in their potential activities in Morocco (we met two of them on the farms); and Moroccan professionals working in NGOs and associations supporting Moroccan immigrants.

In sum, there are low levels of Moroccan CM. Nevertheless, we also witness the more or less extended holidays/non-work periods of temporary and permanent residents, qualitative evidence of unregistered spontaneous temporary returns of one kind or another, and a small but increasingly significant minority of successful Moroccans who often move back-and-forth. Taken together, these trends add up to a growing and richer cross-border mobility between Morocco and Spain, and informs us of how to deal with the political challenge of how to make the most of mobility for the development of the persons and communities involved in it.

[7] A store that includes cyber-café services with several enclosed phone booths, and money transfer services.

4. Conclusion

At the present moment, Spanish CM experiences are a small part of its larger migration reality and their corresponding policies have many improvised answers to urgent needs, even if they also contain important qualities to build upon. For instance, according to most of the interviewees (migrants and SHs), in the areas where PCM has taken place, the system enjoys high levels of transparency and formalisation, which is remarkable given that the Spanish labour market is mired with problems of informality, the black-economy and significant vulnerabilities linked to a severely segmented labour market. In addition, the main actors involved in PCM – employers and migrants – express high levels of satisfaction, with economic benefits for migrants (more than 5-times the income they used to get in Morocco) and labour force advantages for employers. Also, PCM and other migratory policies in the agricultural sector have often meant significant levels of consensus-building and policy learning among the stakeholders (employers, trade-unions, NGOs and different territorial levels of government) in both the design and implementation of policies and institutions. This includes substantial evidence of "best practice" that could be taken into account in future migratory policies and programmes.

In the medium and long term, however, there are several issues that remain unclear. Some of them linked to the very low salaries paid in the agricultural sector and the uncertainty about the extension of contracts and permits.

For most migrants, despite getting a salary that is several times bigger than what they would get in Morocco, the costs of living in Spain and the money dedicated to supporting family members mean they have very little saving capacity, which limits their chances for more or less "successful" returns. In deferring or avoiding return, together with their low saving capacity, we also need to take into account that most migrants value their access to the Spanish health and education systems as two of the major improvements achieved with their migratory project. In other areas, such as possible human capital gains from the migratory experience, these are heavily constrained by the low-skill nature of the jobs, the initial low educational backgrounds, and, in the case of PCM, the short duration of their stays. To be sure, the experience of living in a different culture should not be underestimated, but the temporariness of their stay, the fact that they spend most of the time among compatriots, the scarcity of free-time and the compulsory return for PCMgs and those failing renewal requirements restrain the relative importance of any non-income factor in their migration.

More generally, given the coexistence during the last decade – both in economic boom years and the crisis period – of persistent low salaries, high migration, and past, present, and future forecasts of endemic high levels of unemployment, it is going to be very difficult to assess the fit between agricultural-sector migration and the general Spanish socio-economic structure. Intensive fruit agriculture has proved to be among the most dynamic sectors of the Spanish economy, successfully export-oriented, and

very resilient during the crisis. But this has not translated into significant salary improvements. For the last ten years, salaries have remained virtually unchanged in the successive collective agreements. They were and still are among the lowest of the Spanish economy, and this was also so even in the "boom" years of 2002-2008, when the critical recruitment problems started the search for Moroccan labour but which left salaries untouched. Whereas the intensive agriculture dynamism of the 2000s was often compared to the growth in the construction sector, it did not offer equivalent salary improvements in the face of manpower shortages.

If the agricultural sector, like other low-paid services, even in a context of major labour shortages, was unable to offer more attractive salaries, be it because of global competition, productivity ceilings or adaptation to low wages; what does this mean for the future of those working in this sector? Which could be the reasonable trajectories for improving their working conditions? Are there alternatives to agricultural jobs other than as first stepping stone or last-resort jobs? Is Spanish agriculture an entrenched reality of low-paid jobs with no ways out, or could it offer, in, 5, 10, 20 years, salaries that are closer to the average of the whole economy? How?

During the "boom" years, when unemployment in Spain reached record low levels in several occupations, the agricultural sector, like other low-paid activities (care, catering, etc.), had to, and was allowed to by the regulatory model, rely heavily on a low-paid migrant labour force, since it was unable to offer attractive and competitive salaries to recruit EU residents. This fact leads us to ask important questions on the impact of long-term trends across a number of areas, ranging from what the actual possibilities and scope of a high-productivity knowledge economy might be to the wider socio-economic implications in terms of a more or less unequal society. Before migrants started to enter Spain in large numbers, Spain was among the most unequal countries in the EU-15, and this shaped the conditions the migrants were facing. In this sense, the Spanish example revisits a delicate question: are more unequal societies more open to migration because of their higher tolerance to very low-paid jobs in domestic service, agriculture, construction or catering? During the bonanza years, migrants' hard work was a significant factor behind Spanish economic growth, but this economic growth, for the first time since the 1950s, did not translate significantly into reducing inequality nor was it based on clear productivity gains. Most of the jobs created in those years were low paid and temporary, with domestic service being one of the occupational groups with highest growth in that period. Afterwards, Spain suffered severely with the crisis, with its impact being among the most regressive in Europe, and the social groups at the lowest extreme of the income distribution suffered the highest proportional losses, which often had serious implications in terms of basic needs (evictions, poor diets) (Ayala 2014).[8] Highly unequal labour markets and weak social policies are the main explanations of this last regressive evolution, and both hit migrants very hard.

