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National Report Italy

VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN ITALY

For more than 15 years the topic of Islamic violence has spread throughout Europe and the world, albeit with different levels of interest in the countries and contexts struck, with significantly different levels of intensity and trajectories, by the phenomena. In the same way, IS, or the Islamic State, has emerged in various forms and with differing names in the last ten years. In the last two years the advancement of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has been viewed as a serious threat. Now, however, there is fear that an even worse enemy may arise from the group's defeat¹.

Beyond the multiple and diverse *readings of the becoming* of the phenomena, violent radicalization weaves together a series of other processes with links to the phenomenon's historical, current and potential roots and the various motives that lead individuals to become radicalized such as: the foreign fighters and their role upon return from the area of conflict; migratory flows; the topic of refugees; second and third generation migrants and barriers to integration; the topic of Islamic converts and their role in proselytizing and in direct action; homegrown terrorism and lone actors. It is difficult, then, to give a single definition to the phenomenon. In addition, study of the phenomenon and the risk factors associated with violent radicalization is evolving, beginning with an analysis of the profiles of the subjects involved which above all include, for now, foreign fighters.

¹ Khouri, Rami. "La minaccia dello Stato islamico non sparirà insieme al califfato" [The threat posed by the Islamic State will not disappear together with the caliphate], *Internazionale*. June 10, 2016. (How will the thousands of members of similar radical groups in vulnerable areas around the world – the reference is to The Philippines and Southeast Asia – when the stronghold of IS between Syria and Iraq is dismantled?) <https://www.internazionale.it/opinione/rami-khouri/2016/06/10/minaccia-stato-islamico>.



As underscored in the summary document of the Commission's final report on radicalization and Jihadist extremism published in January, 2017², various indicators suggest that the phenomenon of violent radicalization in Italy, to the extent that it is present, cannot be compared with either the dimension, or the intensity of the threat for most Central and North European countries. Italy has not seen *mass mobilizations towards conflict areas, massive recruitment systems, or attacks of the magnitude observed elsewhere*. If one looks at the autochthonous jihadist scene in Italy, one sees how it is characterized by strong elements of heterogeneity both in relation to demographic profiles and mobilization dynamics. The individuals who have adopted a jihadist ideology in Italy, as in other European countries, demonstrate, in fact, a range of profiles that vary greatly in terms of demographics (gender, age, place of birth, citizenship), socio-economic status (social position, education, profession, income), family situation (various levels or no problems), religious origin and the processes of radicalization and mobilization (channel and context of influence, length, affiliation)³.

The complexity of radicalization, above all the multiplicity of radicalization pathways and the diverse social and cultural backgrounds, has led to the conclusion that Islamic radicalization is a global phenomenon with pervasive communication and propaganda that has rendered it a sort of organizer, both in the West and globally, of the most diverse forms of distress and disaffection towards the West. In some cases the process of radicalization leads to the creation of elements of nobility and payback for a life lived on the margins; in other cases individuals fight against the inequality and injustice that characterize the relationship between developed and developing countries. In others still, IS, and above all, the call for terrorist action or holy war, seem to satisfy the needs for religiosity described by many sociologists in our society. One can think of what Ernesto Laclau said with regards to populism, namely that a large emptiness, which gives a sense to, at times, extremely divergent social and political events, is necessary in order to construct a Gramscian form of cultural homogeneity⁴.

A religious meaning is also significant. It is in relation to Islam that the game is played, beginning with the interpretation of a pure, absolute, not subservient, intransigent Islam that is above all directed towards those who adhere to another Islam, so-called moderate Islam, which not coincidentally constitutes the primary target of violent actions undertaken by IS. A report by the American National Counterterrorism Center underscores that in cases in which the religious affiliation of victims of terrorism could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of deaths between 2006 and 2011. The report also affirms that Muslims are seven times more at-risk than non-Muslims of being victims of terrorism (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2012⁵). More recently, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism shows that, while the terrorist attacks in 2015 were carried out in 92 countries, there was a significant geographic concentration. More than 55% of all attacks occurred in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria) as did 74% of all deaths caused by terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Siria e Pakistan - Country Reports on Terrorism 2015)⁶. It is precisely because they are the first to bear the costs that they feel the strong need to understand, prevent and intervene. Furthermore, moderate Islamic communities are the first and most authoritative voices in counternarratives against jihadism both in relation to the deconstruction of the fundamentalism interpretation of Islam, which takes into

² Summary of the final report of the Commission on the study of radicalization and violent extremism "Verso un approccio italiano alla prevenzione della radicalizzazione", January 2017.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ Cfr. Laclau E., *La ragione populista*, 2005

⁵ <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>

⁶ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information. Share Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.



consideration the esoteric complexity that the counternarration implies, and because moderate Islam offers direct testimony of the vocation, which is also historical, of interreligious dialogue, of openness to exchange and sharing with the autochthonous community, and dedication to helping the most vulnerable individuals.

There is no dearth of examples of individuals over 40 who have taken up arms amongst foreign fighters in Italy, and most of the radicalized individuals are between 16 and 30 years of age⁷. The issue of radicalization is, in fact, connected to the broader issue of distress amongst youth, questions of identity and the open question as to how to best respond to these issues. Consequently, as emphasized by Rami Khouri in the article cited above that appeared in *Internazionale* in June 2016 “*in the long run, the most profound dimension of IS could be the power of identity and political affiliation in areas separated by great distances and not, as it has been in the last two years, territorial*” and the scope of the many vulnerabilities in our societies that national systems are incapable of addressing. The profound transformations in society at the local and global level have opened scenes full of ambivalence and uncertainty. The global society produces connections as well as fragmentations, concentration and decentralization, inclusion and exclusion, wealth and poverty. The distress felt by minors and young adults is growing as seen by multiple indicators (increased suicide rates, substance dependencies, alcoholism, eating disorders, bullying, violence between minors, school/educational dropouts) driven by: economic and social fragility and instability including employment; the crisis of alliance between educational agencies; the fragility of the family and, alongside this, the fragmentation of the local community that has diminished relationships, above all those tied to mutual help and solidarity. This distress, which is not only evident amongst minors and young people with a migratory background, can take on especially complex configurations amongst second and third generation migrants for whom multiple belongings and diverse cultural, value-based and religious references come into play that need to find a composition in the process of the construction of the individual’s identity, which often goes well beyond adolescence. Violent jihadist radicalization is one of the indicators of this malaise.

Violent jihadist radicalism in Italy is not only an imported phenomena, but represents the acts, in nearly all cases, by subjects that have been radicalized in Italy (so called homegrown terrorism)⁸. The analysis of foreign fighter profiles shows that the terrorist activity or plots attributed to them were carried out by three different categories of individuals⁹, the first two being significantly larger than the third:

- Italian citizens: converts and second generation members of the Muslim diaspora;
- Sociological citizens, as defined by L. Vidino, or rather *citizens resident in Italy who grew up there (even if they came from another country) that have absorbed the local culture, values and perception of events*¹⁰; and

⁷ Alessandro Boncio (2017) *Foreign fighters italiani. Indicatori di rischio e prevenzione*. <https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Foreign-Fighters-italiani-Boncio.pdf>

⁸ Ibidem. The analysis of profiles of Italian Foreign fighters shows that 34 out of 55 individuals were Italian converts or second generation Muslims (Broncio, 2017).

⁹ NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism, *Homegrown Terrorism, causes and dimensions*, 3-4 giugno 2014 http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/workshop_reports/02-Homegrown_Terrorism_Workshop_Report.pdf.

¹⁰ L. Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy. Birth, development and radicalization dynamics, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, aprile 2014 www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/vidino-eng.pdf.



- Regular immigrants: workers or students with a permit to stay, primarily radicalized in Italy.

Anti-terrorism laws: recent developments

As of 2001, Italy has had repeated legislative interventions that have led to a revision of the anti-terrorism legislation as a consequence of increasing concern about the phenomenon.

