




EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS



## **European Project MATES**

### **Multi Agency Training Exit Strategies for Radicalized Youth**

**DIRECTORATE-GENERAL MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS**

**INTERNAL SECURITY FUND POLICE (2014-2020)**

**2015 CALL FOR PROPOSALS – HOME/2015/ISFP/AG/LETX/8772**

**Project partner: UTartu**

### **ESTONIAN NATIONAL REPORT**

#### **1. Background of the problem in Estonian context**

##### **1.1. A brief overview of Estonia's contribution to solving the migration crisis**

A country with a little over a million inhabitants in the northern part of Europe, Estonia, is involved in **resolving the migration crisis on a voluntary basis and in proportion to its size in**

**the European Union.<sup>1</sup> The number of applications for international Protection submitted to Estonia is small compared to other EU Member states.<sup>2</sup>**

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (SiM),<sup>3</sup> 206 persons have arrived in Estonia on the basis of the migration plan. 59 of them are displaced from Turkey and 147 people have been relocated from Greece and Italy - 174 Syrians, 24 Iraqi people and 6 Eritrean people. The activities related to the migration program have now ended, the last family arrived from Turkey on March 13, 2018. Estonian Government decided to resettle 40 people from Turkey in 2018 and 2019, which means a total of 80 people. Thus, **Estonia will receive up to 286 refugees on the basis of the two migration plans.**

For security reasons, refugees do not arrive to Estonia at one, but **in smaller numbers**, in order to manage the situation and properly integrate the arrivals. One of the underlying determinants for refusing to accept refugees is the threat to security. In the case of refugees arriving to Estonia, there is a thorough preliminary check to assure they have no links to terrorism. Families and single mothers with children, are preferred. People who have already received international protection will come to Estonia and will go to their new home, which the Ministry of Social Affairs has selected and prepared for them in cooperation with our local governments. **They do not live in the accommodation centers.** Refugees are all located to live on one municipality. The state ensures decent services for adaptation, job opportunities, and school and kindergarten places for children. Refugees are assisted as quickly as possible to work so that they do not remain burdensome for the social system. **They are taught Estonian and they have to embrace our common rules of life.<sup>4</sup>**

## **1.2. Estonia and terrorist threat**

The Estonian Security Police (KAPO) assesses the terrorist threat in Estonia to be **low**. At the same time, the rollout of radicalisation on the Internet and overall globalisation has brought the threat of terrorism much closer to Estonia in the last 10-15 years. Neither national nor international terrorist groups operate in Estonia. However, in recent years, there have been

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<sup>1</sup> Eesti osaleb koos Euroopa Liiduga pikaajalise rändekava koostamisel.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.valitsus.ee/et/pagulased>

<sup>3</sup> SiM andmed 20. juuni 2018.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.valitsus.ee/et/pagulased>.

few Islamic religious representatives in Estonia, **justifying and approving the activities of terrorist organisations.**<sup>5</sup>

Most of the Estonian Muslim community is made up of persons from the former Soviet Union (Tatars, Azeris, Chechens, etc.), who are **well integrated into Estonian society** and who we have no reason to associate with radical Islam. At the same time, the number of Islamic immigrants from the so-called risky countries is constantly increasing, (North Africa, Middle East, Asian Islamic countries) and the number of new ones, ie converters.

Organizations promoting foreign fundamentalist Islam (such as Jamaat Tabligh and Al-Waqf Al-Islami) have **a stable interest in the Estonian Muslim community.** In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood of Moslem Brotherhood has also been seeking contact with the Estonian Muslim community. Due to the influence of the foreign fundamentalist Islamic organizations and of the Internet, extremist propaganda **has witnessed the emergence of radicalization among members** of the Estonian Muslim community. Individuals have radicalized and left Estonia to join the terrorist organizations in conflict zones (e.g. Abdurrahman Sazanakov, who left to Syria in 2013). In 2015, the Security Police (KAPO) initiated its first ever criminal proceedings in connection with the financing and support of Islamist terrorism.

In past couple of years, Estonia has become a country of **transit and a place of visiting** for people travelling to conflict areas for terrorist purposes or are in other ways related to terrorist organisations. A major challenge for European security authorities is that of the **individual actors** affected by extremism and radicalised without being detected. The aim of terrorist organisations is to influencing such individuals to commit terrorist offences through propaganda, without specific instructions or direct contact.