8 http://www.foessa2014.es/informe/uploaded/documentos_trabajo/15102014141318_4885.pdf

In the long term, steps need to be taken to overcome the risks for Spanish intensive agriculture and the other low-paid sectors which rely on the employment and availability of low-paid workers (migrants or locals). It is unclear to what extent the availability of low-wage workers is simply postponing the necessary adjustments in technological innovation and organizational change (Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2012; Ruhs, 2011; Castles, 2006). It also remains to be better explored how the low Spanish minimum wage (around 600€ net per month) legalises what in many other EU countries would be close to social dumping, and to what extent key Spanish sectors (agriculture, HOTRECAT, care, etc.) are becoming highly dependent on a cheap labour force, foreign or otherwise.

As soon as Romanian and Bulgarian employees gained full entitlement to work in the whole EU labour market, agricultural employers started to worry about their flight to other occupations or territories. And this reveals a serious long-term structural problem in this sector: its dependence on manpower with "curtailed" rights, a sort of "captive" labour force. As mentioned above the huge importance of these jobs for migrants and employers alike cannot be ignored. In the case of migrants there is the income and there is the possibility of this type of work being a "stepping stone" into better situations. However, there is also the risk that by *regularising* contracts that are very close to informal and vulnerable jobs, these situations could become embedded in the economy for the long term (Garrido et al. 2010; Bernardi and Garrido 2008). Here, it is worth remembering that when Spain has tried to import flexicurity options that have worked relatively well in other EU countries (Denmark, the Netherlands and other countries), due to the Spanish tolerance towards informality, Spain's productive structure and some institutional weaknesses (supervision, small size of firms), these options have become perverted into lasting forms of precariousness at the other extreme of the "integrative" logic. This is seen, for example, in the case of temporary contracts or the "becarios" issue (internship contracts).

This surely demands reforms beyond migratory policies, as it is also the case with any kind of mobility. For instance, the improvement of circularity depends heavily on major structural trends such as reducing segmentation between permanent and temporary jobs and between seniority lines, to reduce the risks of occupational downgrading in any kind of labour mobility, circular or otherwise, involving foreign or native citizens. The Spanish labour market penalises labour mobility and there are strong links between better working conditions and length of service within a firm, with most good jobs usually linked either to the public sector or long trajectories in companies. Also, beyond legal requirements, normal administrative practices dealing with housing, education, and access to key welfare services – which already make interurban mobility difficult for Spanish citizens – discourage many Moroccans from in engaging in any form of cross-border mobility other than holidays, since they see any relocation to Spain as very problematic in the case that a hypothetical temporary return to Morocco went unsatisfactorily.

Apart from regularised CM, for the Spanish case, a promising area from which to further study CM might be to assess how the "migratory regime" (understood as

something close to the distinguishable sets of institutions and the policies influencing these institutions that simultaneously shape the main elements of a national migratory reality) affects “de facto” and “voluntary” CM through three main areas of policy intervention: first, the first access to regularised residence – for example to what extent illegal entry is or is not a major obstacle to achieving a regularised situation in the short, medium and long term (impact of “general regularisations”); second, what shapes the successive renewals – issues like to what degree these renewals are dependent on labour market participation records; and third, how different factors affect temporary or permanent returns, and voluntary back-and-forth circular movements. In relation to return, apart from the key decisive factor of few comparative opportunities in Morocco, the low-salary and almost no-savings situation of most Moroccan migrants working in Spanish agriculture are certainly major obstacles to voluntary return.

In the immediate future, there is a clear need to clarify what the main targets of any circular migration policy are. As a response to the mismatch between supply and demand of labour in a 500 million labour market, the corrective power of CM looks limited in comparison with other alternatives such as structural readjustments in the existing wage systems. As a policy strategy with expected impacts on the total number of migrant residents, it does not look very convenient either, since the number of those involved in circular movements is a small minority of the total amount of migrants. However, as policy tools that form part of a wider repertoire, including co-development and geopolitical policies with non-EU neighbours, CM promotion policies may have some significant contributions to offer in improving cross-border mobility rights and the well-being of the migrants participating in them.

For example, the temporariness of employment-oriented circular mobility we have considered in this project has inputs to offer, in terms of institutional devices and capacities, for situations where the doubts or lack of political consensus on giving temporary stay permits arise from the wariness about these permits becoming automatically permanent entitlements. In this case, a clear commitment to return may actually contribute to open doors and enhance the response capacity to emergency situations like the current refugee crisis (Autumn 2015) where most European states, full of uncertainties about how many refugees to accept and for how long, are answering reluctantly to the tragic situation of the refugees. A buffer arrangement where the temporary nature of the answer is granted, including clear criteria about return when the situation in the country of origin is not threatening, will surely widen the room of maneuver for national governments to accept more refugees. Mobility is easier when every entry/exit is not assumed as an all-or-nothing irreversible event, and the different European States could better translate this fact into more flexible and detailed regulations.