The most recent are DI 18.2.2015 n. 7 converted in Law 17/04/2015 n. 43, which grew out of the attacks in Paris that began with the attack in the office of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, and Law n. 153 of 28.07.2016, which followed the attacks at the Bataclan.

The first law focuses on four essential areas: increase in the severity of sanctions for subversive acts, reduction in the level of tolerance for the possession of explosives, extension of preventive and punitive measures to foreign fighters, and support for military peace building initiatives. In particular, new offences were introduced: criminalization of recruits (imprisonment of 5 to 8 years, custodial sentence foreseen – art. 270 quarter 2 c.p.), sanctions for the organization of terrorism related transfers (imprisonment of 5 to 8 years, custodial sentence foreseen – art. 270 quarter 1 c.p.), the illegality of self-training (introduced in response to lone actors, foresees imprisonment of 5 to 10 years – art. 270 quinquies c.p.).

The law also foresees the loss of parental custody “when a minor is involved” for conviction for associating with a terrorist group or organization, assisting members of a terrorist group or organization, enrollment and organization of travel abroad for terrorist purposes.

The provision includes preventive measures intended to fight proselytism via the internet. In particular:

- The use of technological tools becomes an aggravating factor when used in crimes of terrorism, instigation or support of terrorism. Similar aggravating factors were introduced for the production and possession of forged documents.
- The Postal and Communications Police have to constantly maintain an updated list of internet sites used for the terrorist and terrorism associated activities in which various input from the judicial police come together. In the presence of concrete elements that lead to the conclusion that specific terrorism related crimes were completed via the internet, the state attorney issues a reasoned order requiring the internet providers involved to remove the illicit publicly available contents. Only the illicit content is removed in the case of content generated by users hosted on a platform traceable to third parties. Service providers are required to respond immediately and under no circumstance exceed a period of 48 hours after receipt of the notice. Failure to respond on the part of the provider leads to blocked access to the internet domain via a preventive seizure.

Furthermore, the National Anti-mafia Prosecutor was assigned the task of coordinating anti-terrorism efforts; the possibility of preventive interceptions was introduced for terrorism. Other measures related to clandestine immigration foresee on-the-spot arrest for human trafficking when caught in the act.

Law n. 153 of 28.07.2016, however, relates to the financing of terrorism related actions (art 270 – quinquies.1 c.p.), the removal of seized goods and money (art 270 – quinquies.2 c.p.) and terrorist acts involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (art



280 – ter c.p.). In addition to measures that apply to person freedom, changes were also made that apply to the suspect's belongings, including mandatory confiscation in all terrorism related crimes (art. 270 – septies c.p.).

To this legal framework one must add the possibility to expel foreigners for reasons related to terrorism prevention. This measure has shown itself to be more flexible and effective in comparison to penal sanctions and in many circumstances has made it possible to quickly remove extremely dangerous individuals from the country. In general, Italian law foresees various means by which to expel foreign citizens from the country, which in some cases are administrative in nature while in other cases they should be considered to be security measures or has serving as an alternative or substitution to incarceration.

The following possibilities are currently available for expulsion in order to prevent terrorism:

- a) Administrative expulsion by the Ministry of Interior (art. 13 comma 1, of d.lgs. 286/1998): The measure has to be adequately motivated in order to specify the danger posed by the expelled person in relation to "national security". It can also be applied to non-resident foreigners and can be appealed at the Regional Administrative Court of Latium; the execution of the sentence, however, is not suspended during the appeal. Expulsion implies that the individual may not re-enter Italy for a 10-year period; failure to abide by this sanction results in arrest. The execution of an administrative expulsion entails accompanying the individual to the border previously validated by the justice of the peace. The measure has often been applied to individuals identified: during investigations of Islamic extremism; due to training or combat experience; by Information Services as sympathizers of extremist Islamic organizations; or as being active on the internet in activities that attest to their radicalization and danger posed.
- b) Administrative expulsion by the Ministry of Interior of the prefect (art. 3 of Law Decree 144/2005): The measure may be used in case the foreigner has, alone or in a group, carried out acts related to the commission of a terrorism related crime, which may be international, and there are well-founded reasons to believe that his/her stay in Italy could in some way facilitate terrorism related organizations or activities.
- c) Administrative expulsion by the prefecture (art. 13 comma 3 of d.lgs. 286/1998): This expulsion is used in cases of illegal entry or irregular stay by a foreigner in Italy, that is for reasons tied to public safety, which places the third country national in one of the categories subject to preventive measures. This last option was expanded in 2011 with legislative decree 159/2011, which foresees the application of preventive measures not only for individuals engaged in illegal trafficking, but also for individuals who, in group or alone, engage in preparatory acts objectively relevant and directed to undermine the order of the State with the commission of some specific crimes (crimes against public safety – book II title VI heading I of the penal code and other offences such as armed groups and attempted terrorist acts) or terrorism related crimes, including international ones. With the changes brought about by legislative decree 7/2015, the power of the prefects to use administrative expulsion for reasons of public safety was extended to include foreigners "who engage in preparatory acts related to engagement in conflict on foreign soil in support of an organization that engages in terrorism of which art. 270 sexies". This administration receives notices – in the case of State Police via the Central Antiterrorism Service – for an initial evaluation and the successive referral of the request for expulsion to the Cabinet of the Minister, or for every other



initiative deemed appropriate to impeding the continued stay on Italian soil of the foreigner deemed to be a threat to public safety.

- d) Expulsion of EU citizens: In accordance with art. 20 of legislative decree 30/2007, EU citizens may also be subject to removal from Italy for reasons related to national security or public order. The expulsion measure for reasons of national security was adopted by decree by the Ministry of Interior and applies to cases in which the stability of public institutions is endangered such as cases of espionage or cases in which there is reason to believe that the person's stay in Italy could in some way facilitate terrorist organizations or activities.
- e) Italian law also has judicial expulsions, ordered by judicial authorities, before or after a conviction, or rather, expulsions as a security measure and expulsions as an alternative to incarceration.

Reported terrorism related crimes (2012-2015)

Crime recorded by district prosecutors in the last few years indicate an increase in charges **tied to terrorism related crimes**, which have **increased by a factor of 5 in 2014-2015** compared to the year before.

CATEGORIA	1/7/2012-30/6/2013			1/7/2013-30/6/2014			1/7/2014-30/6/2015			ANDAMENTO NELL'ULTIMO TRIENNIO	VARIAZIONI ULTIMO ANNO
	NOTI	IGNOTI	TOTALI	NOTI	IGNOTI	TOTALI	NOTI	IGNOTI	TOTALI		
Delitti contro la pubblica amministrazione, di cui:	5.987	978	6.965	5.675	1.030	6.705	4.924	891	5.815	-24%	-13%
corruzione	116	14	130	88	12	100	83	14	97	-13%	-3%
concussione	39	11	50	29	9	38	27	4	31	-26%	-18%
peculato	184	21	205	287	19	306	130	32	162	-54%	-47%
malversazione e indebita percezione contributi	247	1	248	192	2	194	299	2	301	-25%	55%
attività terroristiche	7	4	11	4	1	5	17	13	30	11%	500%
Delitti di associazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso	26	2	28	29	2	31	19	0	19	-44%	-39%
Omicidio Volontario consumato	66	45	111	138	61	199	74	37	111	-13%	-44%
Omicidio Volontario tentato	138	32	170	158	85	243	110	29	139	-29%	-43%
Delitti contro la libertà individuale, di cui:	422	94	516	378	122	500	411	83	494	10%	-1%

Sources from the Department of Judicial Affairs – Directorate General Penal Justice indicate that the continual process of monitoring terrorism-related crimes was suspended due to a restructuring of the process, which explains why data is not available after 2014. In addition, given the new legislative procedures, there has been an increase in the number of inmates due to an increase in the penal measures described above.