### **1.3. National Anti-Radicalisation Programs**

The fight against terrorism has been regarded nationally important in Estonia as well as in international strategies (VTK 2015). According to the Estonian Foundations for Combating

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.kapo.ee/et/content/olukord-eestis-1.html>

Terrorism<sup>6</sup> (SiM 2013), the prevention of terrorism and radicalization, the prevention of recruitment of terrorist organizations and terrorist financing, and the enhancement of international cooperation are all a priority. The Estonian National Program for Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (SiM 2014) and the Internal Security Development Plan (SiM 2015) also relate to refugees.<sup>7</sup>

#### **1.4. Terrorism related legislation and Law Enforcement.**

The criminal law relating to terrorism is embodied in section 3 (Offenses against State authority) of Chapter 15 (State offenses) of the Penal Code (para-s. §§ 237-2373). The following offences are criminalized in Estonia: acts of terrorism (§ 237 of the Criminal Code), membership of a terrorist association, establishment, management or recruitment of such a connection (§ 2371 of the Criminal Code), organizing training for the commission of a terrorist offense, recruiting or otherwise preparing it, and a public call for such a crime (§ 2372 of the Criminal Code); financing or otherwise knowingly supporting the aforementioned offenses, as well as a terrorist association or person whose activities are directed at committing terrorist offenses, as well as making or collecting funds (§ 2373 of the Penal Code).

The current criminal law regulation is affected by the following binding international instruments: a) the United Nations Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 09.12.1999, signed on September 6, 2000, and ratified on 20 March 2002 (foresees the obligation to criminalize the financing of the commission of terrorist offenses); (b) UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)<sup>8</sup> of 28.09.2001; (c) Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of the Council of the European Union of 13 June 2002 on the fight against terrorism,<sup>9</sup> which set out the concept of terrorist offense and placed on the Member States, in addition to the criminalization of terrorist offenses, the management and participation of a terrorist group as well as robbery, extortion and forgery of documents for the commission

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<sup>6</sup> [https://www.siseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/dokumendid/tvv\\_pohialused\\_2013.pdf](https://www.siseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/dokumendid/tvv_pohialused_2013.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.siseministeerium.ee/et/stak>

<sup>8</sup> Riikidele asetati kohustus kriminaliseerida terrorikuritegude rahastamine, toetamine, ettevalmistamine ja täideviimine.

<sup>9</sup> ELT L 164, 22.06.2002, lk 3-7.

of a terrorist offense; invocation, instigation and promotion of terrorist offenses); d) the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism<sup>10</sup> adopted on 16.05.2005, signed by Estonia on 07.09.2005 and ratified by the law of 25.02.2009 (the Member States were required to criminalize a public plea or call to action for the commission of a terrorist offense, the recruitment of terrorists and the provision of training in terrorism); (e) Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA<sup>11</sup> of 28.11.2008 of the Council of the European Union amending Framework Decision 2002/475 / JHA (Member States were obliged to further criminalize public provocation to commit a terrorist offense, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorist purposes); (f) The current regulation has also been influenced by the recommendations made by MONEYVAL in previous evaluation rounds.<sup>12</sup>

### 1.5. Specialized units

There is no special place for violent extremists in Estonia, because they practically do not exist. In Viru Prison there is a youth unit, but according to employees, **violent extremism is not an occurring problem**. As of June 2018, there were 82 prisoners. The age limit for getting there is of 14 years.

### 1.6. Intervention for youth in probation

*Probation systems and intervention approaches with young persons in probation.*

Most of the programmes used probation and prisons are universal, not aimed at a particular age group. For example, the "Õige hetk" program is designed for people who have problems with coping skills. Its purpose is to help convicted offenders to acquire, develop and implement a wide range of skills related to social problems, so that they can learn to cope with problematic situations. The programme deals with the connection of the convicted offender's offences to its attitudes, thinking and emotions; develop communication and conflict resolution skills, and empathy; the social circle and its impact on the person are also mapped; they learn to set goals; topics like the use of substances, finding housing,

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<sup>10</sup> RT II 2009, 10, 24.

<sup>11</sup> ELT L 330, 09.12.2008, lk 21-23.