As regards Moroccan-Spanish relations, it is difficult to imagine any better future scenarios if they do not involve personal mobility across the Moroccan-Spanish border and greater exchanges in all the social domains. However, the materialisation of these flows goes far beyond simplistic win-win assumptions. There are important distributive issues to discuss within both countries, with different social groups benefiting more or

less from all of these exchanges. So far, immigration in Spain has been mainly led by an employer-driven labour market, and, thus, the incorporation of migrants into Spanish society as a whole has suffered the consequences of a labour market characterized by informality, de-regulation and deep lines of segmentation, with all the inherent vulnerabilities that these factors imply. In this sense, an important topic to consider for policy recommendations is to what extent there are margins to de-couple a certain migratory model from labour market imperatives, a certain *decommodification*[9] of the migrant experience and migratory policies. This could mean that in the "good" years migrant entry does not exactly mirror the flamboyant demands of the labour market, but it also means that in the bad years migrants do not disproportionally suffer the effects of the crisis. In Spain we see a situation in which temporary employees (the situation for most immigrants), despite already having lower salaries for the same jobs, have suffered much higher salary losses (close to 20%) during the crisis than permanent employees (under 10% INE 2014).

Given the size of the migrant collectives in Spain, it is not difficult to find qualitative evidence of more or less successful trajectories in most economic activities, including diverse patterns of voluntary circular mobility, but the hard statistics on precariousness show serious room for increasing the number of desirable life courses.

Barcelona, IGOP Mobile Identities team 10/10/2015

[9] Importing the *decommodification* concept from the welfare literature, *Esping-Andersen 1993, 1999.*

5. Annex

5.1 ANNEX 1: INTERVIEWEES, PCM MIGRANTS (21)

As stated in the report, most interviewees were highly satisfied with the opportunity to come to Spain and the income they were earning, with their main worry being the uncertainty about the temporary nature of their permits and their future annual renewal. Most of them expressed a strong preference for staying in Spain longer, more months per year, and more years (at least more than 5, and often more than 10). In the following table, to avoid repetition and overlapping, we have stressed the details of each interviewee which are most illustrative of the PCM situation, even if their personal circumstances vary radically from hardship to relative well-being.

	PCMg-1	PCMg-2	PCMg-3	PCMg-4
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, marital status, education, Spanish knowledge, occupation	Female, 29, 1 child, married, primary education incomplete, minimal basic Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 25-30, childless, married, no education, minimal basic Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 35-40, 3 children, divorced, 2 years of school, no Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 35-40, 4 children, married, secondary education incomplete, basic Spanish, rural, berry picker
STAYS	6 years coming 9 months in Spain per year	8 years coming Between 6-9 months per year	7 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	5 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year
MOBILITY AND RETURN PREFERENCES	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years, but depending on husband's permit	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 5 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years
ANNUAL INCOME/SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	7,000-8,000€/2,000-3,000€ Low human capital gains. No clear long-term plan	3,000-3,500€/2,000€ "I have helped my parents to refurbish their house, and I am saving to build my own." Sometime in the next 10 years wishes to open a shop	3,000€/1,000€ No clear long-term plan	"pay for my children's needs and refurbish my house." No clear long-term plan

	PCMg-1	PCMg-2	PCMg-3	PCMg-4
DRAWBACKS GAINS, OTHER QUOTES	Uncertainty, isolation, language problems, missing husband, homesickness, income threshold for reunification GAINS: High income, polite people, health, education, nice city "If my husband could get the permit, I would like to stay in Spain until retirement."	"The first time I arrived, I was really afraid of stepping on the boat, then of meeting Christians (…). It was a surprise for me seeing boys and girls kissing in the street and how children behave with their parents."	The renewal of permits is very uncertain. Missing children, uncertainty, still temporary, "I would prefer my children here." GAINS: Income, good friendship "Before coming here, in Morocco I worked in the fields at my uncle's and as a labourer in the harvests. I worked ten or more hours, then I worked at home, it is from sunrise to sunset, and not even in one year would I earn the money I get here in a good month (…). They had told me about it, but I still would not believe it until I saw it."	"I miss my children and friends, but I would like to come for longer, 6 months or more." "I would prefer a room of my own." GAINS: "The income!!!" "In 2010, in Morocco I earned 6€ per day." "Here, we have made very good friendships." "The first day of arrival, when signing the documents, you realise many migrants are illiterate (…). I help many of my companions with the documents and money transfers."