Available data (not reported here), and to which a brief comment follows, stem from data collected by the Department of Judicial Affairs – Directorate General Penal Justice (DAG – DGPP) and from ISTAT, the national statistical institute:



1. *Data from DAG –DGGP include crimes covered by the following articles of the penal code:*
 - 270 – Subversive association;
 - 270-bis – Association with the aim to engage in terrorism, including international terrorism, or subversion of the democratic order;
 - 270-ter – Aiding and abetting associates;
 - 280 – Terrorism or subversion related attacks;
 - 280-bis – Terrorist act with weapons or explosives;
 - 283 – Attack against the constitution of the State;
 - 284 – Armed insurgency;
 - 285 – Devastation, raid and massacre;
 - 286 – Civil war;
 - 289-bis – Kidnapping with the intent to commit terrorism or subversion;
 - 305 – Political conspiracy via association with others;
 - 306 – Armed group: training and participation.

2. *ISTAT provides data for the following articles:*
 - 270 quater – Enrollment with terrorist intent including international;
 - 270 quater 1 – Organization of terrorism related transfers;
 - 270 quinquies – Terrorism related training and activities, including international terrorism;
 - 270 sexies – Terrorism related conduct;
 - 414 coma 4 – Instigation of or support for terrorism related crime or crimes against humanity.

Offenders and geographical areas

The picture that emerges from the ISTAT data for the period from 2012 to 2014 illustrates a concentration of crime related to articles 270 (Subversive association) and 270-bis (Association with the aim to engage in terrorism, including international terrorism, or subversion of the democratic order) with a notable level of variation during this timeframe in relation to the number of individuals involved and type of crime. Furthermore, the number of juvenile cases is very low with only four offenders (1 in 2012, 2 in 2013, 1 in 2014) who committed various offenses (related to 289-bis; 285; 270-bis of the penal code). Despite the low number of cases, the areas that seem to be most affected by the phenomenon are Lombardy (data from the district of Brescia) and Emilia Romagna. The data appear coherent with the most recent events that include, in addition to the regions cited, Veneto and Liguria as affected regions.

Preventive interventions (law enforcement and intelligence)/Measures targeting Islamic extremists

The most recent data available on individuals targeted by interventions due to their involvement in violent radicalization show low counts: extradition for security reasons was applied to 109 individuals including 9 imams; 85 extremists were arrested and 110 foreign fighters have been subject to monitoring (of which 32 are dead and 17 returned to Europe).

The most active sector remains that of prevention (law enforcement and intelligence), which involves monitoring and interventions with subjects at-risk. While data on the number of persons currently being monitored in Italy are not available, it is possible to refer to data for verifications of web contents between 2015 and 2016, which show that



406,338 websites were monitored with 527 at-risk of being blocked by law enforcement agencies.

Source: Ministry of Interior, January, 1° 2015 – July, 31° 2016

Prison-based interventions

Ministry of interior: January 1st 2015 – July 2016	
Mesure/Intervention	N°
Extradition for security reasons	109
<i>of which imams</i>	9
Arrested Islamic extremists	85
Monitored Foreign Fighters	110
<i>of which dead</i>	32
<i>of which returned in Europe</i>	17
Verified web contents	406.338
Blocked web contents by Law Enforcement Agencies	527

Italy has adopted a structured policy for the prevention of radicalization amongst inmates in prison.

In 2015, the ISSP (Higher Institute for Penitentiary Studies) made use of the collaboration between managers and functionaries of the State Police's Scientific Police Service and functionaries of the Carabinieri Corps who addressed the topic of strategic and scenario based criminal analysis, with special attention placed on radicalization in prison for inmates belonging to the Islamic faith.

The same year, the four-year participation in RAN came to a conclusion with the organization of multiple events addressing the topic from the perspective of training for penitentiary and probation personnel and the launch of the new Centre of Excellence destined to run until 2020. On the same topic, ISSP also organized a training for European police entitled "Radicalization: Threats and Trends" in cooperation with CEPOL (33 course participants representing 26 European countries)¹¹.

From 2007 on, the Department of Prison Administration (DAP) adopted preventive control measures via the monitoring and analysis of radicalization and proselytism.

The ministerial decree of June 14, 2007 instituted, within DAP's Office for Inspection and Control Activities, a central service of judicial police called the Central Investigation Unit (Nucleo Investigativo Centrale - NIC) intended to carry out activities related to organized crime and terrorism, guaranteeing the coordination and support of investigations conducted at a peripheral level for purposes including the maintenance of order and security in prisons. In February 2015 the NIC was formally assigned the task of monitoring and analyzing proselytism and radicalization in prison. It is the NIC then to which penitentiary administrations primarily need to refer to in case there is suspicion about the prison radicalized inmates or inmates in the process of radicalization within the prison.

The DAP shares the information acquired with the National Antimafia and Antiterrorism Prosecutor and participates, as of 2008 and via the Office for Inspection and Control Activities, in the Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee, which is a permanent

¹¹ See: <http://www.camera.it/dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/211/003/00000034.pdf>



working group instituted at the Ministry of Interior that includes judicial police and intelligence services.

DAP's 2009 circular made an important distinction in the high security circuit distinguishing three sub-circuits capable of separating the most dangerous inmates in accordance with homogenous categories. Individuals completing a sentence for a terrorism related crime are restricted to sub-circuit AS2; the data from December 2015 show that 32 inmates were held in AS2, which is present in the penitentiary facilities in Macomer, Benevento, Rossano, and Asti.

Analysis of the phenomenon demonstrates that individuals at-risk of proselytism/radicalization in Italian prisons lack affective connections and prospects for the future and are driven by the need for group belonging especially if they view detention as the failure of their expectations meaning that they perceive the need to feel to important. Young inmates appear to be most vulnerable. The perception of discriminatory acts and the negation of rights by public institutions, perhaps due to a lack of response to requests without adequate justification, also appears to be very dangerous. In the end, prison overcrowding can represent an incubator, to the extent that it is an indicator of a system that is not an example of legality, that does not apply the rules, that does not recognize inmate's rights, and that confines them to inadequate conditions in prison.

Observation of the inmates makes it possible to identify one or more of the radicalization indicators specified by DAP, which fall in five categories:

- 1) Religious practice, or: means of praying (increases or decreases in comparison to the onset, tendency to isolate during prayer); the role assumed in the prayer group (guide/imam or participant); acceptance or refusal of the accredited imam; behavior directed towards other inmates (is prayer imposed? Does the inmate behave in a discriminatory manner or have conflicts with moderate Muslims or those who do not adhere to the precepts of Islam?)
- 2) Daily routines, or: appearance and eventual changes; refusal to participate in daily activities; tendency to isolate; refusal to shower, eat, use prison issue sheets, share a cell or common spaces with non-Muslim inmates; requests for special visits (spiritual guides as opposed to family members), change in interests and media consumption;
- 3) Cell organization, or: the presence of carpets for prayer, posters, journal articles, photos, writings on the wall; refusal to have a TV; request to share a cell with inmates who pray a lot;
- 4) Behavior in relation to other people, or: means of interacting with people belonging to another religion (tolerance, acceptance, refusal); attitude of superiority; means of interacting with treatment staff (openness, or lack thereof, to dialogue), penitentiary police and with authorities, with women (refusal to shake their hand); nomination, or not, of a defense attorney (figure that Western culture considers appropriate); acceptance or refusal of contact with family members via visual visits, telephone contact and written correspondence; refusal of body and room searches; eventual assumption of the role of spokesperson for other inmates or mediator during protests by Muslim inmates;
- 5) Means of commenting on political event and attitude in relation to Western values.

The behaviors which require further attention are referred to DAP management (Office of Inspection and Control Activities, NIC, Directorate General Inmates and Treatment) and to the regional superintendent's office (provveditorato regionale). Data are



then inserted in the SIAP/AFIS database in the situation room of the Office of Inspection and Control Activities under the category “risks of proselytism and radicalization”.