<sup>12</sup> Vt: [https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Countries/Estonia\\_en.asp](https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Countries/Estonia_en.asp)

educational possibilities, work and economic coping are also discussed. The programme is implemented mostly in probation and before release from prison, as the person should be able to apply theoretical knowledge and resolution strategies on their own into practice.

**The following programs are related to youth:**

- A) "**Minu valik**" (essentially anger management), which is similar to the "*Õige hetk*" and "*Sotsiaalsete oskuste treeng*" described above. It is meant for those who can not control their anger and feelings. It is taught to keep anger in order that it can not escape people's control.
- B) In "**Sotsiaalsete oskuste treening**" you are taught to express yourself in everyday life, analyze your thoughts and control your behavior. The skills needed to communicate with other people are refined and developed: through practical exercises, role plays, discussions, and other exercises, students learn to deal with different situations without harming others.
- C) The "**EQUIP**" program aims to educate young people about responsible thinking and behavior through helping others. The target group is young people aged 14-21 with high or moderate recidivism risk who want to change their behavior. Topics that are discussed include evaluating and renaming hatred/aggression, the role of thinking and mindset with anger, monitoring the mind and body, reducing hatred, tracking and correcting thinking patterns, relaxing, self-help techniques for reducing hatred, consequences, self-assessment, distorted self-image.
- D) "**Agressiivuse asendamise treening.**" In this process, students learn to use positive social skills instead of aggressive behavior. The goal is to change the participant so that one would start taking into account other people. The program is intended for violent offenders of medium or higher recidivism who want to change themselves. The training consists of three components: social skills training, anger management training and morality training. Topics covered in the program: listening and communication skills, complaining, lessening anger, coping with accusations, reminders, negotiation, self-assessment, conflict prevention, thinking, empathy, coping with someone else's hatred, expressing feelings, controlling anger, apologizing, complimenting making.
- E) "**Vabanenute tugiteenus**" is targeted at prisoners (including those on probation and electronic monitoring). The support service consists of support and accommodation

services and is free of charge for the participant. The overall objective of the support service is to increase the participation of the prisoners in the labor market, the use of labor market and social services, and thereby reduce the recidivism of prisoners. The support will improve the social inclusion and opportunities of participants.<sup>13</sup>

F) *MDFT* (Multi-Dimensional Family Therapy) is a family-based interventions system for adolescents who use psychoactive substances, for the treatment of deviant behavior and related behavioral and emotional problems, and are typically administered within 4-6 months while at home with family. In addition there are meetings in the regional office and telephone support. For positive changes and maintenance of these changes, the program systematically deals with the young person him-/herself, his/her parents, family and significant non-native people and institutions (eg school, teachers, friends).

## 2. **Assessment activities:**

### a) Description of activities.

Firstly, we conducted a focus group interview (FG) on May 7, 2017 at the University of Tartu's teaching building in Tallinn. Experts from the Department of Criminal Policy of the Ministry of Justice (Mari-Liis Sööt, Head of the Analysis Department), Kaire Tamm (Adviser), Brit Tammiste (Adviser) and Stanislav Solodov (Project Manager) and Kristi Loide (Viru Prison Probation Service Officer) participated.

We learned that the National Audit Office of Estonia has conducted an audit in so far as Estonia is prepared to accept refugees. The Ministry of the Interior conducts trainings for officials to prevent radicalization. The police in the county are more fearful about the attitude of the people towards refugees, not the refugees themselves. In types of boarding schools for children with behavioral problems (for example, in Tapa city), officials have been exposed to the issue of hatred between Estonians and Russians, but not the issue of radicalization of refugees.

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/et/vabanenute-tugiteenus>

The question was raised, what kind of so-called hostile groups can be distinguished in Estonia based on nationality and origin? Answers: people against russians, against new immigrants, opponents of estonians, etc.

Kapo clearly has the best understanding of the hostile groups in Estonia and radicalization. Key experts in the field of violent radicalization in prisons and probation services in Estonia could be considered prison chaplains and probation officers. Imam should also be a worthwhile key person on this topic. Unfortunately, it was not possible to get in touch with him because he did not respond to any emails.

The second focus group interview was held in Viru Prison on May 17, 2017 in Jõhvi. Participated: Olga Randmaa (probation officer, VV), Ott Ojaperv (Senior Chaplain, VV), Merike Kütt (JMVO, Counselor-Headboard), Kristel Kontkar (VV), Kätlin Johannes (VV), Kristel Floren (JMVO), Anu Möldri (VV) Director, Argo Toming (VV), Aleksei Belitskin (specialist, VV), Andres Kliimant (VV), Velli Ehasalu (Advisor, JMVO), Sten Kasela (Inspector, VV), Anna Markina and Marianne Paimre (University of Tartu).