	PCMg-5	PCMg-6	PCMg-7	PCMg-8
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, marital status, education, Spanish knowledge, occupation	Female, 44, 1 child, widow, secondary education incomplete, basic Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 35-40, 4 children, divorced, one year of secondary education, minimal basic Spanish, rural berry picker	Male 35-40, 2 children, married, primary education incomplete, minimal basic Spanish, rural. Food handler and packaging	Female, 30-35, 3 children, married, 4 years of school, no Spanish, urban, berry picker
STAYS	5 years coming 4 months in Spain per year	6 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	8 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	6 years coming 4-month periods per year
MOBILITY AND RETURN PREFERENCES	Will definitely return when son finishes university	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years
ANNUAL INCOME/SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	3,500€/2,000€ Savings for son's university fees and maintenance No clear long-term plan	3,000/1,500€ No clear long-term plan	"I am saving to build a house." "one year I saved 3,000€."	No clear long-term plan

	PCMg-5	PCMg-6	PCMg-7	PCMg-8
DRAWBACKS, **GAINS, OTHER**	"My life in Morocco is much nicer, my friends, my family." "I wanted to go to France." GAINS: Income Supportive employer Health system	Uncertainty of renewals, unpredictability, "work is tough" "lack of privacy in the rooms (4 to a room)" "During recruitment, in Morocco we were asked if we would like to stay longer than 5 months, but we knew that we had to answer no, because of my children." "They looked at our hands to see if we had done rural work."	"You know when you start to work and when you end, and what you are going to get (…) you have your hours of rest and if you work overtime, you are paid. Most of us want to work overtime, here we do not have much else to do."	Missing children "Each year you do not know if you can come or not." "Two friends of mine were not hired this year because of the restrictions." GAINS: Income, good working conditions, "the farm is very good to us, very supportive." "I also like the free afternoons."

	PCMg-9	PCMg-10	PCMg-11	PCMg-12
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, marital status, education, Spanish knowledge, occupation	Female 25-30, no children, single, primary education, no Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 35-40, 2 children, divorced, primary education, rural, basic Spanish, food handler and packaging	Female, 45-50, 5 children, married, 3 years of school, no Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female 40-45, 4 children, divorced, no schooling, learned to read in Spain, basic Spanish, urban berry picker
STAYS	7 years coming 9 months in Spain per year	6 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	7 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	5 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year
MOBILITY AND RETURN PREFERENCES	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years
ANNUAL INCOME/SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	8,000/3,500 No clear long-term plan	No clear long-term plan, maybe a farm with family members	In the future, opening a shop	3,500/2,000 “I need most of the savings I make for the rest of the year, when I do not earn anything.” No clear long-term plan

	PCMg-9	PCMg-10	PCMg-11	PCMg-12
DRAWBACKS, GAINS, OTHER	Uncertainty, unpredictability “Not knowing Spanish is a problem sometimes, I miss XX (a mediator; the crisis has reduced the number of mediators).” “ A friend of mine is afraid of going to the doctor and taking sick-leave”	“ I remember the day I saw my first salary, I could not believe it, so much money.”	“It would be much better if we could come more months.” “On this farm I am very happy, but we know of other farms where women are not that happy, where for whatever reason the foreman reduces the number of working hours for the next day, or threatens them with not calling them the next year.”	Uncertainty, unpredictability “I leave my children on their own, the 2 oldest ones (>14) take care of the youngest ones.”

	PCMg-13	PCMg-14	PCMg-15	PCMg-16
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, marital status, education, Spanish knowledge, occupation	Male, 30-35, 1 child, married, primary education, good basic Spanish, urban, driver	Female, 30-35, 2 children, separated, primary education incomplete, good Spanish, urban, packaging supervisor	Male, 35-40, 3 children, married, primary education incomplete, no Spanish, rural, berry picker	Male, 35-30, no children, single, primary education, basic Spanish, rural, irrigation supervisor
STAYS	7 years coming 9 months per year	8 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	5 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	8 years coming 9 months in Spain per year
MOBILITY AND RETURN PREFERENCES	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years
ANNUAL INCOME/SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	8,000€/3,500€ “becoming a bus driver”	No clear long-term plan	No clear long-term plan	7,500€/2,500€ No clear long-term plan
DRWBACKS, GAINS, OTHER		“I liked the Spanish course very much, it was nice to meet in the afternoons (…). The teacher helped us with many things.”	“Here, in one day I earn more than what I get in Morocco in one week, and I am just a 4-hour drive away.”	

	PCMg-17	PCMg-18	PCMg-19	PCMg-20	PCMg-21
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, marital status, education, Spanish knowledge, occupation…	Female, 40-45, 1 child, widow, primary education incomplete, no Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 25-30, no children, single, 4 years of school, good basic Spanish, rural, food handler and packaging	Female, 35-40, 3 children, married, 5 years of school, minimal basic Spanish, rural, berry picker	Female, 35-40, 2 children, divorced, primary education, basic Spanish, urban, berry picker	Female, 35-40, no children, divorced primary education incomplete, good Spanish, rural, berry picker
STAYS	7 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	6 years coming 5 months in Spain per year	6 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	5 years coming 4-5 months in Spain per year	7 years coming to Spain 4-5 months per year
MOBILITY AND RETURN PREFERENCES	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 5 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 5 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 5-10 years	Longer stay, ideally no definitive return in the coming 10 years
ANNUAL INCOME/SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	3,500€/2,000€ No clear long-term plan	4,500€/3,000€ Owns a taxi with her brother “I want to buy another house.”	3,500€/1,500€ No clear long-term plan	“Open a clothes shop?”	No clear long-term plan
DRAWBACKS, GAINS, OTHER	“I remember when I was selected (…). First, I was told by a town crier (…). We met there, and	“XX (NGO mediator) was very helpful to me with several issues.”	“The first time I came here, after some weeks, I asked my friend “Are you sure we are in	“I was almost separated before the first time I came to Spain (…), then, the second year I	“After 7 years, I am still PCM, now it is not possible, but 5 or 6 year ago I should