The (Office of Inspection and Control Activities places the inmate under one of the following levels of observation based on the information received:

- High risk: inmates imprisoned for a crime related to international terrorism for whom a behavioral report is prepared every month;
- Medium risk: inmates who display behavior that point to a closeness to jihadist ideology for whom a behavioral report is prepared every two months;
- Low risk: inmates in need of further observation since the institution has generic information for whom a behavioral report is only prepared when something of interest takes place.

Finally, L. 10/2014 made the immediate identification of foreigners upon entry in prison mandatory and increased the use of the alternative measure of expulsion. Laws allow for the adoption of specific measures upon release from prison and immediate communication to the State Police’s Central Directorate of the Prevention Police in case of early release from prison.

The responsible office must inform law enforcement services at least three days prior to the release of inmates categorized as medium risk in order to initiate preventive measures such as accompanying the individual to the Centers for Identification and Expulsion¹².

Prison population characteristics

As shown in the table below, the Muslim population in Italian prisons is significant. In 2017, out of 55.381 inmates, 18.885 were foreigner and 14.680 of them were originally from Muslim countries (the population is growing rapidly if compared to 2015 when there were 10.485 inmates from Muslim countries). In Italy, about 80% (78%) of foreign inmates identify with Islam (which accounts for 3 out of inmates in comparison to Italians), and have a high rate of self-harm.

	N.	%
TOTAL PRISON POPULATION	55.381	
<i>of which foreigners</i>	18825	34%
<i>of which Muslim</i>	14680	
<i>of which professing</i>	7500	
<i>of which Imams</i>	157	

Source: Commission on radicalization and jihadist extremism. Italian Ministry of Justice, January 2017

In Italy, the focus is on ensuring the achievement of the full right to freedom of religion for Muslim inmates while exercising due control of the risk of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist proselytism, a risk that the penitentiary administration holds to be quite high, especially in prisons.¹³ In order to ensure the right to freedom of religion

¹² M.C. Covelli, “Come combattere il reclutamento dei terroristi nelle nostre carceri”, LIMES, n.7 – 2016.

¹³ In the aftermath of the achievements of the Ministry of Justice on these topics, one of the key points is about the difficulties to be faced as a consequences of the increasing number of migrants of Islamic faith with regards to the exercise of their religious freedom. This topic poses a problem concerning the usage of the legal concept



in safety and to foster cultural integration, DAP launched a collaboration among external Islamic communities to facilitate access for religious ministers and cultural mediators.

The UCOII (Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy) agreement was signed on the 5th of November, 2015. The protocol grants access to correctional facilities for carefully selected religious ministers. The trial will last 6 months in 8 prisons, chosen according to the percentage of Muslims in the population and the existence of a prayer room. Consequently, the project will be extended to other facilities that will have to identify suitable subjects. Volunteers supported by a positive judgment from the directors will be specifically trained in universities or by a licensed partner.

Radicalization in prison

Data in the chart below data show that, in 2017, there were 393 monitored individuals in prison monitoring for radicalization, out of whom 175 were at high risk of proselytism and radicalization as a consequence of imprisonment; 46 were in a high-security regime (AS2) because of terrorism-related crimes, including international, or the use of violence to subvert the democratic order (crimes covered by art. 270, 270-bis, 270-ter, 270-quater, 270-quinquies, 280, 280-bis, 289-bis, 306 of the Criminal code) and 18 converted Italians.

The numbers are low for minor inmates at risk of radicalization with only 12 individuals registered as such in Italy.

	N°
Monitored individuals in detention	393
<i>of which at relevant risk of violent radicalization or proselytism in detention</i>	175
<i>of which in high security regimes</i>	46
<i>of which converted Italians</i>	18
<i>Monitored detained minors at risk of radicalization</i>	12

Source: Commission on radicalization and jihadist extremism. Ministry of Justice, January 2017

More up-to-date data about monitoring of radicalized individuals or those vulnerable to radicalization in prison are not currently available because the Ministry of Justice is revising data collection and organization as a consequence of the recent integration of crimes defined by the new 2015 law on radicalization (e.g., incitement to terrorism). The new monitoring will detect a higher number.

As can be inferred by the previous statements, Italy does not have a program aimed at de-radicalization/rehabilitation of radicalized inmates (whether or not they are detained for terrorism-related crimes). Although the indicators adopted to assess the degree of risk

of “ministry of cult” and “religious beliefs” that, having being borrowed from the Christian model, are not suitable to the non-hierarchical, fragmented and local structure of Islamic communities. As a consequence of the difficulties encountered when attempting to include Imams in the “ministry of cult” category in Italy, there is still not a “list” of “Islamic ministry of cult” that has received official ministerial authorization. This problem produced material effects on the implementation of the right to religious assistance for inmates of Islamic faith. This is also connected to that fact that the preliminary controls for the ministerial security clearance that imams have to undergo became more and more meticulous because of the risks of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist proselytism that the penitentiary administration deems to be very high, especially in detention structures.



of Islamic radicalization of inmates are notably, but not exclusively, connected to cultural and religious aspects, attention needs to be brought to the lack of risk assessment strategies that involve cultural mediators and experts of Islam.

Intervention systems in the field of probation

Intervention systems in probation are not affected by Islamic radicalization; this is the outcome of two factors mentioned earlier: the increasingly limited access to probation measures, such as alternative measures to detention, for individuals convicted of terrorism-related crimes (access to “mitigated” detention measures such as house arrest); and the enforcement, in case of foreign inmates, of preventive strategies such as expulsion. There is a dis-connection in Italy amongst the different actors that intervene on the phenomenon (in prison and probation), which reflects the dis-connection of services (penitentiary, USSM and UEPE) that theoretically should be consistent in their interventions with individuals.

This situation also stems from the lack of tools aimed at risk assessments of radicalization in probation, an environment where monitoring of subjects is definitely more complex and calls for the implementation of multi-agency and multi-actor strategies. A low predisposition to consider de-radicalization interventions as an activity requiring a specific training, targeted approaches, specific alliances/intervention networks, and specific tools with regards to social reintegration interventions in probation with other targets is also evident.

Foreign Fighters in Europe

Besides the population accounted for by justice system services, many countries view the phenomenon of foreign fighters with worry. A recent study about “Foreign fighters and threat of returnees” (Barret, 2017) on the situation in Europe, highlights that while returning foreign fighters have not as yet added significantly to the threat of terrorism around the world, the number of attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State continues to rise. All returnees, whatever their reason for going home, will continue to pose some degree of risk. There are now at least 5,600 citizens or residents from 33 countries who have returned home. Added to the unknown numbers from other countries, this represents a huge challenge for security and law enforcement agencies.

The table below shows the approximate number of foreign fighters in Europe as it is developing in the aftermath of the beginning of the war in Syria and Iraq. The table provides country by country data about foreign fighters who have gone to Syria or Iraq; been stopped in, deported from, denied entry to, or watch-listed by Turkey; remain fighting; and returned.



State of Origin	# FF	Sentback/Stopped in Turkey	Remained	Returned
Austria	296	31/204	~ 150	90
Belgium	~ 528	85/1,519	~ 275	> 123
Denmark	> 145	23/196	~ 35	67
Finland	> 80		~ 43	~ 43
France	1,910	254/2,622	~ 700	302
Germany	> 915	133/657	~ 450	~ 300
Italy	110		57	13
The Netherlands	280	22/520	< 190	50
Norway	90		40	> 30
Spain	204	21/325	129	30
Sweden	~ 300	55/300	112	106
Switzerland	~ 70			14
UK	~ 850	106/1,172	~ 400	~ 425
Overall	5778	730/7515	2581	1293

Foreign Fighters in Italy

Numbers in Italy, as can be inferred by data shown below, are ostensibly lower than in most European countries. As a matter of fact, in comparison to the 110 foreign fighters registered in Italy, there are about 1500 registered in France and 1000 in Germany; even countries with a smaller population in comparison to Italy, such as Belgium and Austria, report a higher mobilization of such subjects (500 and 300 respectively).