It was acknowledged that there are few instances of radicalization in prison. There is also no propaganda related to religion. In the case of young people in prisons, the rate of manifestation of radicalization is even more scarce compared to adults. Right-wing extremism is not a problem in prison. There have been isolated cases: e.g. swastika or a Hitler picture on the wall. The fact that anyone on a daily basis expresses their association with a group does not occur. There have been instances of Russian prisoners hatred against the Estonian state.

They know where to place people if there should be any riots in the prison. Prison officers considered the Council of Europe's handbook "*Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (Council of Europe, 2017)*"<sup>14</sup> as a very good training material.

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<sup>14</sup> [https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result\\_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016806f4fbd](https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016806f4fbd)



Probation services have different programs, such as the STEP program, which helps to increase the employment of young people and support them in their work or study.<sup>15</sup>

When interviewing Eero Janson, the head of the Estonian Refugee Council, we learned that trainings are being conducted in Estonia for recognizing radicalization. The teachings of SiM (the Ministry of the Interior) and SKA (Social Insurance Board v Estonian Academy of Security Studies) was considered poor and stereotypical. Refugee assistance was considered to be better. The problem with Estonian society is a general bad attitude towards refugees.

The senior chaplan Ott Ojaperve and advisor-head chaplan Merike Küti expressed in an interview (May 17th in Jõhvi) the prejudices of Estonian officials about the Muslim world. The same was emphasized in an interview by Eero Janson, the head of the Estonian Refugee Council, on May 9, 2017 in Tartu) who also highlighted the problems of training for officials at the Ministry of Interior and the Estonian Academy of Security Studies (rather stereotypes are being fixed in training). The problem is that local people in Estonia are hostile to the new immigrants rather than the refugees themselves. At the same time, a couple of cases of violence in the area of refugees have been intensely highlighted in the media, which may contribute to their perception of being dangerous and violent.

#### **b) Assessment of Probation services**

In Viru Vangla probation services there were 354 young people as of 26.06.2018.

**There are no special units for violent or radicalised young people, no radicalized youth were identified.**

**An example of multi-agency interventions is the MAPPa program.** This has been used by the probation service since 2015 in cooperation with police and other relevant partners. The model foresees that prisons will determine which prisoners will take part in MAPPa program after being released from prison. Appointment for MAPPa can also be done through

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<sup>15</sup> <http://www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/et/step>

probation supervision: if registered person meets MAPPA criteria then he will be added to MAPPA. If a person who meets the criteria and is about to be released on parole, then the prison information and research department will inform the probation department and the person will also be added to MAPPA.

The target audience of MAPPA are : a) Persons who have committed a sexual offence and whose risk evaluation for sexual offenders is low-moderate or higher; b) persons who have been convicted for domestic violence; c) persons who have 10% or higher probability to commit a new violent crime over a period of two years and persons who have been titled highly dangerous; d) persons who have 50% or higher probability to commit a new violent crime and persons who have been titled highly dangerous; e) persons who do not meet the conditions named in the list but who have reasonable doubts that intensified cooperation is necessary. In practice all highly dangerous people don't belong to MAPPA. Adding a person to MAPPA list depends on the outcome of risk assessment (violent crime probability % in period of 2 years). The higher the danger of a person, the more intensely the treatment model provides for monitoring activities and network services, which of one form is MAPPA.

#### **Profile of target group (youth in probation).**

As of January 2018 there were 1032 young people aged 14-26 on probation, according to Ministry of Justice. Their average age was 22 years. 67% was made by Estonians, 28% by Russians. 38% had level I primary education. On average they were sent to probation at the age of 21.

#### **Sensitivity/awareness of the official's about the risk of radicalization**

As stated previously, the radicalization in prisons is not considered a problem. At the same time, prison officials and probation officers were happy to raise their awareness of the recognition of violent extremism. According to officials, prison and refugee workers, when talking about radicalization, the biggest problem is right-wing extremism and also the fact that public officials have suspicious attitudes towards Muslims.