	PCMg-17	PCMg-18	PCMg-19	PCMg-20	PCMg-21
	15 days later, when I was told I felt like I'd won the lottery" (town criers, word of mouth and printed posters, are the main means of announcing recruitment). "The first months I did not know how to do anything alone, we never walk alone, we did not know how to do anything with documents (…). Now, I do many things just on my own, I do things now alone, by myself, I would have never done that in Morocco."	"Here you have many more entitlements."	Spain?" "The first year we did not go at all to the village, not knowing the language, we did not want any problems and we were afraid of not finding our way back to the farm." "My husband encouraged me to come, even though he would have preferred to come by himself"	was divorced, now I had money and I could do it, but had I stayed in Morocco, we would have also got divorced."	have overstayed, and now I would have had my papers, my neighbour did and was successful."

5.2 ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES, NON-PCM MIGRANTS (16)

	NPCMg-1	NPCMg-2	NPCMg-3	NPCMg-4
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, education, Spanish, occupation	Female, 27, 2 children, divorced, secondary education, urban, fluent Spanish, berry picker and HOTRECAT,	Female 35-40, 3 children, married, 3 years of school, rural, good command of Spanish Cleaning	Female 25-30, 1 child, married, primary education incomplete, rural, basic Spanish Berry and orange picker	Female 40-45, 3 children, married, primary education, urban, minimal basic Spanish Berry picker
STAY	11 years living in Spain, irregular entry via ferry and false documents	7 years living in Spain, irregular entry, temporary permit, overstay, (…), temporary permit	7 years living in Spain. First came via PCM, then got a temporary full-year permit	8 years coming to Spain, 2007-2013 via PCM; then full year temporary permit
PERMIT STATUS MOBILITY RETURN PREFERENCES	Permanent resident, no return in sight No regular return for Moroccan holiday	Permanent resident, ideally no return in sight 2 months Moroccan holiday	Temporary, ideally no return in sight 1 month Moroccan holiday	Temporary, return in 10 years or so < 1 month Moroccan holiday
ANNUAL INCOME/ SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	9,000-10,000€/<1,000€ Low savings, but occupational upgrading expectations, maybe going to university	7,000€/2,000€ No clear long-term plan	10,000€/	8,000€/1,500€
DRAWBACKS,	" I am about to get Spanish nationality,(…) I have a	" Sometimes, I am not sure about the children, my	" Life is becoming more and more difficult, now I save less	"I'm not sure all the authorities apply the same criteria to

	NPCMg-1	NPCMg-2	NPCMg-3	NPCMg-4
GAINS, OTHER	brother who moves back and forth quite often, but I do not like Morocco that much.”	nephew is doing pretty well in secondary school in Morocco; but young Moroccan boys in the Spanish schools do not do that well”	money than when I just came 5 months (PCM), (…) you have to pay the rent, whilst before the farm lodgings were free; my husband is also a seasonal worker(…). We want to stay in Spain (…). In Morocco it is very difficult to find a good living (…) and what about the school for the children?”	renew the permits”

	NPCMg-5	NPCMg-6	NPCMg-7	NPCMg-8
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, education, Spanish, occupation	Male, 35-40, no children, cohabiting, secondary education, rural, manager on a farm	Male, 40-45, 1 child, married to Spanish woman, urban, higher education, very fluent/native Spanish, NGO qualified employee	Male, 30, 2 children, married, primary education. Agricultural labourer, rural	Male , 50-55, 4 children, married, primary education incomplete, urban, owns 3 shops in Spain, and renting 4 houses in Morocco
STAY	14 years living in Spain, irregular entry (small boat), 2005 collective regularization	20 years living in Spain, overstayed first permit	9 years living in Spain, wife and children live in Morocco; irregular entry (hidden in a truck), temporary permit, overstayed, and new temporary permit	25 years living in Spain Legal entry
PERMIT STATUS MOBILITY RETURN PREFERENCES	Permanent resident, no return in sight, 2 or 3 2-week Moroccan holidays and CM movements during the year. Owns a house in Morocco	Permanent resident, no return in sight, 1-2 month Moroccan holiday	Temporary No return in sight 2-month Moroccan holiday (summer non-working periods)	Permanent resident, will definitely return for retirement or before; < 1 month Moroccan holiday, but many back and forth movements
ANNUAL INCOME/ SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	20,000-25,000€/ 3,000€		7,000€/ <1,000€	

	NPCMg-5	NPCMg-6	NPCMg-7	NPCMg-8
DRAWBACKS, GAINS, OTHER	Highly satisfied, "I came to Spain to work in Barcelona in the building sector, then I decided to move around, and who would have guessed that I would end up in Huelva?"	Satisfied, "My situation is better than I had often expected, (…), but in recent I see so many people suffering a lot. Most Moroccans are economically better here in Spain, but there are also other things (…). For some of those who are close to having nothing to live on, they may regret having come to Spain, but most do not dare to go back…"	"I want to bring my family here, but at the moment I do not reach the annual income threshold to bring them. I would need 14,000€ a year, and how can I earn that?" "Another alternative is staying here from February to June, when there is work to do; and spend the other 6 months in Morocco, but, then, I could not get the long-term permit"	"I see more Spaniards in the big Moroccan cities now (…). In the future there will be more Spaniards there and more Moroccans here."