	N°
Foreign fighters who have left Italy	110
<i>of which women</i>	10
<i>of which Italian citizens</i>	8
<i>of which women under 18</i>	5
<i>of which returned to Italy</i>	17
<i>of which currently monitored</i>	6

Source: Commission on radicalization and jihadist extremism. Ministry of Justice, January 2017

The challenge posed by foreign fighters therefore increasingly implicates the community and calls for a shift from a security approach to a safety approach. This is even more relevant when referring to foreign fighter returnees and the challenge they



pose to the various countries. It is not by chance that the European Commission is pushing to define intervention strategies for probation for radicalized youth that involve all the actors of the community (from families to migrants' associations, to mosques, to all communities context individuals feel to belong) in addition to third sector services and organizations.

Current overview and new perspectives

As underlined in the summary document of the Commission's final report on radicalization and Jihadist extremism (initiated in September 2016 and finished by the end of the same year), *"various indicators suggest that the phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in our country, present only to a certain extent, is not comparable to either the dimension, or the intensity of the threat for most Central and North European countries. Because of several reasons, from the demographic situation to the Italian counter-terrorism system skills, Italy did not show any mass mobilizations towards conflict areas, massive recruitment systems, nor attacks of the magnitude observed elsewhere. Nonetheless this phenomenon on Italian territory, even though on a smaller scale and with some peculiarities, mirrors the same dynamics occurring in other European countries"*. Experts and academics (in fields such as sociology, the Islamic world, terrorism, and psychology) who contributed to the definition of an Italian approach to the prevention of radicalization within the frame of the Commission on the phenomenon of radicalization and jihadist extremism, attempted to describe the uniqueness of the Italian case and to outline possible scenarios on the evolution of such phenomenon in Italy in coming years.

As underlined by the Commission, these reasons may be related to a mix of demographic, sociological, administrative, and legal factors. Immigration to Italy has been growing exponentially since the 1980s, (in contrast to the U.K and France where Muslim migrants began arriving in large numbers during the gradual de-colonization process in Africa and in India). This is one of the reasons why Italy has a lower number of second and third generation immigrants (namely the most vulnerable to radicalization), far lower than other EU countries. Moreover, in Italy, the lack of a clear dominant ethnic group may prevent the development of the exclusionary and isolationist dynamics that brought countries like France and Belgium to the creation of ghetto-neighbourhoods populated for the most part by people of Islamic faith; these neighbourhoods are often considered to be a fertile environment for radicalization and jihadist mobilisation.

In Italy, Islamic militant organizations have taken some, but limited, actions and the legal framework provides appropriate tools to investigative authorities, which can be enhanced in order to contrast both terrorism and radicalization. The mechanism of expulsions works in this sense, namely expelling foreign subjects for reasons of public order or state security. This is the direction towards which the new legislation is heading (despite criticism that emerged on possible abuse of civil rights) and in several occasions it showed to be effective in preventing the broadening of the extremist scene in Italy.

According to what has been mentioned until now, it appears that the country is going through several significant changes. As mentioned, up to this moment Italy presents a situation which differs from other European States because of a delay in immigration as well as in the implementation of local policies.

However, there is a need to take into account the possibility of conspicuous changes in the next 5 - 10 years. The prospect of the destabilization of the existing balances is emerging because of the current socio-political changes, internal tensions stemming from the social alert caused by the mass influx of asylum seekers caused by global geo-political changes and the appearance of new charismatic Islamic leaders.



Recent developments in integration policies, show how the implementation of an increasingly securitarian approach and an increasingly less inclusive approach to the immigration phenomenon, in addition to the already difficult situation for granting full access to citizenship rights for second generation youth, seems to be directed towards erasing the elements marked as “protective” against a possible jihadist drift by the commission. Furthermore, in coming years, hundreds of thousands of Muslim youth born and raised in Italy will enter adolescence and post-adolescence for the first time, a critical age with regards to the risk of radicalization.

While on the one hand it may seem difficult to foresee the outcome of these dynamics, on the other hand it is important to intervene promptly with measures aimed at promoting integration and preventing the radicalization of this category of youth.

MATES ASSESMENT ACTIVITIES

In the defining of a more suitable intervention strategy as the basis to draw on for training material, MATES involved juvenile justice practitioners, adults and practitioners from different organizations first in research activities and then in the pilot training in order to share responsibility for effective social reintegration interventions in the country. The task was to gather material that could properly address intervention strategies and de-radicalization programs and to examine and meet the training needs of such programs. A first step in this direction is the assessment of what exists, namely how criminal justice related services operate with regards to probation, treatment and social reintegration for minors and adults. Turin was selected as the first location for this assessment.

Turin was identified by the Juvenile Justice and Community Department as an area where it would be possible to theoretically and practically challenge notions of accountability with regards to subjects within the criminal justice system who have a past of violent radicalization, or are at risk of recruitment, in relation to the de-radicalization process during probation through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools.

The choice of Turin was founded on several reasons including:

1. Turin has extensive experience with networking and integration amongst different actors and services, especially concerning minors and Maghrebi youth;
2. On a regional level, a “reflection on legality, prevention and radicalization including different actors, of whom some Islamic community representatives”;
3. In the area, the launching of a joint project about prisons and the access of Imams, which was agreed upon by UEPE and the Italian Islamic Religion Community and other organizations;
4. In the Piedmont region, and especially in Turin, there are significant experiences with regards to the implementation of programs aimed at preventing social and scholastic discontent of for vulnerable foreigners (prevention for school dropouts, bullying)
5. In general, the territory shows a penchant for working in a network (restorative justice, crime victims, projects aiming at alternating school and professional trainings) and community work (restorative justice, community policing structuring the taking on responsibility of civil society, urban quality and social alarm as indicated by individuals and schools). Actors involved in the different intervention networks had a say in structuring multiagency interventions based on effective methodologies of working in networks and on its consolidated competencies of the different operators and experts involved.



It is also true that actors involved in these services and in the project in Turin, when questioned on the phenomenon, gave accounts of not having yet directly worked with radicalized individuals. The ongoing monitoring process of individuals at risk of violent radicalization run by the services did not provide any evidence with regards to the existence of radicalized subjects among the ones accounted for by justice services on probation. However, from the start of the project, several stories about individuals under investigations because of terrorism or terrorism-related activities jumped to the attention of the media in Piedmont and in the Turin area.

Listening to the territory

Local dialogue and exchange activities started in May 2017 and comprised a large meeting to share objectives and activity planning and first thoughts about Islamic radicalization on the local level, and the conduction of in-depth interviews for with the directors of the two services and relevant actors within the local probation/community sentencing network for USSM (Ufficio di Servizio Sociale per Minorenni) and UEPE (Uffici per l'Esecuzione Penale Esterna) services.

This large meeting took place at the UEPE headquarters on the 9th of May 2017 and aimed at illustrating the project initiatives and describing all the actions provided in the same plan. Operators from UEPE, USSM, CGM and DGEPE took part in the meeting. Representatives of the central administration include: Isabella Mastropasqua, Director of Office II: Prevention of Draft; Relations with Local Services for Treatment Activities, Fostering Restorative Justice and Mediation of the Juvenile Justice and Community Department, and the Nisida European Study Center; and Sonia Specchia, Director of Office I – Directorate General for Probation Implementation for Juvenile Justice and Community Department, in addition to the Psychoanalytic Institute of Social Research, Coordinator of the MATES project and responsible for the implementation of the activities on a national level. The meeting aimed at analysing the following:

- Network experiences with regards to social reintegration interventions for youth on probation developed by USSM and UEPE both jointly and independently;
- Potential collaboration experiences with individuals and community actors (e.g., Imams, foreign community representatives) who may be considered as resources within the scope of social reintegration interventions with young perpetrators of terrorism-related crimes.
- Methodology and tools useful to the MATES project within the field of de-radicalization interventions.