Since we do not have radicalized people, according to *multy-agency* strategies we have not had significant necessity for it. The Ministry of Interior (SiM) has developed a basis for

fight against terrorism in Estonia (2013), which also lists all institutions in Estonia, that are involved in the actions of fighting against terrorism. The Ministry of Interior is training officials to prevent radicalization. The MAPPA program described above is multi-agency.

Practically there are no prisoners on whom to apply the counternarrative approach and to whom such messages would be needed. Then there is nothing to describe about the content of the messages.

### **3. Pilot site selection and Testing phase**

- a) The research on the state of art in Estonia demonstrated the problem of radicalization in the society in general and in prison and probation services is rather non-existing. Therefore, it is perceived as rather theoretical problem. The research also revealed that what is badly needed is general literacy on the topic of Islam, radical Islam, radicalization etc. Therefore, it was decided that for Estonia the best approach would be to provide all agencies involved in criminal procedure (police, prosecution, courts, correctional services, but also lawyers) with Basic training on this issue.

The research also demonstrated that for most projects there is a problem of sustainability. The training is provided just once, as long as the project is financed and then the activities stop. To overcome this problem, it was decided that the best way to provide sustainable training would be to integrate pedagogical units produced as the result of MATES project into the Basic training of the correctional/police officers.

We kept the negotiations with Estonian Academy of Security Studies – the only Training site for all prison officers to include units into the teaching agenda. The units will be taught for the first time in Spring semester 2019. The units were also offered for testing to the law students of the School of Law, University of Tartu. After the evaluation, we are considering including these units to the Criminology agenda taught at the University of Tartu.

- b) The decision to teach the MATES units as part of the basic course for the students has benefits when it comes to the recruitment of the participants as well. The students

demonstrated interest in the topic and there was no problem to get enough participants for the testing.

c) The units were tested in Estonian language by two groups of students: two units by one group and two units by the second group. Altogether 21 persons tested the units.

d) Results of the pilot phase:

UNIT: Countering violent extremism

16 persons tested the unit.

12 persons read the unit thoroughly, while 4 selected some parts.

13 persons reported that it took less than 1 hour to complete the unit, 3 persons said it took more than 1 hour but less than two.

2 persons thought the unit was too short, for 2 persons it was too long and for 12 persons it was about right.

2 persons reported looking at the attachments and bibliography, while 14 did not do so.

	Section 1: <i>Islamic Radicalism and Its Narrative – Concept and Message</i>	Section 2: <i>Islamic Radicalism and Its Narrative – Channel and Media</i> and Section 3: <i>Radicalisation Online – The Role of the Internet</i>	Section 4: <i>Media Used to Spread Terrorist Content – Central Propaganda Organs, Radio Stations, Publishing Houses</i>	Section 5: <i>Keyman Propaganda and Inspiring Figures: Two Case Studies</i>	Section 6: <i>The Moderate Reform Movement: A Legitimate Voice</i>
Overall opinion about the Section	2,2	2,25	2,25	2	2,4
The appeal of the contents	2,25	2,625	2,4375	2,1875	2,625
Level of the contents (compared to your knowledge/expeca	2,31	2,375	2,5625	2,23	2,75

tions)					
Relevance and usefulness of the contents to your work	2,94	3,125	3,0625	2,8125	2,9375
Readability	2,19	2	2,125	1,9375	2,3125
Clarity of argumentation	1,94	2	2,0625	1,875	2
The presentation and layout	1,94	2	2,0625	2,25	2,1875
The use of images and graphics to support learning	2,0	1,94	2,125	2,4375	2,4375

Half of the persons thought they could use some elements in their further work, while half did not think so.

The overall average evaluation of this unit on 5-point scale was 1,9 or "Good".

One person found this unit to be "extremely useful", 12 persons marked it as "rather useful" and 3 persons thought it is rather "not useful".

To the question "How likely are you to recommend it to others who work with radicalized youth" 3 persons responded "very likely" while 13 persons "somewhat likely".

#### UNIT: Exit strategies

11 persons tested the unit.

7 persons read the unit thoroughly, 2 selected some parts, while 2 just skimmed through it.

9 persons reported that it took less than 1 hour to complete the unit, 1 person said it took more than 1 hour but less than two.

Nobody thought the unit was too short, for 5 persons it was too long and for 5 persons it was about right.

Nobody looked at the attachments and bibliography.