	NPCMg-9	NPCMg-10	NPCMg-11	NPCMg-12
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, education, Spanish, occupation	Male, 45-50, 3 children, married, secondary education, urban, fluent/native Owner "*locutorio*-shop" (1 employee)	Male, 35-40, 2 children, secondary education, urban, fluent Spanish. Foreman, supervisor	Male, 30-35, upper secondary education, married, 2 children, urban, native/fluent Spanish. Car mechanic and owner of a car repair shop (2 employees)	Female, 40-45, one child, divorced, higher education, urban fluent/native Spanish, NGO mediator
STAY	19 years living in Spain. Irregular entry, false documents	15 years living in Spain. Irregular entry (small boat)	17 years living in Spain, entry via family reunification	12 years living in Spain. Regular entry
PERMIT STATUS MOBILITY RETURN PREFERENCES	Spanish citizen. In 5 years, maybe 6-months in Spain, 6-months in Morocco, > 1 month Moroccan holiday	Permanent resident, no return in sight, 2 months Moroccan holiday	Spanish citizen, when in his fifties, maybe 2-3 months holiday in Morocco, or early retirement.	Temporary. Planed future in France or Spain, few Moroccan holidays, brother and sister in Switzerland and Germany
ANNUAL INCOME/ SAVINGS LONG-TERM PLAN	Before the crisis, he was co-owner of a small electrical installation business, and would like to go back to that	No major long-term plan, in the past thought of opening a shop, but then the crisis came 11,000-12,000€/1,500€		
DRAWBACKS, GAINS, OTHER	"If the situation here improves, and I make some money,	Unsatisfied with migratory experience,	"I do not see the possibility of opening a similar business in	"If I go back to Morocco now, it would be difficult to have a

	NPCMg-9	NPCMg-10	NPCMg-11	NPCMg-12
	maybe I could think of opening something in Morocco (…). I know former friends, from the building sector, who are doing well there (…) yes, yes, they move back and forth, one has Spanish nationality, another a long-term permit (…); I have heard of someone else who has bought two taxis there."	"If the situation in Morocco improves, I am not sure the whole thing is worth it (...), all this (...) for what? I was also young, what did I know?" "A former schoolmate, who has stayed in Morocco, is doing much better than me." "(…) though, I have a boy with serious health problems, and even if I am not that happy with how things have gone within the Spanish system, in Morocco I would have to pay those costs myself and I could not afford it."	Morocco (…) too risky(…). Maybe with a partner, but I am so busy here."	situation equivalent to the one I enjoyed before." "It is not as if I am in such a better situation here, but (…)"

	NPCMg-13	NPCMg-14	NPCMg-15	NPCMg-16
ATTRIBUTES: gender, age, children, education, Spanish, occupation	Male, 24, single, no children, secondary education incomplete, second generation, native Spanish. Manager of medium-size family grocery store (5 employees)	Male, 25-30, married, 1 child, secondary education incomplete, urban, fluent/native Spanish, Grocery shop-assistant	Male 45-50, 3 children, married, primary education incomplete, rural, good Spanish, until 2011 temporary worker in building sector and agriculture, now unemployed	Female, 35-40, 2 children, married, secondary education incomplete, fluent in Spanish, rural Initially berry picker, then moved to HOTRECAT, and now kitchen manager in a big restaurant
STAY	Born in Spain, Spanish citizenship	8 years living in Spain. Irregular entry through Italy (via illegal vessel)	>20 years living in Spain Irregular entry	8 years living in Spain. Entry via PCM, irregularly overstayed, then regularised
PERMIT STATUS MOBILITY RETURN PREFERENCES	"My oldest brother is in Morocco now helping my father in a small business, but just a temporary thing (…). None of us is considering a permanent movement to Morocco, except maybe my oldest brother." "My sister has finished university (chemistry), she is thinking of going to Egypt (…)	Temporary, no intention to move to Morocco, maybe somewhere else in Europe	Permanent 2-3 month stays in Morocco. No possible future in Morocco, maybe in retirement "Sometimes I think of going back to Morocco to try my luck, but I do not want to lose my residence permit, if you stay there more than one year, what happens? (…) Then, the	In the near future, while remaining in Spain, she wants to open a restaurant in her Moroccan town

	NPCMg-13	NPCMg-14	NPCMg-15	NPCMg-16
	but us boys did not like to study."		children are in school (…). At my age, with no savings, it is dangerous to take risks."	
ANNUAL INCOME/ SAVINGS, LONG-TERM PLAN	In the future he would like to open a car dealership or household appliances shop	He would like to open his own shop, if that is not possible in Spain, maybe go to France or the Netherlands		

5.3 ANNEX 3: HUELVA

Programmed circular migration in Huelva: Aeneas-Cartaya, M@res I, M@res II

Aeneas-Cartaya, and its M@res I and M@res II heirs, constitute an exceptional case in Spain as to going beyond formal regulation to institutionally coordinate and support the different phases of programmed circular migration: recruitment, the compliance of workers entitlements, and helping foreign workers, with a variety of measures ranging from accommodation through to legal advice and to language and "what-to-do-with-their-savings" training – oriented towards local development. The involvement and support of all the main social actors, from employers' associations to several NGOs, have also facilitated the development of transparent protocols and, at least in terms of Spanish context, a receptive institutional structure.