A series of interviews with various actors of the network (e.g., socio-health services, local services, third sector, volunteer organizations) was conducted later. The interviews were intended to provide a detailed reconstruction of the functioning of the network and the experiences and perspectives with regards to violent radicalization involving a heterogeneous group of actors, with different roles, cooperating to support the social reintegration of juvenile and young offenders.

Interviews with network actors

Interviews took place on the 7th and 8th of June 2017 with all the different actors of the intervention network; the intent was to create a detailed map and to verify the correct functioning of the intervention network for minors and adults on probation. Information was collected on the following topics:



- field of activity and skills of the individual actor
- active collaboration with USSM/UEPE on treatment
- Quality and intensity of the collaboration
- Distribution of roles and competence
- Potential formalised procedures
- Significant actors still not involved in effective de-radicalization actions
- Viable collaboration processes with such actors
- Difficulties and problems to be solved
- Skills the network is already using and skills to enhance

In this first phase, interviewees, listed below, refer to the USSM and UEPE intervention network:

USSM

- USSM Turin director and social assistant
- "Stella Polare" alternative assistance community director
- City of Turin Foreign Minors Office

UEPE

- UEPE director and area supervisor
- *ABELE lavoro*, support to social reintegration and work
- *USCITA SICURA*, support to social reintegration and employment
- San Luca Parish
- Turin ASL (local health authority)
- Alps Islamic association which is running two mosques
- Asti and Ivrea UEPE

OUTCOMES OF LISTENING ACTIVITIES: HOW THE INTERVENTION NETWORK WORKS.

Special value was given to the "locating and analysis procedures" with regards to the information collected on the territory in order to effectively contribute to the creation of a new operational model of accountability of subjects at risk of radicalization, which would also work to improve the overall capacities of concerned actors/services.

The choices on how to address the usage – for the duration of the project and in the medium to the long term – of existing resources, given the detected complexities (in terms of practitioner training and skills enhancement within the framework of a multi-disciplinary team) in the quality of these analysis; what topic to prioritize in order to facilitate the building of synergies to empower the integrated intervention system; what operative solutions to suggest and, lastly, what kind of experimentation to start in order to create good working practices.



The interviews allowed to bring on some reflections, albeit scarce, in addition to enabling the reconstruction of a comprehensive map of existing resources, actors and skills. At the same time, it also grants the possibility to underline the main hurdles underpinning the network activities when aimed at a specific target, radicalized individuals (minors and young adults) on probation. The paragraphs that follow, building on the collected information, try to account for the characteristics of the current UEPE and USSM intervention network and provide insight into how suitable those network are for specific target groups to then formulate “new” operational perspectives that call for the involvement of actors not yet concerned about prevention, service provision and re-entry.

UEPE and USSM: shared elements and integration complexities

UEPE and USSM started a joint reflexion on the degree of connection between the two offices, topics and ways of working. Such a synergy finds its reason to exist in the progressive construction process of an integrated working system in the field of probation between UEPE and USSM launched by the D.P.C.M (decree of the president of the council of ministers) 15 June 2015 n. 84 (came into force on the 14 July 2015). It aims at a rationalization and systematization of resources, especially on an operative level, based on a comparison of the procedures in the two fields (minors and adults) as well as in relation to integrating the experiences of the two offices (especially with regards to young adults), and with the objective of giving continuity to interventions for adults transiting from the juvenile system, a passage that has been marked by a specific protocol between UEPE and USSM.

At present, a significant distance is evident between the justice system offices that manage interventions for adults on probation (UEPE) and minors (USSM), in terms of actors in the network, interventions, experience and practices. A structural element underlying the complexity of “contamination” of the working practices between the two offices seems to concern the possible existence of a relative specialization of the network actors working with minors and adults to the extent that the utilization of resources for one intervention system often does not allow space for another. This specialization is also a reflection of differential financial capacity allocated to work with both segments of users, such as projects aimed at social and professional re-entry: at present, there seems to be a more limited financial availability for adults. Therefore, not only are there significantly less resources available for interventions with adults, but in the case of foreigners, this “lower opportunity” risks permanently compromising foreign minors who exit the system after reaching the age of 18 without either a regular residence permit that would enable the foreigner to extend his/her stay in Italy, or the social capital (notably family) capable of providing adequate support for the reintegration process.

UEPE and USSM: Intervention networks

In the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century, the justice system focused on developing its work in community corrections (from alternative measures to custodial treatment) and an era of intense network building activities started. This kind of work saw the gradual engagement of different actors ready to share responsibility for social re-integration. Over time, UEPE and USSM intervention networks for community corrections underwent changes, albeit in different ways, in response to the resources available for social re-integration. In particular, the intervention network for adults thinned out along with the decrease in the availability of resources: a thinning out that led to the re-confirmation and strengthening of relations between the actors involved in a network smaller in scope compared to the original. A renewed impulse in the building of a wider



actor network came from the development of the institute of probation for adults, and the subsequent ratification of agreements and conventions with *new local resources*, which then became the *new network resources* (practical examples: agreements with institutions such as UISP, CONI in the field of socially useful works)

Nowadays both UEPE and USSM have a range of local actors organized in a fairly wide network including public operators (local social services, for example) and third sector operators, many of which are Catholic volunteer organizations, some companies: this mainly refers to actors supporting the social-labour re-entry paths of minors or adults and are therefore active within the scope of alternative measures or probation, in welcoming offenders on parole for good conduct, etc.

MATES capacity building strategy

The MATES project launched, in the Turin area, a capacity-building path on de-radicalization and social reintegration for youth on probation, which mainly involved justice system practitioners and some representatives of companies implementing community-based interventions in collaboration with justice services.

The debate and the pilot-training have been precious occasions for joint work between the UEPE, USSM and CGM on common management models about de-radicalization in prison and alternatives to incarceration, as well as an opportunity to support working methodologies where the justice system acts in a network along with other subjects to acquire the techniques to be developed in the project itself in the areas of concern.

The building of the operational model has been outlined as both listening and accompanying for the various stakeholders in the verification and reconstruction of what has been done over the years in order to improve accountability processes by the services involved and the outcome of the enforced interventions.

Given this structure, the debate on the possible operational strategy had to take into consideration some critical points and some "improvable points" essential to the intervention system about:

- a. Facilitation of information exchange among all the network actors;
- b. Implementation of an "integrated" approach capable of enhancing connections among the different agencies involved in the network. To strengthen the connection/integration it is essential that the "dependence" on the usually resorted-to professional and institutional competences has to be loosened and that in the same field, positive investments with regards to the critical points tackled during the intervention process, need to be activated. Such a new approach demands that the difficulties encountered be grouped – in a converging way – in common targets achievable by all the different involved actors, thanks to constant teamwork.
- c. Activation of a support process to the mutual interaction of involved subjects, both in terms of functions, at times not very clear to the actors themselves, and in terms of possible synergic mechanisms. This means to operate under a desirable lowering of the diffidence level among the actors, in order to enable an overcoming of what can be defined as a "common bad practice" grounded on elements of mistrust, distance or in any case, a matter of a scarce habit to cooperating, usually considered as insoluble elements.



- d. Implementation of an inclusive approach: potential expansion of the existing network by involving new practitioners to enhance the working qualities of the network.
- e. Construction of forms of mediation: highlighting the “possible contact points” namely elements shared by different professions aiming at initiating a new working proposal that would foster an active collaboration amongst the different subjects rather than working in opposition to each other.