	<i>Section 1: Deradicalisation vs Disengagement Strategies</i>	Section 2: Prison and Probation Activities: Current Implementation in the EU	Section 3: Relapse Prevention, Social Reintegration and Prosocial Lifestyle
Overall opinion about the Section	2,36	1,82	2,09

The appeal of the contents	2,27	1,91	2,00
Level of the contents (compared to your knowledge/expectations)	2,64	2,27	2,27
Relevance and usefulness of the contents to your work	3,09	2,73	2,55
Readability	2,91	2,27	2,18
Clarity of argumentation	2,27	1,91	2,09
The presentation and layout	2,27	2,18	2,00
The use of images and graphics to support learning	2,18	2,18	1,91

Half of the persons thought they could use some elements in their further work, while half did not think so.

The overall average evaluation of this unit on 5-point scale was 1,82 or between "Excellent" and "Good".

One person found this unit to be "extremely useful", 9 persons marked it as "rather useful" and 1 person thought it is rather "not useful".

To the question "How likely are you to recommend it to others who work with radicalized youth" 2 persons responded "very likely" while 9 persons "somewhat likely".

#### UNIT: Multi-agency Approach

10 persons tested the unit.

3 persons read the unit thoroughly, 2 selected some parts, while 4 just skimmed through it.

7 persons reported that it took less than 1 hour to complete the unit, 2 persons said it took more than 1 hour but less than two.

Nobody thought the unit was too short, for 5 persons it was too long and for 4 persons it was about right.

2 persons looked at the attachments and bibliography, 7 did not.

	<i>Section 1: Prison and Probation</i>	Section 2: Key Elements of Multi- Agency co-operation	Section 3: Multi-Agency cooperation with radicalized individuals on probation
Overall opinion about the Section	2,2	2,4	2

The appeal of the contents	2,1	2,4	1,8
Level of the contents (compared to your knowledge/expectations)	1,9	2,0	1,6
Relevance and usefulness of the contents to your work	2,3	2,8	2,6
Readability	2,3	2,9	3,1
Clarity of argumentation	1,7	2,5	2,1
The presentation and layout	3	3,5	3,5
The use of images and graphics to support learning	2,3	2,7	2,2

Half of the persons thought they could use some elements in their further work, while half did not think so.

The overall average evaluation of this unit on 5-point scale was 2,4 or between "Good" and "average".

One person found this unit to be "extremely useful", 7 persons marked it as "rather useful" and 1 person thought it is rather "not useful".

To the question "How likely are you to recommend it to others who work with radicalized youth" 2 persons responded "very likely" while 7 persons "somewhat likely".

### UNIT: Ethics

6 persons tested the unit.

Nobody read the unit thoroughly, 3 selected some parts, while 3 just skimmed through it.

3 persons reported that it took less than 1 hour to complete the unit, 3 persons said it took more than 1 hour but less than two.

Nobody thought the unit was too short, for 2 persons it was too long and for 4 persons it was about right.

2 persons looked at the attachments and bibliography, 4 did not.

	Section 1: The Landmarks	Section 2: The Need for An Ethical Approach to Deradicalisation	Section 3: Potential Conflicts	Section 4: Harmonising Ethical Rules with Deradicalisation Activities
Overall opinion about the	2,5	2,17	2,4	2,8

Section				
The appeal of the contents	2,33	2,17	2,67	2,33
Level of the contents (compared to your knowledge/expectations)	1,83	2,50	3,0	2,83
Relevance and usefulness of the contents to your work	2,83	2,80	3,0	2,83
Readability	2,50	2,67	3,0	3,0
Clarity of argumentation	2,17	2,50	2,33	2,5
The presentation and layout	3,50	3,17	2,83	2,83
The use of images and graphics to support learning	2	2,5	3,00	3,00

Half of the persons thought they could use some elements in their further work, while half did not think so.

The overall average evaluation of this unit on 5-point scale was 2,17 or between "Good" and "average".

All 6 persons marked it as "rather useful"

To the question "How likely are you to recommend it to others who work with radicalized youth" 2 persons responded "very likely" while 4 persons "somewhat likely".

#### 4. Dissemination activities

The units were introduced to the staff of Estonian Academy of Security Studies (*Sisekaitseakadeemia*) to be used as part of teaching agenda. No special dissemination event was organised.