The local Government of Cartaya (a city of 20,000 inhabitants in Huelva, South-Wast Spain, in the biggest Spanish berry-producing area) – with the collaboration of ANAPEC, the NGO Andalucía Acoge and the trade-union CC.OO. – successfully applied for financial aid from the EU *Aeneas Program.* This aid was granted in order to provide "financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum," and to develop the project "Comprehensive and Ethical Management of Circular Migration between Morocco and Huelva" *Programa de gestión integral de la inmigración temporal entre las provincias de Benslimane (Marruecos) y Huelva (España)*; the project was known as AENEAS-Cartaya and it aimed to provide a framework for the integrated management of seasonal immigration. The project was implemented between 2005 and 2008, with a budget of 1,495,000€ (1,196,000 € from AENEAS), and though it was initially expected to contribute to managing the flow of around 2,000 Moroccan workers, in the end it helped to manage the work and residence permits of more than 20,000 Moroccan migrants (González Enriquez 2013; Gordo 2010, 2013, 2014).

At the same time, in 2005, ANAPEC received important EU funding via the MEDA funds which allowed it to increase its institutional capacities and significantly increased its involvement in the selection procedures.

The main aim of these efforts was to develop the institutional structure to favour collective hiring of seasonal workers from Morocco. This included supporting the management capacities and coordination of the main actors involved (employers, ANAPEC, trade-unions and different levels of administration), as well as assisting with implementation, through the different steps and processes that go from the main policy, through to intermediate procedures and on to the specific protocols in each phase:[10]

[10] The following information is from SHs' interviews and Gordo's extensive research on the topic (2010, 2013 and 2014).

- To improve the match between labour force demand and supply and to diminish the transaction costs for all the parts involved (searching, screening, hiring, and training). To assess how well demand and supply is matched: number and profiles of employees. An agreement was reached in 2006 with ANAPEC to formalise ANAPEC's action areas and detail its involvement in the selection procedures in Morocco. The project also included the training of the Moroccan staff conducting the process.

- To synchronize the transport from origin to workplace and to facilitate the bureaucratic controls through better coordination between Spanish consulates, port authorities and border police.

- To increase transparency and formality in employment contracts and working conditions, and guarantee compliance with the regulations and collective agreements. Including the acceptance of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

- To facilitate the arrival and of the Moroccan workers and their coexistence with the host community.

- To support areas like accommodation and training, especially language courses and relevant every-day knowledge on issues such as basic rights (visas, contracts, pensions, health) and financial literacy. Moreover, the project AENEAS-Cartaya planned for two information centres to help workers, one in Benslimane (Morocco) and the other in Cartaya (Spain).

- To favour return. For example, together with help in favouring transport back home, a successful initiative has been to simplify the bureaucratic procedures to confirm return by offering the possibility of getting official recognition at the port of entry to Morocco instead of having to go the Spanish consulate. The incentive for return was stronger when the Spanish economy started to contract, since finding a job in other sectors was becoming very difficult, while by returning to Morocco after the berry campaign the migrants got the guarantee that their contracts would be renewed in subsequent years. In the end, though, CM contracts were among the first to be reduced when the crisis set in.

The leading organisation of the program was the Foundation for Foreign Workers in Huelva (FUTEH, *Fundación para trabajadores extranjeros en Huelva),* a non-profit organization established in 2008 to support the different procedures, to favour the exchange of best-practices linked to CSR, and to promote its extension to other economic and territorial areas. FUTEH maintained various working commissions with participation of the main actors involved (local governments of the main municipalities in the berry sector, employers' associations, trade-unions, immigrants' associations, and ANAPEC (for a detailed description see Gordo 2014:242-243). The running of the project also brought with it other important organisational initiatives: the opening of an employment and training agency/office in Casablanca, the design of a portal-web with information on job offers and potential candidates.

AENEAS-Cartaya was succeeded by *M@res: Sistema para la movilidad de flujos migratorios laborales en la provincia de Huelva,* for the 2009-2011 period, which tried to adapt the logics of the project to the crisis situation in Spain, and the final reduction of CM to a complementary role. This time, through the POCTEFEX scheme, it managed a budget of 1,044,833.33 € (Gordo 2014: 244). The aims of the project stressed cross-border institutional cooperation, promoting CM to other areas and further developing the organizational and human resources of the previous project. Here, there were significant improvements in the following areas: IT (information technology) used to deal with visa and return issues (also biometric data), the training of staff in both origin and host countries, several seminars on the main issues with the key actors, facilitating and integrating cross-border bureaucratic procedures at both points of departure and return, and training and information modules and materials were delivered to migrant workers (introduction to language, culture and everyday life and specific knowledge linked to their work and companies).