Working methodology to build the operational model had to consider these items in order to:

- Promote mutual acknowledgment amongst actors
- Enable all actors to understand the roles and mandates of the different network members
- Define the specific competences of each actor
- Outline the setting of the shared intervention
- Highlight opportunities and complex elements of the integrated action
- Define shared practices
- Formalize agreements/collaboration protocols

TOWARDS THE INCLUSION OF NEW ACTORS?

The range of actors involved in the intervention system in the area of probation is culturally homogeneous and, despite the changes that occurred to the welfare system, the so-called penitentiary medicine and the allocation of competences among the actors of the system, with regards to a cultural background of the subjects involved, has changed little in the last 30 years.

However, as reported by justice practitioners, although the cultural code of reference for the services and therefore the intervention strategies and the corresponding intervention networks may appear to have remained within the cultural framework they belong to, it is possible to identify some dynamism beginning with initiatives taken by individual practitioners. In fact, individual operators face a more and more heterogeneous group of users that put them in front of complex cultural challenges (such as radicalized individuals); the practitioners tried, albeit within the scope of their position, to find solutions leading towards a more heterogeneous network of actors from a cultural perspective, as well as, as it will be shown later on, from a religious perspective.

It is also true that, for example, interaction with actors that may be significant for specific user profiles within the justice system, is still at the onset of the potential dialogue: significant actors are those who are able to work with cultural and religious diversity within the intervention system, to bring in new skills, knowledge, experiences and adapt the intervention to the specific characteristics of individuals and to their relation with the community of belonging. Conversely, both UEPE and USSM developed a solid relationship with local actors with a catholic background, even if not too structured, bearing in mind



the traditional role parishes used to play in the reintegration of vulnerable people, independent of the offender's religious affiliation¹⁴.

How do services perceive this cultural and religious difference? The interviewees substantiate the care put into granting the right to practice religion and, within the Turin context, even the importance religion plays in the life of an individual, especially when in detention. However, this same element is not yet part of the reflections on social re-entry. At the moment, efforts are aimed at achieving the minimum goal or the inmate's right to practice his/her religion, under due control for risk of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist proselytism, which the penitentiary administration considers to be fairly high especially inside detention institutions¹⁵. Such a reflection started on a national level with the DAP-UCOII protocol that seeks to regulate Imams' access to prisons and, until now, only concerns the Turin penitentiary system thanks to the pilot experience in the Lorusso and Cutogno penitentiary, which made it possible for Imams who have attended a UCOII preparation training and supervision to conduct the Friday prayer.

The topic of religion raises a significant theoretically reflection. As of today, there has been the impression that users' religion was considered to be a private matter that should not and could not be the object of particular focus. Maybe also for this reason, what can now be referred to as flexibility by the justice system in regards to religion has been left in the shadows, and that no practices focusing on the pivotal role of such dimension have been adequately improved. The possibility of practicing the Islamic faith was not given any particular attention. Just recently there has been a shift in such attitude towards an approach oriented towards granting space for more constant religious practice. This attention increased because of a growing focus on the users' rights, but also because of the idea that not paying attention the inmates' religious rights may have ignited resentment among the users and fostered radicalization processes. After all, even the necessity to ensure the presence of an Imam belonging to moderate Islam finds the reason of its existence within these same concerns.

The elements connected to cultural and religious background of foreign citizens in the justice system appear obscure and hard to read into, this is why there is not enough care with regards to these aspects. In such contexts there is the risk of failing to adequately consider the cultural and religious dimension of the individuals of concern in the hands of the justice system at an early stage. This may be because of a fear of not understanding or mis-understanding some signs emerging from a more in-depth analysis causing on the one hand a feeling of underestimating one's needs (for example with regards to the practice

¹⁴ Although Parishes are not predominant in the system and collaboration among them is not really structured, they are the last resort when all other strategies have failed: parishes accept to work with everyone regardless of their religious beliefs.

¹⁵ In the aftermath of the achievements of the Ministry of Justice on these topics, one of the key points is about the difficulties to be faced, as a consequences of the increasing number of migrants of Islamic faith, with regards to the actual realization of their religious freedom. This topic poses a problem concerning the usage of the legal concept of "ministry of cult" and "religious beliefs" which having being borrowed from the Christian model, are not suitable to the non-hierarchical, fragmented and local structure of Islamic communities. Therefore, as a consequence of the difficulties encountered when attempting to include Imams in the "ministry of cult" category, in Italy there is still a lack of a "list" of "Islamic ministry of cult" who received the official ministerial authorization. This problem produced material effects on the implementation of the right to religious assistance for inmates of Islamic faith. This is also connected to that fact that the preliminary controls for the ministerial security clearance which imams have to undergo, became more and more meticulous because of the risks of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist proselytism which penitentiary administration deems to be very high especially in detention structures.



of religion and respect of religious precepts), and on the other hand opportunities opening in the field of treatment, for example with active participation in social reintegration processes in the community of belonging the subject better identifies with.

However, for what concerns interventions with adults on probation, at times the judiciary, and especially ordinary judges, did not accommodate proposals from the services to provide for alternative measures in the mosques when on probation because of reasons related to the reasons behind the interventions, reasons which may hide issues of diffidence. In case of community service, the additional motivation concerns the fact that such a measure is seen as an opportunity to provide services outside of one's own community of belonging, public utility services for the broader community. In case of volunteering, instead, judges opinions have been more prone to accept this possibility because the measure is perceived as an opportunity to valorise enriching personal experiences for the individual before entering the criminal justice system.

Again, on the specific topic of radicalization, offices neither had to face or confront radicalized subjects, nor did they show a specific interest in the topic of violent radicalization, despite the fact that such cases exist (the recent case of Youssef Zaghba, 22-year old Italian-Moroccan man who was listed as one of the London attackers on the 22nd March 2017): as can be inferred from the interviews, there is a feeling of a risk of underestimating the phenomenon because of the lack of elements and skills to identify it ("we don't know what to look for and where to look"), but also the fear of not being able to clearly identify the signs and to fall in the trap of "over flagging" individuals because of suspicious behaviours and actions.

Over the years, in Turin, there were several training interventions aimed at radicalized violence and proselytism with a focus on penitentiary settings (that last was held in the Training School of Verbania Penitentiary Police in 2016), in addition to developing intervention strategies to prevent the circulation of violent ideologies in prison; these trainings enabled the participants - especially penitentiary police and psychosocial practitioners active in prisons characterised by a strong presence of inmates of Islamic culture - to acquire the basic knowledge needed to understand Islamic culture and its underpinning values and religious practice in accordance with an intercultural approach.

The training was an opportunity to strengthen relations with law enforcement authorities specialised in counter-terrorism. In Turin, an important actor in the UEPE network, in the frame of intervention on violent radicalization, is the Via Valfrè Police Unit, a resource considered to be a valuable and significant contribution in flagging subjects at risk. However, it seems that not all actors involved in the network have each equally access to this unit.

PATHS FOR REFLECTION

Although discussions with interviewees were rich of inputs, the study of the intervention network of the justice services in the Turin area may only be referred to as initiated. The collected inputs may be an asset for the outlining of a first picture of the system and its existing interrelations, by now only from a qualitative, and not quantitative, point of view. With no demand for comprehensiveness, we present below some of the paths of work and reflection that may back the definition of local multi-professional and multi-agency working strategies on violent radicalization and may assist in orienting the detailed analysis activity deriving from the charts presented.

Over the years, both in Turin and on a national level, not only numbers, but also the characteristics and the profile of the foreign population have changed. As the new flows modify the mosaics of origins, communities with a longer history of immigration organize



along cultural and religious lines, building intermediary bodies which play an important role in mediating between the individual and the local society, supporting an integration process which would otherwise be way more complex. Communities of third country citizens, with very different countries of origin, who reside in Italy are now more extended, including various communities of Islamic faith.