M@res, in turn, was followed by *M@res II-transferencia del sistema para la movilidad de flujos migratorios laborales Marruecos-Andalucía,* with funding from the second POCTEFEX scheme (75% of its 1.5 million € budget), for the period running from 1 January 2012 to 31 December2013, then extended until 30 June 2014.

Aeneas Cartaya and its successive renewals, M@res I and II, have extended the program since its beginnings and the end of 2005 until June 2014, and produced considerable levels of satisfaction among both employers and migrant seasonal workers. For employers, it meant the guarantee of a reliable and efficient labour force; for migrant workers, it meant, in comparison with other seasonal jobs, a steady and formal source of income.

The projects also received several positive evaluations, both internal and external (including its consideration as “best practice” by the European Commission). However, funding problems, linked to budget constraints and cuts in public subsidies, meant that in the 2013-2014 campaign, The Foundation for Foreign Workers in Huelva (FUTEH), which was created to implement the programs, could not keep going in its traditional role. Most actors and social partners recognised that FUTEH was the key player in managing Huelva CM during the 2008-2012 years, and that FUTEH, or something like it, would be pivotal for any possibilities of CM development once, and if, the economy recovers. There were also some criticisms of FUTEH’s management and technical capacity. Crucially, the lack of funding is testing its continuity, and the organization has gone from employing 20 full-time workers to functioning on a voluntary basis. In June 2014, the continuation of its activities was subject to still unresolved assessments, and the program was risking zero funding. This situation reveals a major concern when considering the institutional infrastructure to favour fair circular migration, namely: had Spain’s high unemployment not limited the permits for CM, could the local activities benefiting from CM have the capacity to fund and manage CM with progressively less dependency from state and European money? If the economy recovers, this would be an important test to assess the whole process.

5.4 ANNEX 4: El País 24-11-2014 an example of best practice?

The sociologist Luis Ángel Alfonso has spent the last three years with a herd of 300 goats in the mountains of the Swiss canton of Graübunden. He finished his degree at the University of Salamanca and abandoned his home town of Caceres to seek out a living. A relative told him that being a shepherd in Switzerland was a well-paid option and, in the absence of other opportunities, it wasn't hard to take the decision to follow this up. "It gives me enough to live very well, and I earn more than anyone working in Spain with my qualifications," he explained by telephone. He combined five months every year in the mountains with his herd, with hours of 05.00 until 22.00, seven days a week, with periods of unemployment in Spain. He earned a gross monthly salary of 4,200 Swiss Francs (almost 3,500 Euros). After studying a one-month intensive course, he has moved up to cheesemaker, a position which pays a salary of 5,000 Swiss Francs (4,158 Euros) and which allows him to work ten months continuously per year. Alfonso does not see himself doing this job all his life, but he has not given himself a deadline to return to Spain. He states that he has completely distanced himself from his academic field and that he might even be considered the luckiest of his university classmates, noting "The classmates I'm in touch with are either still studying or neither work nor study."

5.5 ANNEX 5: MAIN OUTPUTS

FIELDWORK

- Migrant interviews:
- Programmed Circular Migration: 21; 4 of them of more than 3 hours, the others of 1-2 hours.
- Non-programmed Circular Migration: 12; 2 of more than 3 hours, 10 interviews of 1-2 hours.
- Besides the formal interviews, we met and carried out conversations, of a duration ranging from 10 to 30 minutes, with numerous Moroccan migrants from different areas of life, ages and socio-economic backgrounds. Our main interest was their views on cross-border mobility and indefinite returns for them and their compatriots.
- Stakeholders interviews: 22; 3 of more than 2 hours, the others of around 1 hour.

DOCUMENTATION: literature review, main regulations, statistical data, main programs, press reports.

WORKING REPORTS FOR THE NATIONAL AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS REPORTS.

NATIONAL WORKSHOP and the corresponding reports.

DISSEMINATION

Contents and management of the project's webpage, IGOP's newsletter, and press release (regarding National Workshop):

http://igop.uab.cat/es/mobile-identities-2/

http://pagines.uab.cat/mobileidentities/content/projects-description

http://www.uhu.es/canaluhu/?menu=viewitemrss&item=953

http://www.diariodehuelva.es/index.php/area-metropolitana/huelva/item/14289-la-uhu-reúne-a-expertos-en-migración-circular-entre-españa-y-marruecos#.VTY6SreJjIU

http://www.heconomia.es/volatil.asp?o=-1673993774

All the interview details, documentation, written material and reports will be available in a dropbox link in the coming days.

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VOLUNTARY, INVOLUNTARY AND PROGRAMMED CIRCULAR MIGRATION IN SPAIN: THE CASE OF MOROCCAN WORKERS IN THE BERRY-PRODUCING REGION OF HUELVA (SPAIN).

IGOP, Zyab Ibáñez, Miriam Acebillo, Margarita León