In Italy there are Moroccan, Tunisian, Egyptian, Bengalese, and Pakistani communities, just to mention some of them, and they all founded associations to manage a certain number of mosques/prayer halls whose number increased widely (there are now 19 in Turin alone), thus acquiring a significant social importance that did not find any potential alliance with local structures, given that, on average, among young Muslim there is a 4 times higher participation rate to religious associations (12%) than Catholics (3%)¹⁶. This brings into question the weight given to the cultural and religious background of foreign citizens and what role this should have in the definition of viable paths and integration policies in the social reintegration strategies of vulnerable subjects.

The intervention system struggles to comply to such a various context. In interventions for integration of citizens with a migrant background, even in advanced contexts as is the case of Turin, there is the perception that the initial drive has been lost so that now the justice systems, and more in general the local actors, struggle to meet the demands of foreign citizens (above all the fact that the agreements for linguistic mediation expired and were not renewed, services which were never activated, even though in Turin competences in the field of cultural mediation are very advanced and in constant evolution especially regarding specialized profiles in the field of criminal justice). Furthermore, the complex topic of the reception of refugees and migrants in Italy and the intense and increasing flux of arrivals shifted the focus of the discussion and the intervention towards an "emergency approach", leaving integration projects behind.

The relation/collaboration with immigrant citizens' associations and with mosques is still marked by a certain diffidence, pursuing garantist objectives more than progressive ones. The Islamic faith community, mosques and association managing them still play a very peripheral role with regards to the prevention and intervention system despite the fact that the percentage of non-EU citizens in the criminal system is significant (34% of inmates is not Italian, more than 75% of foreign inmates identify as a Muslim) albeit apparently having better awareness of violent radicalization in comparison to central actors, and in spite of the fact that many young adults in our country leave to go to war zones (the so-called *foreign fighters*). Local justice social services did not initiate a debate on the opportunity to encourage the engagement of mosques and associations managing them in the network in a preventive and treatment-wise perspective in the field of probation, even though their role is already crucial, even if not stated, and this is quite clear in the intervention system.

There is no doubt that any social reintegration intervention with subjects at-risk (including de-radicalization interventions) has to be founded on these same networks of primary prevention, representing the first important training ground for collaboration.

Primary prevention networks represent the outcome of the investment in terms of dialogue, trust, active citizenship and measures of "positive engagement" with communities and segments deemed as potentially being at high risk of radicalization. Primary prevention poses significant challenges to the plurality of involved actors, to the risk of stigmatization, to the protection of individual rights, to the definition of collaboration procedures, all elements that despite having been identified (in the Piedmont Region for example), have not been conceptualized yet.

¹⁶ Rapporto IDOS, 2015



The recent unification of UEPE and USSM systems provides an important occasion to give new impulse to multi-actor interventions, not only to systematize the resources becoming increasingly more scarce, especially for interventions with multi-problematic situations, but also to ignite virtuous and creative processes starting with considering a wide range of experiences and competences implemented by UEPE and USSM in joint collaboration with local actors of both networks as an asset.

Results of the pilot testing of the MATES UDs

Italy tested and evaluated all four didactic units with the number of test subjects ranging from 2 (Multi-agency Approach) to 4 (Exit Strategies). None of the test subjects have experience working with radicalized youth, whereas the majority expect to work with this population in the future. All test subjects, with the exception of one that evaluated the Multi-agency DU, were female. All participants reported having a good or excellent knowledge of English and most reported reading the units either thoroughly or by focusing on select parts. Most participants evaluated the length of the units as being “about right” (percent ranges from 50% to 100%), but very few looked at the attachments (only 1 participant for each didactic unit).

While the number of participants is small, findings are fairly consistent and based on assessments by individuals with a good knowledge of English who generally reported taking the time to read the unit with some care.

Didactic Unit Evaluations				
Participant Characteristics				
	Countering Violent Extremism (n=3)	Exit Strategies (n=4)	Ethical Issues (n=3)	Multi-agency Approach (n=2)
Experience w/radicalized youth				
No	100%	100%	100%	100%
Expected future experience				
Yes	100%	75%	75%	50%
Gender				
F	100%	100%	100%	50%
Level of English				
Excellent/Good	100%	100%	100%	100%
Read unit				
Thoroughly	100%	75%	33%	--
Select parts	--	25%	33%	50%
Skimming	--	--	33%	50%
Length				
About right	67%	50%	100%	50%
Too long	33%	50%		50%
Viewed attachments				
No	67%	75%	67%	50%



Overall ratings of the units were generally excellent good, with one outlier who evaluated the Multi-Agency Approach and Exit Strategies. All other participants rated the units as either “Excellent” or “Good”. Most participants stated that the units were somewhat useful” to them (50% to 100%) and “somewhat useful” to others (67% to 100%). Only one participant evaluated a unit as not being useful (Multi-agency approach). Participants also reported being inclined to suggest the unit to others with all participants, except one who evaluated the multi-agency approach, saying that they were very or somewhat likely to recommend the unit to others.

Didactic Unit Evaluations SUMMARY TABLE				
	Countering Violent Extremism (n=3)	Exit Strategies (n=4)	Ethical Issues (n=3)	Multi-agency Approach (n=2)
Overall opinion				
Excellent	67%	75%	33%	50%
Good	33%	--	67%	--
Average	--	--	--	--
Fair/Poor	--	25%	--	50%
Useful to you				
Extremely useful	33%	25%	--	50%
Somewhat useful	67%	75%	100%	50%
Not useful	--	--	--	--
Useful to others				
Extremely useful	33%	25%	--	50%
Somewhat useful	67%	75%	100%	--
Not useful	--	--	--	50%
Likely to recommend				
Very likely	100%	67%	50%	50%
Somewhat likely	--	33%	50%	--
Not at all likely	--	--	--	50%

Evaluations of the individual sections within each didactic unit show some differences although the low n makes conclusions difficult as single outliers greatly influenced average scores about the overall opinion for each section.

The Countering Violent Extremism unit received the highest rating in relation to overall opinion (1 being excellent, 5 being poor) with average section ratings ranging from 1.33 to 2.00 for its five sections. All participants reported learning something new and either one-third or two-thirds of the participants stated that they would incorporate the information in their work.

The Exit Strategies unit receiving an average rating that ranged from 1.75 to 2.25 for its three sections. Participants reported learning something new in all but one of the sections



(Section 3), where one participant reported not learning anything new. Seventy-five percent (3 out of 4) participants stated that they would incorporate the information in their work.

The Ethical Issues unit has an average score that ranges from 2.00 to 2.33, which is lower than others. All participants, however, reported learning something new and all but one, in one section, stated that the information would be incorporated in their work.

The Multi-agency Approach unit was evaluated by two subjects that provided diametrically opposing feedback, one rather the unit as "excellent", the other as "fair". This dichotomy in opinion is seen across all questions.

Didactic Unit Evaluations				
Section Evaluations				
	Countering Violent Extremism (n=3)	Exit Strategies (n=4)	Ethical Issues (n=3)	Multi-agency Approach (n=2)
Section 1				
Overall opinion (ave)	1.33	1.75	2.33	2.50
Learn something new Yes	100%	100%	100%	50%
Incorporate elements in work Yes	67%	75%	67%	50%
Section 2				
Overall opinion (ave)	1.33	2.00	2.00	2.00
Learn something new Yes	100%	100%	100%	50%
Incorporate elements in work Yes	33%	75%	100%	50%
Section 3				
Overall opinion (ave)	1.67	2.25	2.00	2.00
Learn something new Yes	100%	67%	100%	100%
Incorporate elements in work Yes	33%	75%	100%	50%
Section 4				
Overall opinion (ave)	2.00		2.33	
Learn something new				



Yes	100%		100%	
Incorporate elements in work	33%		100%	
Yes				
Section 5				
Overall opinion (ave)	1.67			
Learn something new				
Yes	100%			
Incorporate elements in work	67%			
Yes				